Proof of God & Anthropological Dualism
Proof of the Existence of God: Two Evidences
Arguments for the Demonstration of the Existence of God
Descartes used three arguments for the demonstration of the existence of God:
- The Argument of Causation Applied to the Idea of Infinity: God. Acceptance of the proposition that nothing comes from nothing. Everything has a cause and the consequence cannot be more true in the effect than in the cause.
The idea of an infinite being cannot have been caused by myself, since I am a finite being, but must have been caused by a being whose formal reality, its reality in the act, is proportional to the idea; in short, by an infinite being. It follows that an infinite being exists. - The Argument of God as the Cause of My Being. If I were the cause of the objective reality of the idea of perfection, my reality would be proportional to that idea. Then I could give myself any perfection that I want, and that is clearly not possessed. Therefore, if I have the idea of perfection, and I do not have the perfection that could be the cause, the cause of my idea of perfection is someone as perfect, at least, as the idea of perfection that I own and that has been given to me, and this being cannot be more than God.
- The Ontological Argument. It was first formulated by St. Anselm in the eleventh century. It was rejected by St. Thomas Aquinas and taken up by Descartes. The ontological argument claims to be proof of the existence of God from the same idea of God. San Anselmo uses the predicate of divine greatness. Descartes goes to this kind of ontological argument because, until now, he was only sure of the existence of self as thinking, the existence of ideas, and the kinds of ideas discovered. In its formulation, it is of the classic argument of mathematical elements, but in essence, it is the same. In the Discourse, Part 4, Descartes says that the same idea of God has implicit objective existence outside the thinker. Namely, if God is the sum of all perfection and to a high degree, He must necessarily exist because otherwise, He would not be perfect. Just as it is implicit in the idea of a triangle that its three sides are equal to two right angles.
The Anthropological Dualism: Mechanistic and Freedom. The Problem of the Substance
Dualism and Interaction Produces a Soul-Body
Descartes’ anthropological theory is dual. It has a conception of man as a composite of two substances: thought and matter as independent and irreducible substances. It is important to note two points:
- The categorical statement that the soul and body are united.
- The strong emphasis of Descartes to affirm the soul as a substance entirely different and independent of the body (wide area), and that despite this union, it can exist without it.
The problem that Descartes will face as a result of his dualistic claim is the relationship between the two substances. This is the same problem faced by Plato, who also defended anthropological dualism. For Descartes, the problem is even more acute for two reasons. First, because the separation that he states is more radical (two different substances and irreducible to each other because they have different attributes: thought and extension). Secondly, because he is fully aware of the intimate interaction between them. Plato says that the soul and body are more united than the pilot and the ship; they are mixed as if they were the same thing.
How to Explain This Close Relationship?
Descartes employs a physiological explanation: in the center, in the lower part of the brain, is the pineal gland, which would be the contact point where the interaction would take place, body and soul. This safeguards freedom.
Freedom
For Descartes, freedom can only lie in the soul because, unless extended, the substance is not subject to physical laws.
The soul has two functions: understanding and will. Understanding is the faculty of thinking and intuition, and the will has the power to affirm or deny, and Descartes identified it with freedom.
The will sometimes hastily states reality, while at other times, for prevention, it denies a clear and distinct idea. In both cases, as noted in the first precept of the method, the will lies with the error. The central issue concerning the will is freedom because the possibility of error is derived from freedom.
Freedom is basically the ability to select different options before us. Only when the understanding has clear and distinct ideas about good and evil, or true and false, can the will choose freely. Freedom consists in the subjugation of the will to knowledge, and this submission is the central idea of Cartesian ethics.
of Cartesian ethics.