The Russian Political System: Evolution and Current State

Posted on Dec 7, 2024 in History

Chapter 11: The Russian Political System

A Historical-Political Perspective

In the study of the Russian political system, we must consider two sets of singularities:

  • Those based on a traditional political culture that, strengthened by Stalinist totalitarianism, still persists.
  • Those related to the genesis of a political system largely influenced by the failure and collapse of its predecessor.

1.1 Specific Features of Russian Political Culture

Despite the demise of Soviet totalitarianism, some of its traces are still visible.

On the one hand, Soviet totalitarianism acted as a fixative of some features of the ancient concept of authority in Russia, permeating society with ideas such as:

  • Unlimited authority,
  • Autocracy,
  • Orthodoxy,
  • Faith in the ruler, and
  • The messianic vocation of the nation.

Totalitarianism acted as a fixative of some historically consolidated features of the exercise of authority in Russia. This is not surprising, given the need to combine a traditional and backward society with the demands of rapid industrialization, urbanization, migration to the city, etc.

On the other hand, totalitarianism acted as a reagent by imposing and accelerating processes of social change. It utilized social control techniques never before seen, applied to a society culturally predisposed to accept a highly concentrated power.

Finally, it acted as a stain, selectively highlighting institutions, rules, and ways of understanding social life. This helped build distorted, pseudo-Western progressive notions of the USSR that persist even today, in the twenty-first century.

1.2 The Soviet Legacy

We can consider changes in Eastern Europe as the fourth wave of democratization of the twentieth century. However, they differ from previous changes. In this sense, Beyma summarizes the new features of this fourth wave as follows:

  • Communist systems, unlike fascist systems, were accepted as reliable partners in the construction of coexistence, despite not being democratic.
  • The fall of socialism led to the crisis of an ideology with great global influence.
  • Modern socialism contained important elements of rational bureaucracy, and thanks to them, a second modernization boost occurred in some sectors of democracy.
  • The fourth wave of democratization had to undertake two tasks simultaneously:
    • The transformation of the political system, and
    • The transformation of the economic system.
  • There was no change in these processes from an organized counter-elite or alternative ideology. There were no clandestine parties or charismatic opposition leaders, only politically exalted cultural elites.
  • The 1989 rebellion was directed against political dictatorship, the inefficiency of the economic system, and the hegemonic power’s supremacy over the rest of society.
  • The socialist system left a structure of institutions usable by new democracies.
  • The new system had to bear the burden of a political culture not appropriate for the construction of new democratic institutions.
  • The Soviet political system failed because of its internal contradictions and shortcomings, and this happened in the absence of mobilization and societal opposition.

Thus, the tasks facing Russian society imply a change that goes beyond the transformation of one regime for another. It must transform a society that has maintained a substantial quota of old authority structures, only superficially converted.

Therefore, the time required for a change of this magnitude should be much greater than that required in other transition processes. Consequently, the possibility of reaching an acceptable final result is greatly reduced.

The USSR had to address all these changes. We can consider it an implosion of the semi-peaceful political and economic climate, with growing vital, national, and conservative authoritarianism.

Among the processes of change in Eastern Europe, the Russian case is the most likely to affect the political and social equilibrium of Europe. This is due to its historical significance, imperialist past, the humiliation experienced by its leaders and the Russian people, its comprehensive economic disintegration, widespread poverty, ideological vacuum, etc.

2 Elements of the Political System

2.1 The Constitutional Process

Before the dissolution of the USSR, with the rise of Yeltsin to the presidency of the Soviet Federal Socialist Republic of Russia (RSFSR), work began to provide a sovereign and independent Russian constitution that reflected a break with the past.

The process began on May 29, 1990, the day Yeltsin was elected President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of Russia. A few days later, he unilaterally declared the sovereignty of Russia in the First Congress of People’s Deputies of the RSFSR. This declaration of sovereignty would shortly lead to the establishment of an independent Russia with a new constitution.

Shortly thereafter, the First Congress of Deputies formed a Constitutional Commission composed of fifteen Members of Parliament. In principle, the Commission sought to develop a draft constitution that would serve as a break with the Soviet past and align with the aspirations of the new Russian elite in power.

The Constitutional Commission submitted its first draft in November 1990, but it was rejected by the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR for being anti-Soviet. It also coincided with the reactionary turn produced by the central authorities of the Soviet Union.

Consistent with that new turn, constitutional reform initiatives became much more moderate and related to the past, driven by the parliamentary faction of the Russian Communists.

These initiatives, along with others arising from certain universities, influenced the work of the Constitutional Commission. As a result, the text under discussion in early 1991 was milder than that of November 1990.

But at this point in the constitutional process, three events disrupted its dynamics, mainly by altering the composition of the political forces that had been forged:

  • The referendum in March 1991,
  • The failure of the coup attempt of August 1991, and
  • The demise of the USSR in December 1991.

The outcome of the referendum marked the beginning of the end of Gorbachev and the USSR itself, placing Yeltsin in an advantageous position to face the direction of the post-Soviet future.

The most important aspect of the referendum was that it supported the presidential option, announcing that Russia would have, in the near future, a separate institution with broad powers to lead the process of the Union’s decomposition.

Regarding the failed coup attempt, the clearest result in the process of constitutional reform was the elimination of the opposition to constitutional projects that departed from Soviet practice and content.

In this context, the Constitutional Commission, accepted by Yeltsin, took the opportunity to submit a new draft in October 1991 to the Russian Supreme Soviet.

In this project, there was broad consensus on rights and liberties. In contrast, there were significant differences regarding:

  • The organization of legislative and executive powers, and
  • Relations between the subjects of the Federation and the central institutions.

Because of these differences, the draft Constitution was modified several times before its publication in March 1992.

Two other projects joined this draft in the Presidential Court:

  • One designing a system with a wide separation of powers, increased safeguards for rights and freedoms, and favorable to the independence aspirations of the periphery.
  • Another from Yeltsin’s circle, more presidential, and with totally separate powers:
    • The legislature could not dismiss the President, and
    • The President could not dissolve the bicameral parliament.

In April 1992, with these projects known, the Sixth Congress of People’s Deputies of Russia decided, without much enthusiasm, that parliamentary discussions should focus on the work of the Constitutional Commission.

At this time, there was a clear discrepancy between the legislative and executive branches—between two ways of looking at policies regarding nationalism and economic and social reform.

Hence the distant attitude of Congress toward the constitutional process and, above all, toward the presidential thesis of the draft constitution.

In these circumstances, the President accused the legislature of borrowing from the Soviet past and slowing down a new constitution free of any common bond.

Indeed, with the current Constitution in hand, only the Congress of People’s Deputies had the recognized power to reform or adopt a constitution.

So the confrontation between the President and Congress was set. Yeltsin accused the legislature of wanting to establish a permanent dictatorship and a neoliberal economic regime in the service of international capital.

Therefore, when Parliament refused to grant Yeltsin special powers, he refused to accept the constitutional proposals. These proposals were largely left to the Constitutional Commission, and he devoted his efforts to reforming the old Soviet Constitution of 1978, making over 500 reforms between 1992 and 1993.

Yeltsin responded to this challenge by accusing the legislature of being a relic of the Soviet past, seeking Western support to strengthen his economic policy, and trying to govern as much as possible by decree.

But despite the conflict between the executive and legislative branches, the work of the Constitutional Commission continued, and a new project was approved by the Seventh Congress of People’s Deputies.

In addition, Congress forced Yeltsin to forgo his Prime Minister and replace him with Chernomyrdin.

In this situation, Yeltsin decided to call a referendum with a highly plebiscitary character in April 1993 to politically cancel Parliament.

Therefore, the President-Parliament conflict intensified:

  • The Eighth Congress decided that it could remove the President if he violated the Soviet-era Constitution, in addition to not renewing the special powers he enjoyed.
  • For his part, the President decided to establish a presidential regime until the referendum.

At this juncture, Yeltsin saw the right time to boost his Presidential Constitution, which eliminated the Congress of People’s Deputies and created a Lower House and an Upper House of a territorial nature.

The legislature, in an increasingly weaker internal and international position, tried to overthrow the President during the Ninth Congress of People’s Deputies in March 1993 but failed.

So in April 1993, a referendum was held with a clear outcome in favor of Yeltsin and the emerging new institutions. This served as a political endorsement to present his draft Constitution to the Constitutional Commission in May 1993.

But as relations between the legislative and executive branches were broken, the Commission rejected the project. With the parliamentary path obstructed, Yeltsin, against the current Constitution, created a special Constitutional Assembly-Conference composed of delegates chosen for a new project.

But the Constitutional Commission ignored the work of the Assembly-Conference and ended up approving a text in which the next President could see his power greatly diminished.

In this situation, between August and September 1993, Yeltsin decided to:

  • Dissolve Parliament,
  • Suspend the Constitution, and
  • Call elections for December 1993.

The legislative response was swift:

  • They called Yeltsin’s acts a coup,
  • Removed him as chairman, and
  • Named Rutskoi, who formed a government.

Thus, in September 1993, Russia experienced a situation of dual power, with two opposing views on Russian nationalism and socioeconomic and institutional reform struggling to impose their policies.

This confrontation ended in late September with the Ministry of the Interior troops attacking groups loyal to parliamentary power.

After two weeks of a state of emergency and more than 150 dead, according to official figures, Yeltsin’s position triumphed. After a transitional period of dictatorship, he called for a constitutional referendum and local and general elections by December 1993.

Finally, the final draft Constitution, prepared by the Constitutional Assembly-Conference and aligned with presidential approaches, was adopted by referendum on December 12, 1993, by 58.4% of voters.

We can recapitulate this constituent process by highlighting the following unique aspects:

  • The process began before Russia was an independent state. This resulted in overlapping efforts and guidelines that were not always compatible with the destruction of the old order and the building of a new one. In fact, it was not so, at least in terms of its authors.
  • The institutions and actors involved in the constitutional process expressed very early on very specific positions of power that eventually proved to be incompatible.

Initially, the constitutional process was driven by a “semi-parliament” chosen at the end of the Soviet era. However, once the President of Russia was introduced in June 1991, discussions on the Constitution took place simultaneously in the old Parliament and the presidential environment, under the umbrella of the undemocratic Constitutional Assembly-Conference and in a scenario of dual power.

When confrontation became impossible, the old parliament and the old law were destroyed by gunfire, and old Stalinists were detained.

  • The constitutional process was influenced by exceptional and dramatic events:
    • Two coup attempts, in January and August 1991,
    • The disappearance of the USSR in December 1991,
    • Two phases of temporary dictatorship during 1993,
    • The bombing and destruction of the old parliament in October 1993,
    • The foreshadowing of the future border war in the Caucasus,
    • The extent of poverty and inequality,
    • The ideological vacuum, etc.

* During the constitutional process, there was no negotiated break from the law, first Soviet and then Russian.

  • Finally, a minimum degree of consensus was not achieved on:
    • The dynamic component,
    • The distribution of power (in functional and territorial terms), and
    • The content and scope of economic reforms.

2.2 Principal Policies of the Union Institutions

2.2.1 Parliament: The Roots of Parliamentarism in Russia

Three paradigms are used by Russian political thinkers to describe their society:

  • The first paradigm is based on an organic conception of the world. Each social group is distinguished from others by its role, and therefore, each occupies its rightful place in society. This implies a great harmony within the entire social body.

The kind of power that corresponds to this type of society should define a monopoly of rules to be applied for the smooth functioning of society.

The existence of conflicting interests, and therefore the fragmentation of power, are interpreted in this paradigm as dangerous anomalies that threaten the existence of society.

The representative institution of this understanding of society is the old obshchina or rural community.

  • The second paradigm is the Hegelian-Marxist one. It views society not as homogeneous or harmonious but as having an inevitable antagonism between “civil society” and “economic infrastructure.” This antagonism is the basis for the march of history, which is the class struggle.

Thus, political power in class societies is always particular because it represents a part of society and can never aspire to be universal.

The disappearance of antagonists and the rationale for class becomes an indispensable condition for man to be reconciled with himself. Representation should then be transformed from particular to universal.

At this point, the image of a society in constant conflict becomes anecdotal, and one can perhaps speak of a monist society in the service of the common interest.

The representative institution of this way of understanding society is the Soviet.

The third paradigm is the pluralist one. It shares the Hegelian-Marxist vision of society as an arena of conflict but believes that conflicts are not unsolvable because their roots are not solely in class antagonisms.

The type of power that corresponds to such a society is democratic and respectful of minorities, with Parliament as the peak representative institution.

Since power and representation are essentially fragmented, parties or other organizations represent the interests of groups, thus forming a majority interest that must be respectful of the interests of minorities.

We find ourselves with democratic-liberal parliamentarism and a highly differentiated society. Social and political integration is achieved through the state, which is strong enough to mediate and make bearable the ongoing conflict between individual liberties and general freedoms.

At present, the Hegelian-Marxist paradigm is repudiated by the parties and much of Russian society. We can also say that it is not important in Russian politics.

Therefore, it is questionable whether present Russian society is interpreted according to criteria of monism or pluralism. To answer this question, we must first understand the classical distinction between Russian sobornost and Parliament.

For Khomyakov, sobornost is the religious cement that unites Russian society and makes it different from Western society. It is, therefore, an idea of religious or spiritual communion.

For Simon Frank, in contrast, sobornost has lost its religious content. He considers it the organic unity that gives meaning to and on which society rests, the foundation of societal solidarity.

Therefore, whether from a religious perspective, which considers the spiritual community, or from a sociological perspective, which considers the organic community, for both thinkers, the heart of the social is an organic whole. This is a precondition for the individual and the social to be able to undertake a collective project, mobilizing the useful forces of society.

These ideas about the organic union of dispersed individual energy and a superior civilization or chosen nation continue to feed and impregnate a hostility to a Parliament, which, by definition, can only be pluralist and rationalist.

Instead, the Sobor is the meeting place of society to express and seek the common good. Therefore, for Russians, the concept of assembly is very different from our Parliament.

Thanks to this concept, in the Assembly, different political groups of society are not represented, but the whole people, as a natural body and a prior and unquestioned reality.

Consequently, in the public forum, issues cannot be decided by the majority. Instead, the truth must be sought in the form of the common good, without respect for party discipline or program.

Therefore, the concept of political parties is contrary to the sobranie, or manifestation of social unity, because the party is the expression of the breakdown of the unit. This is why there is a strong rejection of partisan culture in Russia.

The ideology of sobornost does not help either Parliament or the parties to achieve sufficient legitimacy. Citizens seek to supply this lack of legitimacy with political objectives consistent with their traditions, such as a strong and honest ruler or the aggrandizement of nationalism.

Therefore, for the ideology of the Sobor to become imperative, a sea change in Russian political culture is needed to drive it toward more functional areas. Russia cannot speak of the existence of a political system in which Parliament has something to say while the people and their leaders continue to consider that pluralism is a threat to the unity of the political community.

a) The Russian Parliament from the Failure of Perestroika to the 1993 Constitution

In March 1990, during the third stage of perestroika and glasnost, Russian voters chose a “semi-parliamentary” institution called the Congress of People’s Deputies.

The choice was made using a two-round majoritarian system in which 1,068 seats were put into play.

The huge size of the Congress of People’s Deputies went beyond the limits of functionality and only debated major political and constitutional issues.

For everyday items, a Supreme Soviet emanated from the Congress of Deputies, consisting of two chambers of 126 members each, known as:

  • Soviet of the Republic and
  • Soviet of Nationalities.

In turn, these chambers came together in a Presidium composed of 40 representatives. It was like an executive committee comprising a president and the heads of the committees.

But the activity of the legislature was very confused due to:

  • The Soviet tradition,
  • Weak partisan formations,
  • The electoral system used,
  • The fact that Congress replaced the Supreme Soviet,
  • That the Supreme Soviet replaced the Presidium, and
  • That the President of the Presidium obscured the work of the Presidium itself.

The functions of Parliament were broad. As the conflict with the executive was not very large, Parliament, in the use of its sovereign powers, decided to work with the President, giving him ample room for political maneuver.

This line of cooperation reached the Sixth Congress of Deputies in April 1992. Until then, Congress passed measures such as:

  • Establishing a presidential court system,
  • Adopting a law on the president with very generous content, and
  • Granting special emergency powers to the President, etc.

Once this initial phase of collaboration with the President was over, and after selecting which institutions of the dying Soviet Union had to be demolished, the priority task became the creation of a different political system.

Faced with this challenge, the ideological differences between Parliament and the President’s circle ended up being insurmountable.

The change in relations between Parliament and the President began in the second half of 1992. Therefore, in December 1992, at the Seventh Congress, Yeltsin had to dispense with the head of government, Gaidar. By the end of 1992, the distance between the two institutions was such that it led to the violent destruction of Parliament by the presidential power in October 1993.

But what was settled in the crash between Parliament and the President was not whether Russia was going to have a more or less parliamentary or presidential regime. What was settled was which elite would be consolidated and what kind of economic, social, and political policies were to be promoted.

b) The Parliament in the 1993 Constitution: Parliament during the Second Republic

As a result of the previous avatars, the Parliament intended by the Constitution of 1993 is a weak institution in political terms and subject to the executive.

Under the Constitution, the Federal Assembly or Parliament is bicameral and consists of:

  • The Federation Council, the upper house or territorial representation, consisting of two representatives elected in each of the 89 local authorities (republics, provinces, regions, etc.). The system of choice was not defined until Putin’s reform in 2001, which aimed to reduce the power of the territorial authorities and stop the Senate’s bid for independence from certain local authorities.
  • The State Duma or lower house, with a direct election system to be described later.

The legislative function is vested in the Duma, although it shares it with the Federation Council, the government, and, above all, with the President of the Republic. The President has veto power over legislation emanating from the Duma, and this veto can only be lifted if at least two-thirds of the deputies agree. This requirement effectively makes the President of Russia the ultimate legislator.

  • The Presidency of the Republic and the Government:

A Semi-Disguised Hyperpresidentialism

In states emerging from the breakup of the Soviet Union, we find two types of political regimes, not necessarily democratic:

  • Those that are clearly presidential.
  • Those that are formally semi-presidential but in fact hide a strong presidential institution imposing itself on at least a weak Parliament and a government beholden to the President. This is where the Russian regime fits.

Steven Fish defines the superpresidentialist arrangements that exist in Russia as:

  • An executive at large that consumes a disproportionate amount of resources,
  • A president with the power to enact and who controls the majority of budgetary powers,
  • A depleted legislator unable to revoke presidential decrees and with few means to monitor the chief executive,
  • A constitutional provision to require the President’s responsibility, but impossible to follow, and
  • A judicial system largely controlled by the President.

According to Fish, despite the President not enjoying absolute power and being subject to periodic change through elections, the superpresidentialist scheme can be compared with autocracy.

The 1993 Constitution, adopted after the crushing of Parliament, is very generous in assigning powers to the presidency at the expense of the legislature. The functions assigned to the President include:

  • The President is the Head of State and acts as guarantor of:
    • The Constitution,
    • Sovereignty,
    • The independence of the Federation,
    • The territorial integrity of the state,
    • The integrity of the rights and freedoms of citizens,
    • Collaboration and coordination of different state institutions, and
    • The design of domestic and foreign policy.

In addition to these powers, the Constitution imposes further responsibilities on the President:

  • Appoint, with the agreement of the Duma, the Prime Minister,
    • Chair meetings of the Government,
    • Decide on the government’s cessation,
    • Appoint and dismiss, on the proposal of the Prime Minister, the Deputy Prime Minister and Federal Ministers,
    • Submit to the Federation Council candidates for members of the Constitutional Court and Supreme Court,
    • Present the proposal to cease the Attorney General of the Federation,
    • Approve the military doctrine of the Federation,
    • Determine the composition of the Presidential Administration,
    • Appoint and dismiss the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces,
    • Appoint and dismiss diplomatic representatives, etc.

Moreover, the Constitution spells out the kinds of relationships that exist between the presidential institution and the State Duma. The President:

  • Calls elections to the Duma,
  • Presents bills,
  • Sanctions and promulgates Federal Law,
  • Annually addresses Parliament (the Federal Assembly) to account for the country’s situation and the general lines of domestic and foreign policy, and
  • May dissolve the State Duma.

The President, under the Constitution, can legislate temporarily through presidential decrees when vetoing legislation passed by Parliament. However, these decrees cannot go against federal laws or affect constitutional provisions.

The presidential power to dissolve the Duma creates a very unbalanced relationship between the President and the Duma. It is not just a way to punish the Duma in the event that:

  • It rejects the candidate for Prime Minister proposed by the President three times by absolute majority. In this case, the Duma is automatically dissolved, and early elections are called.
  • It approves two motions of censure against the Government within three months by a majority of the votes of all deputies. In this case, the President can choose between:
    • The resignation of the government or
    • The dissolution of the Duma.
  • It denies a vote of confidence to the Government. In this case, the President has one week to decide between:
    • The resignation of the government or
    • The dissolution of the Duma.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Constitution provides that the Duma cannot be dissolved under any of these circumstances:

  • If the legislature has not exceeded its first year,
  • If a state of emergency or war has been declared,
  • During the last six months of the presidential mandate,
  • If the President has resigned or is incapacitated, or
  • Once impeachment proceedings against the President have begun.

It is in these circumstances that a Duma hostile to the President or the Government can take the opportunity to exercise its limited powers.

But beyond these circumstances, there is only one parliamentary method to hold the President politically accountable: removal of the President for treason or any other serious crime.

However, the chances of a successful indictment against the President are very remote, as the initiative of the Duma requires double confirmation from the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court, whose members are elected with the approval of the President.

For an impeachment process to succeed, the initiative must first be approved in the Duma by two-thirds of the deputies and later by the Federation Council, also by two-thirds, within a maximum of three months. If the necessary votes are not obtained within this period, the accusation lapses.

According to other functions recognized by the President in the Constitution, he may act as a conciliator in conflicts:

  • Between federal and members of the federation, and
  • Between different subjects of the federation. (“Subjects” are the provinces, districts, republics, regions, etc.).

In this reconciliation, even if not rendered by the President, he may invalidate the decisions referred to in the conflict, particularly if he considers that they go against the Constitution, federal laws, or international commitments.

In short, the presidential institution brings together the typical powers of a Head of State, to which are added normative veto power, executive and judicial powers, and the power to dissolve a “troublesome” Duma, all in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.

Therefore, in this constitutional scheme, the legislature’s ability to control is heavily depleted, and there is a huge imbalance in the relationship between the President and Parliament. The functional division of powers effectively disappears, placing the rule of law in a very precarious situation.

That said, we can say that the Russian presidential institution concentrates in itself the three powers. Constitutionally speaking, the President of Russia may become a legal dictator on whom it is difficult to exercise effective parliamentary scrutiny.

Regarding the relationship between the President and the Government, the situation is not very different. The government’s position is subordinate to the Head of State, not only in terms of appointments and removals but also because government activity is carried out according to presidential decrees.

In short, the Constitution establishes a system of very unequal relations between powers in which:

  • Parliament cannot control the executive except in exceptional circumstances,
  • The government rules on probation, and
  • The President collects many of the powers of the three branches of government.

Finally, it should be noted that the President has a “parallel government” formed by:

  • the Presidential Administration, with about 2000 employees,
  • the Security Council, which is placed even above the Ministries of Defence and Interior.
  • an extensive network of state councils and committees and
  • business structure in charge of raising money for the Presidential Administration and influence, even in economic policy.

STRUCTURE OF THE PRESIDENTIAL This escapes any kind of political control although it has influenced such important issues as security, the determination of the new military doctrine, foreign policy and privatization.

  • The judiciary and the rule of law

Among the serious deficiencies in the administration of justice in Russia two stand out:

  • The lack of resources and
  • The strong dependence, if not submission, all jurisdictions, but especially the Constitution, in respect of State executive power, particularly regarding the presidency.

Therefore, the legal concept Guarantor of the rights of citizens is of great weakness, to the point where it produces almost the bankruptcy of certain human rights in Russia.

Concerning the lack of means, we may instance the minimum salaries of some judges appointed by the executive and therefore very vulnerable to all forms of corruption, bribery, etc.

Regarding the dependence of the executive, the Constitution of the Russian art.128.1 makes this clear when he says to be appointed by the Federation Council the proposal of the President of the Russian Federation:

  • Constitutional Court judges,
  • Supreme Court judges in charge of the civil courts, criminal and administrative
  • the judges of the Supreme Arbitration Court (ECONOMIC jurisdiction).
  • the Attorney General of the Federation
  • and even “other judges belonging to other federal courts.”

All these shortcomings are amplified in the absence of a legal culture which respects the rights of individuals as Russian history has not known long enough periods of predominance of the rule of law and traditions that it is associated.

Therefore, the absence of the possibility nor the custom of settling disputes through legal channels, the procedures were, and are, bribery, favoritism, and even the USE OF FORCE.

In Russia, despite the changes since 1991, is still considered, quite rightly, that the administration of justice is primarily a repressive environment in the service of political authority.

In this play an important role MACHINERY Prosecutors, as subordinate to political power through the Ministry of Interior become the executive arm of the desire of an administration that, for now, do not recognize theRULE OF LAW and its consequences.

Moreover, the role reserved for judges and lawyers is limited to facilitating the work of the Prosecutor

investigations and confirmed it that most of the time, there have been violating the most elementary human rights and federal laws.

All this is due to the lack of separation of powers and existence, therefore, some courts are not the most minimally FAIR. And is the Constitution which denies that which says:

  • If on one hand, recognizes Rights and Freedoms,
  • on the other hand, provides no effective mechanisms that guarantee.

Therefore, we can say that today, 2003, Russia is not a rule of law. In other words, Russia is not satisfied a condition that would allow us to speak of the existence of a true democracy, that is, THE RULE OF LAW.

The same conclusion reached by successive reports to the European Council’s request about Russia’s request INCOME in this body, I refer to the following reports:

  • 1994 report by the Vice-President of the European Court of Human Rights, the Presidents of the Chamber of the European Commission of Human Rights and members of the European Commission of Human Rights.
  • 1996, report of the German Socialist parliamentarian Rudolf Binding.

Although BINDING claimed that political reasons, for example, estimated that the admission of Russia into the Council of Europe could contribute to increasing in the future RESPECT HUMAN RIGHTS, justify Russia’s accession to Council of Europe.

BINDING’s recommendation was taken into account and surprisingly a country the likes of Russia in 1996 became the 39th member of Council of Europe.

Today, seven years after his admission, the political reasons which justified it have not been met in any way and the constant violation of human rights remains the practice in Russia. Therefore, the Council of Europe is high time to raise his expulsion.

2.3 THE POWER OF TERRITORIAL DIVISION

One of the causes of the accelerated process of collapse of the Soviet Union was the false nature of federalism:

  • Nominally the USSR was a federal state but
  • in practice the MONOPOLY of the CPSU and the centrally planned economy, producing a highly concentrated political support, at most, with the recognition of certain cultural uniqueness of different peoples and some perks to sharing certain peripheral authorities.

But during the economic downturn in the ’60s was to strengthen the power of the republican authorities without causing any reform of the law, so a decade later the problem of relations between the Union and one of the republics was sufficiently serious.

Therefore, the central project of “a new man, the Soviet man” failed and, before the crisis, compounding the national men do not believe in the general interests and “ruined” cling to the more immediate, his nation.

As the crisis deepened and Ideological Legitimacy of the USSR, the Nationals were occupying the space assigned by the Marxism-Leninism.

The ease with which ideological substitution occurred has several causes:

  • Nationalist tensions were a constant throughout the life of the USSR, the principle of cooperation and FRIENDSHIP peoples was no more than a slogan failed, especially there where we had to bring “revolution” to guns, areas in that persisted national identities and religious opposition to Russification.
  • Nationalism as quickly filled the vacuum left by Marxism-Leninism because both ideologies are coming in the following aspects:
    • TOTAL EXPLANATIONS intended to be of reality,
    • are considered morally superior to other ways of thinking,
    • are able to rank them unambiguously the value of:
      • SOCIAL GROUPS,
      • And collective goals
      • To achieve these goals.
  • Many officials linked to the old Soviet structures saw their life raft in its adaptation and conversion to the tenets nationalists. (It is typical of old to new jacket sleeve of “demócratasdetodalavida” know so well here).

On the other hand, the Russian Constitution devotes a chapter to Federal structure and formally establish a system of division of powers into two tiers:

  • in the first list, shows the influence of the Federation, the most important
  • in the second list, the joint tasks.

For both types of competition determines the supremacy of federal law, in contrast to the powers which may be included in the residual clause is accepted that the right to apply is the emanated from members of the federation.

But beyond the Constitution, Russia is a permanent tension between:

  • the secessionist stance, as some Caucasian republics,
  • supporters of asymmetric federalism, local advocates for special treaty signed with Moscow before being granted a special relationship with the Centre,
  • what they consider state unity can only be ensured on the basis of a decentralized system only administratively, as the zealots of Russian nationalism.

Present, there are these trends, but the worsening economic crisis and instability of the political system will strengthen the positions of those advocating no more:

  • secession or
  • the old central.

POLITICAL ACTORS: POLITICAL PARTIES AND PRESSURE GROUPS

As demonstrated by the creation of sisemas party in the West, this is a slow process fraught with difficulties. In Russia it would not be less, but we also add a number of challenges none of which have helped to consolidate a system of political parties, among them:

  • The traditional elements of Russian culture,
  • the political dynamics of the last 10 years
  • the specifics of electoral laws in Russia.
  • * POLITICAL PARTIES

Various kinds of games can be found in Russia:

  • Those who are the result of the failure of political organizations or pre STATE STRUCTURES, as those groups who claimed the interests of their region at the expense of staying in the union, so once dissolved the USSR and the CPSU are meaningless.

Perhaps the only party that survived to this situation was the Communist Party of Russia, although an exception, as most parties that survived this were in a marginal position.

  • Those who are the result of outgrowth of official power are fictitious organizations and improvised to attend the next election. Lack of tradition, stable organization, implementation, database and autonomy. They are also replaced by others in subsequent elections.
  • Those that are built around a character, for example the economic world, is the familiar formula of notable party or pressure group that contributes to the elections as a political party.
  • There is also a traditional part, with general introduction, with a political program and a permanent structure and also with stable and significant electoral results, as with the Communist Party of the Russian Federation.

In short, what about existing in Russia are weak parties are the breeding ground for indiscipline, lack of commitment and ties between equipment makers and bases, where there are also some ELECTORAL PROGRAMS ambiguous and strange to not correspond with the party ideologically say ideologically defined.

Regarding the ideological differences have been declining over time and now all political forces share a fund established by a Nationalist ideology on supporting their respective programs, so it is with the major Russian parties:

  • Liberal Democratic Party, an extremist anti-Western nationalism.
  • Russian Communist Party, conservative right-wing nationalism and Eurasia.
  • Unity, nationalism and authoritarian Eurasian tones.
  • Fatherland-All Russia and Eurasian very authoritarian nationalism.
  • Yabloko, nationalism and pro-Western liberal.

Consolidation of Nationalism acts not only as a powerful barrier limiting the development of the national rights of the minorities living in the territory of the Federation, but also as a brake on progress and consolidation of the rule of law and democracy in Russia .

* MAP OF THE COMPLEX OF PRESSURE GROUPS

In Russia the weakness of political parties is the Strength of the pressure groups, including the mafia, and informal mechanisms of political decision making at the expense of the formal and procedural incorporated in any democracy.

In this case, the pressure groups are the “prehistory” of the party, its embryonic stage that can result:

  • or the development of NONPARTISAN MACHINES similar to Western
  • or the opposite, and became enemies of the political parties.

In Russia, illegal mechanisms of formation of political will in moving PRESSURE GROUPS are not subject to any control and, in some cases are, without more, SECRETS.

His growing influence, which has its roots in the Brezhnev era, is corrupting the weak democratic impulses that emerged in Russia after perestroika.

But keep in mind that the mechanisms “informal / illegal” decision-making and groups who use them are not only the result:

  • Crash and the vacuum left by the old powers and
  • of corruption inherited from the Soviet past,

but has also been fueled by the economic reform policies carried out since late 1991.

Through these policies of economic reform came a financial oligarchy that took advantage of the Soviet BLACK MARKET opportunities afforded an economy on the brink of collapse.

Since the early 90 informal links were established between:

  • the emerging financial oligarchy,
  • new entrepreneurs and
  • the political power that had supported them.

All while remaining needed for demolishing the remains of the Soviet and DEAL cost a portion of the state property.

The result of these informal links and sharing of interests, that is, financial support to politicians who promise to programs that benefit the oligarchy, was an extreme confusion between public and private that occurred:

  • the Bankruptcy MATERIAL of the new Russian economy,
  • the widespread extension and public corruption,
  • the moral bankruptcy of a society that had abandoned many years before relating Collectivism.

Thus, in Russia, in 10 years there has been a process of primitive accumulation of capital has allowed the emergence of a small circle of economic power that occupies the top business and finance and deploying a decisive influence on political power to the point that seems to confuse him.

Accumulation mechanisms used during the 90s have been three:

  • The first is GRANTED DIRECT GOVERNMENT AUCTIONS or by AMAN. So, what were once state monopoly has been converted into private monopolies belonging to those already in the possession or belonging to persons required to power.

In the end, as part of IMF loans, those already converted STATE PROPERTIES PRIVATE MONETARY ASSETS evaded the tax havens or sites of the European Community.

Is estimated at a conservative estimate that in 1998-1999 the Russian capital flight amounted to 5 or 6% of GDP.

  • The second is the expropriation for debt as a result of the collapse of the ruble, of hyperinflation and the shock of the banking system 98 August that led to Russia INTERNATIONAL PAYMENTS SUSPENSION.

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The sad result of hyperinflation and financial meltdown has been the impoverishment of the citizenry, thus:

  • between 33 and 50% of the Russian population now lives below the poverty line,
  • the number of unemployed is estimated at between 20 and 25 million workers and
  • social inequality is enormous because the 2% accounts for almost 60% of wealth.
  • The third is the brutal CONTRACTION PRODUCTIONIn the 1990-1996 period GDP declined by 54%. This contraction of GDP coupled with the two previous mechanisms has helped to create opportunities for profit in illegal activities and legal sectors arms exports and imports of raw materials and consumer goods.
  • The fourth, not yet started, will be the privatization of the entire land, especially the vast and rich Siberian region, the consummation of this fact close the first chapter of development of capitalism in Russia today.

The names of the members of the new Russian oligarchs have begun to be made public from the proceedings as Capital Accumulation. The Oligarchy is a set of opaque power groups that have an important role in shaping the political course of Russia because:

  • sit directly on the government or in that sort of parallel government is the Presidential Administration, or
  • because they lent money to the Treasury, or
  • for financing election campaigns,
  • Bribery
  • use the repressive apparatus of the state against its enemies,
  • MEDIA support, etc.

But these groups do not form a monolithic unit and among them there are fighting for the political and economic power.

  • ELECTORAL SYSTEM AND POLITICAL BEHAVIOR
  • ELECTION RULES

The Russian president is elected through a two-round majority system and candidates must be backed by 500,000 signatures.

Regarding the referendum, the validity of a proposal submitted to the same be achieved if it reaches the back of an absolute majority of voters, provided they exceed more than one half of the electorate.

For the Federation Council, 178 seats, two for each of the 89 constituencies where they split the territory of the federation, was initially established a multi-member majority voting system, but this system was exceptional.

The usual was that the legislative and executive branches of each subject of the Federation have appointed their respective representatives in the Senate, at least until the 2001 reform PUTIN modifications of this procedure in order to reduce the powers of the authorities LOCAL.

In the allocation of seats in the State Duma will govern a mixed system:

  • For half of its seats, 225, applies a majority vote on a single lap single-member constituencies each representing about 500,000 voters.

Each candidate must submit an endorsement of signatures equal to 1% of the electorate of his constituency and must be achieved by a 25% stake in each district so that the results are valid.

  • For the other half, applies a proportional system in a single federal district, with 5% electoral barrier and the requirement that the electoral lists are guaranteed at least 100,000 signatures, from at least 7 of the territorial authorities Russia is, or what is the same, not admitting more than 15,000 signatures per district.

The results will be valid if it reaches 25% participation in the federal district unique.

The fact that established a mixed electoral system for several reasons DUMA:

  • It found that half of the seats were subject to a majority system to prevent the proliferation of parties and, above all, to curb the rise of those formations opposite YELTSIN enjoying a better position throughout the Federation, but they were weak constituency a constituency.
  • In addition, by reserving half the seats in the majority vote was allowed on a single lap that they could organize PERSONAL NOMINATIONS devices linked to local executives, in turn, depended largely on the President.

These electoral provisions were amended in June 1995 in order to limit:

  • concurrency and
  • Fragmentation of the nascent party system.

Regarding the DUMA, the new rules, which can only be submitted to future consultations parties and movements who have registered six months before the election, also adds the need for a guarantee of 200,000 signatures to validate the electoral roll, no supported by each of the 89 local authorities in the federation over 7% of total firms.

This reform hinders access of new political formations to the allocation of seats in the federal electoral college unique.

  • ELECTORAL BEHAVIOUR AND POLITICAL CONTEXT

We can arrange the elections held in three different political periods:

  • From spring 1990 until December 1991, ie those that occurred before the dissolution of the USSR. It held a legislative, 3 / 90, a referendum, 3 / 91, and a presidential 6/91.
  • From December 1991 to October 1993, when the bombing of the Russian Parliament, which coincides with what some authors call the First Republic. Referendum plebiscite was held on 4 / 93.
  • From 1993 to present, With the wars in Chechnya as a backdrop to this Second Republic. The constitutional referendum was held on 12/93, three general elections in December of 93, 93 and 97 and two presidential, 7 / 96 and 3 / 00.
  • The elections held in Russia between March 1990 and December 1991:

Against the USSR RUSSIA

At this early stage the priority task for the opposition was to weaken and destroy the main Soviet political institutions, especially the Communist Party, the Congress of People’s Deputies of the USSR and the Union presidency.

Following the March 1990 elections in the Democratic Russia and other opposition groups won a number of seats than expected, members of the Inter-Regional Group of the Congress of People’s Deputies of the USSR decided to abandon his previous line consisting of Democratization structures of the Union and replace it with the most advantageous to strengthen their own republics with a view to a more than expected dissolution of the USSR.

This was a big stage and denounce statements of ideology, institutions and authorities in the past, but few proposals.

Such statements and promises of Russian opposition not only contributed to eroding the already low credibility of the Soviet system, but encouraged false hopes among the people both spiritually, and materially.

In the elections of March 90 was elected the First Congress of People’s Deputies of the Soviet Federal Socialist Republic of Russia, which, in turn, elected Yeltsin as the highest authority in electing Republican chairman of the Presidium of Supreme Soviet.

The first major decision was to declare unilaterally YELTSIN Sovereignty of the Republic as a step towards independence from Russia, that sovereignty meant the supremacy of Russian laws on the laws and Constitution of the Soviet Union.

After the Russian declaration of sovereignty came cascading similar statements from Uzbekistan, Ukraine, Belarus, Baltic States, Armenia, Georgia, etc, the viability of the USSR, July 27, 1991 was impossible.

So Gorbachev called for a referendum on the continuity of the USSR, but the authorities of the Russian Federation added a second question on the direct election of the presidency in Russia.

The referendum result as contradictory, was also contradictory because 71.3% of Russian voters voted for the Union’s continued while responding positively to the second question, contradicts the first, 69.85 %.

Therefore, rather than clarified, the political landscape became even more confusing, as both critics and supporters of keeping the Soviet Union felt they had won, but in any case it should be noted that the Russian authorities obtained the same support that the authorities Union, which already marked a success of the new Russian authorities.

The presidential elections of June 1991 would clarify the confusing picture, it is the consecration of YELTSIN and all supporters to break the already deteriorating LEGALITY UNITY and the USSR.

Thus, supporters of a strong Russia in a post-Soviet context were more numerous than those who wanted a Russian fair within the structures of a renewed Union. YELTSIN become the figure of a new time, while, Gorbachev was sinking in the disrepute and, with it, everything that symbolized the USSR.

  • The April 1993 referendum: the executive against the legislature Russian Russian

The first phase aimed at the destruction of an order that was known failure was followed by another in which the priority was the construction of a new political system.

The euphoria of the previous phase soon become disenchantment:

  • Economically, the introduction of measures LIBERAL impoverished population increasingly pessimistic
  • politically, the period was marked by discussions on the Constitution that we have seen.

Both issues distanced all sectors in the previous stage were Clumps in the face of the old regime. PARLIAMENT-The detachment and alienation GOVERNMENT CENTER-PERIPHERY eventually became in conflict, and conflict in violent struggle:

  • The distance-GOVERNMENT PARLIAMENT ended with the bombing of the Parliament by the executive authorities.
  • The center-periphery distance out (or rather, began) to the situation in Chechnya.

With the aim of consolidating its position to the legislature, Yeltsin decided to hold a referendum in which he called explicit support for him and his political line. The same was convened with a sophisticated set of four questions.

The result of the four questions was so tight that instead of clarifying the situation did not blur it was not because all the disputing parties interpreted the favorable results.

Thus, both the President and Parliament, after the referendum castle on their positions in the end the political conflict escalated and resulted in a violently suppressed by the other party.

  • Elections under the new Constitution:

Russia’s quest for the consolidation of the political system

The Second Republic clearly shows that the problems are far from being solved:

  • thepoverty has not stopped growing,
  • the national economy has suffered a grave deterioration,
  • scandals, linked to the process of primitive accumulation of capital and contaminate all the authorities are common,
  • political corruption and mafia phenomena spread unstoppably,
  • war in the Caucasus for control of gas and oil from the Caspian is a common reality,
  • the political system, weak and unstable, is still in the space of authoritarianism and rejection of the HUMAN RIGHTS.

Therefore, at this late stage two types of events have a decisive influence on the various election results:

  • the first, economic, is the unstoppable decline of the ECONOMY, the crisis of society, the scandals and financial bankruptcy of the summer of ’98.
  • the second political, are the two wars in Chechnya.

Both events show a double failure:

  • the neoliberal economists
  • that of the rulers, who consider themselves Democrats, but do not hesitate to violate human rights with the possibility of losing control of energy resources.

December 12, 1993

As for political consultations, the Second Republic was inaugurated with a character that overlap multiple:

  • the constitutional referendum
  • a legislative and
  • Partial local elections.

The conditions for this first consultation was held were not the most appropriate:

  • immediately following the bombing of Parliament
  • with the local Soviets dissolved
  • with political detainees in prisons
  • The ban on some games
  • with the closure of some newspapers,
  • with the heads of administration YELTSIN appointed directly by setting the convenience of the central power of constituency boundaries,
  • under the formula of temporary dictatorship,
  • with a “timely” Reform of the referendum on the law only two months of its conclusion.

Despite these conditions, the turnout was low and the results TIGHT, so much so that if he had not made the “timely” REFORM, NOT the Constitution would have approved, in addition, 17 Russian republics and regions of the Constitution NO was approved.

In short, the Constitution was adopted, but it was clear that the days of joy and glory to the Russian executive had passed into history, and the romance between the people and the rulers had come to an end.

As for the elections to the Duma, on the same day December 12, 1993, the enemy to beat for Yeltsin and Gaidar’s Russia’s Choice was the ultranationalist Liberal Democratic Party SHIRINOVSKI.

And it would ELECTORAL SYSTEM which absorb the results of an anti-Semitic extreme right because if at the federal district got only 22.9% of the vote, reached only 14.2% of all seats in the Duma, while Option Russia 15.5% of votes in the federal single constituency, won 15.6% of the seats in the House.

The reason for this difference is that the Liberal Democratic Party lost badly in the conquest of the 225 seats allocated by the majority system.

Thus, the DUMA that came from these early legislative consisted of six major political blocs:

  • PRO-GOVERNMENT trend, with 25.6% of seats.
  • The neo-communists, with 18%.
  • The extreme right, with 14.2%.
  • Interest Groups, with 5.5%.
  • Centrists, with 3.7%.
  • Independents, with 31.3%.

With regard to SENATE:

  • pro-government trend reached a performance markedly superior to that of the DUMA.
  • the neo-communist and nationalist opposition results were worse
  • EXTREME RIGHT reached the negligible representation.

In short, the first parliament elected after the adoption of the Constitution, besides having far less powerful than the Congress of Deputies dissolved Russia, contained a more favorable balance of power to PRESIDENTIAL INTERESTS.

With this new composition was to provide better coordination between executive and legislative, and, in early 1994 opened a period of institutional stability for President Yeltsin.

To achieve that stability in the first half of 1994 YELTSIN making two major policy measures:

  • Amnesty to those responsible for the attempted coup of August 1991
  • Amnesty to those stationed in Parliament in October 1993.

In so doing, sought to bring together all political, economic and social considered fair in April 1994 signed a Pact for Civil Peace.

* * * *

The legislation of 17 December 1995

Presidential elections of June-July 1996

The legislation of 19 December 1999

Have been influenced by the two wars in Chechnya

  • The December 1994-August 1996
  • the September 1999 -?

1st Chechen War

In August 94 the Russian secret services began a covert war against the Chechen authorities. Since 1992 Chechnya was suffering an economic blockade, but the December 11, 1994 produced the military invasion of Chechnya. The reasons:

  • The control of the riches of the Caspian
  • the weakness of the Caucasian FRONTERA,
  • the risk of expiry of the Chechen separatists and other regional authorities to follow,
  • Russian demographic decline,
  • disregard for the HUMAN RIGHTS shown on both sides of the conflict,
  • decomposition of the Chechen society at the mercy of terrorists, kidnappers, mobsters, drug dealers, etc.

The economic and the dirty war conducted by Russia between 1992 and 1994 much more complicated scenario, since the Russian intervention while the enemy seek to divide what he got was the map Chechen fragments making it difficult to find a negotiated solution stable for the region.

In addition, it was possible that people not only hated one of its local authorities, but also ended up hating the RUSSIAN INVASIVE that killed 90,000 countrymen had built detention camps and had produced thousands of refugees and displaced persons.

The optimistic expectations that Russia believed the conflict would quickly resolve with the victorious entry into Grozny without hardly firing a shot.

But the Russian army crumbled before the Guerrillas independence, and the humiliation suffered by the resurgent Russian National only reinforced their essential character.

The result was clear, the party of Prime Minister Chernomyrdin, Our Home Is Russia, suffered considerable wear and ELECTORAL YELTSIN popularity plummeted.

the December 1995 legislative

Meanwhile, the Communist Party extended their expectations to vote, therefore, now in the general elections on December 17, 1995 to beat the enemy was the Communist Party, which had got the dissatisfaction with the events in Chechnya. The results speak for itself:

  • The Communist Party won the elections from 48 to 157 of the 450 seats in the Duma.
  • The official option, Our Home Is Russia, took second place losing 20% seats and 55 seats now ranking.
  • The ultra-right SHIRINOVSKI dropped significantly, reaching 51 seats.
  • For the liberal Yabloko and they accounted for 45
  • The Agrarian Party of Russia won 20.
  • Remainder to 450 were attributed to minor political parties and independent.

In short, in this election, beyond the Communist victory and the relative failure YELTSIN options can say that no major changes in the fragmentation or the multiparty nature of Russia, although steps were taken to the disappearance of large numbers of small parties.

presidential elections on June 16, 1996

From these data the calculations were clear, if Chechnya war had eroded the government party, the same would happen to Yeltsin, and the presidential elections would take place six months later.

Thus, Yeltsin sought at all costs PEACE to participate in the elections with few guarantees of success, so what we did was not directly involved in negotiations with Chechen rebels not to take the risk of possible failure and let a rival political entity, the LIEBE GENERAL tackle this task.

If LIEBE failed, it would not be the direct responsibility of YELTSIN, but if successful could capitalize on the success and compete for voters strip near the Communist Party.

Finally, on June 16, 1996 is held the first round with an investment of close to 70%. None of the contestants won an absolute majority:

  • YELTSIN took first place with 35.28% of the vote.
  • ZSIUGÁNOV second with 32.03.
  • LIEBE with 14.52,
  • YABLINSKI 7.34 and
  • SHIRINOVSKI 5.7.

So we had to go to the second round:

  • YELTSIN won, with irregularities, with 53.82% while
  • ZSIUGÁNOVobtuvo the 40.31%.

2nd Chechen War, legislative December 19, 1999

The policy is this 2nd war has been to the manipulation of information, and censorship of information, and the application of the tactic of hitting from UP to suffer as few casualties as possible, as learned from the strategy used in Kosovo and Serbia Nato.

Now, Chechen terrorist acts, the attempted invasion of the Republic of Dagestan, the widespread hatred of the Chechens, etc, made the party opposed to the war in Chechnya to be punished by the electorate in this election, as happened to Yabloko .

Now the Kremlin, quickly improvised a new party, Unity, with which the officers were presented to these third legislative election, a turnout of 61.5%, yielded the following results to the Duma:

  • Communist Party winning 113 seats,
  • second, Unit 73,
  • third coalition Fatherland-All Russia PRIMAKOV 68,
  • Union of Right Forces, near the Kremlin, 29.
  • Yabloko, 20 and
  • far right 17
  • INDEPENDENT reached the 114 seats.

The high percentage of Independents in this legislature will make the parliamentary groups of the Duma are highly variable, thus buying WILLS precedence and temporary alliances of a personal and a very relaxed DISCIPLINE TO VOTE.

The Chechen war allowed political bind at second row, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, and placed in an advantageous position in the race for next PRESIDENTIAL that would be set out in their first round for the March 26, 2000

According to polls Putin was a candidate capable of dealing with guarantees of success for other groups in the running who aspired to the presidency, moreover, their proposals did not pose a break with the dominant economic sector who supported Yeltsin, nor with the oligarchies who staged the fraudulent privatization. Economic power was with him.

the presidential elections of March 26, 2000

So shortly before the third presidential election the former hero of democracy, Yeltsin was a figure that is divorced, his health was badly damaged, could not constitutionally stand again, economic corruption wrapped her surroundings, her relentless political decline and the electoral success of the unit were factors for the December 31, 1999 to resign.

Yes, but not before set the ground for an adverse outcome in the presidential elections to be left at the mercy of his rivals and the serious charges that fell upon him:

  • Treason for having dissolved the USSR and ordering the shelling of parliament,
  • TREASON for causing the first Chechen war,
  • genocide,
  • corruption, etc..

Therefore, the candidate Putin in his first act as acting president, Yeltsin immediately granted immunity in perpetuity through a decree that increased the 2000 presidential win.

While this was happening, the war in Chechnya continues while NATO looked the other party and the Council of Europe prevented any kind of sanctions to newest member and the war became one more forgotten wars that do not seem to worry the defenders OF HUMAN RIGHTS.

Following the resignation of Yeltsin’s presidential elections in March 2000 had cleared for Putin. This was aided at least six reasons:

  • The military successes of misleading the 2nd Chechen war,
  • Soaring oil prices that allowed GRANTS pay payrolls and backward
  • the fact that he was designated successor to Yeltsin and his entourage, which provided him with automatic credit west
  • good understanding of the Oligarchy,
  • Their youth and austere image and MARCIAL and
  • his promise to establish the dictatorship of law to impose order.

So, with 52.6% of the votes, an absolute majority won election without having to go to the second round. The second candidate ZSIUGÁNOV was only 29.3% of the vote.

The ideological profile of the candidates for president leads us to distinguish six different political blocs:

  • the Kremlin, with Putin, economically ultraliberal represented by civic dignity.
  • the city hall in Moscow, Primakov and Country-All Russia movement.
  • communism, Communist Party ZSIUGÁNOV the Russian Federation.
  • the right-liberal, Yabloko and the Union of the Right Forces.
  • the regional, Kiriyenko with the Union of Right Forces
  • SHIRINOVSKI the extreme right and the Liberal Democratic Party.

In order inside the Putin government program that has developed during his first year in office is based on three principles:

  • respect to the idea of Russia
  • strong state and
  • the desire to establish an efficient economy.

The first principle has several strands:

  • one hand, means upholding certain religious traditions and historical symbols rejected by Yeltsin, as the rehabilitation of the leadership of the KGB, the restoration of compulsory military training in schools.
  • On the other hand, involves defending the territorial integrity of Russia against any attempt at secession, for it occurs territorial reshaping the state.

With Putin reasserted the centripetal tendencies and central YELTSIN last season and creates seven large districts across Russia at the head of which shall direct a presidential envoy empowered to dismiss heads of governments and parliaments to dissolve any subject of the federation in the non-compliance with the Constitution or federal laws.

The defense of the IDEA OF RUSSIA by Putin is leading to a rapprochement with other nationalist forces, as the Communist Party, and has allowed Putin obtain the approval of prominent conservative intellectuals as SOLSHENITZSIN.

Regarding the second principle, the strong state, it is to regain the influence of secret services in the country’s political life for the restoration of order, an idea that should not surprise a former member of the KGB and Putin.

The idea of a strong state is not equivalent to the state auditor, rather corresponds to that of the state vigilante articulated from the ministries and agencies of force that will be under a unified command (the defense, interior, border, secret service , etc).

Furthermore, the idea of strong states is based on the doctrine that FREEDOM OF INFORMATION SECURITY is subordinate to and the national interest, leading to arbitrarily limit that freedom.

Finally, with regard to the third principle, the program aims to promote the conditions for the development of an efficient economy, ie one in which the oligarchs act in a more orderly fashion under the protection of INTERIOR counterintelligence service.

This means that Putin will try that the influence of the oligarchy of political power is more discrete and predictable with YELTSIN, rewarding those oligarchs who accept these rules and persecuting those who are unwilling to comply.