Franco’s Regime in Spain: Institutions, Development, and Opposition

**I. Institutions and the Consolidation of the Regime**

The institutionalization of the system included two basic facts:

  1. The enactment of a series of fundamental laws from which the various bodies that made up the Francoist political system derived.
  2. The consolidation of a number of disparate ideological political families.

Franco was always reluctant to establish in detail the organs that comprised the Francoist political system. Franco was always reluctant to establish in detail the elements of governmental bodies in Spain, hence the process of institutionalization of the system was made over nearly three decades. On the other hand, they were strongly opposed to providing Spain with a Constitution that would remind them of the liberal system.

Institutions expressed the personal dictatorship of Franco and the corporatist character that was intended to characterize the regime. In the 1960s, once the dictatorship was inserted into the international context and economic development was underway, the regime sought to consolidate its institutionalization and continuity, which led to political reforms. The most important was the Organic Act of 1967, aimed to unite dictatorship, monarchy, and corporatism. It was intended as a culmination and summary of all the previous Fundamental Laws. The system then said that it represented the definitive Spanish Constitution. The Succession Act of 1969 established the mechanism of the succession of Don Juan Carlos Franco, who took the oath of allegiance to the principles of the Movement and received the title of Prince of Spain. It was not a return to the previous monarchy, but the introduction of a new one, albeit with the same Bourbon dynasty.

A. Governing Bodies and Other Institutions of the Basic System

1. Governing Bodies

  • The Head of State: Always held by General Franco, whose power was absolute.
  • The Government: Its boss was also Franco and, therefore, he chaired the Council of Ministers. (The Organic Act of 1967 separated the Head of State and Government, but this was not delivered until 1973 with Carrero Blanco).
  • Courts: Advisory body with no real decision to legislate and not binding. Its members (attorneys) were there by virtue of their office (ministers, mayors, etc.), nominated by the Head of State, or appointed by the Unions. In the 1960s, there were elections for solicitors in courts across the so-called natural organs (the family, the municipality, and the union), to which were added those appointed directly by the government.
  • Council of the Realm: Composed of senior Army, Church, and solicitors, to advise the Head of State. After the Organic Law of the State of 1967, it provided that the Prime Minister would be appointed by the Head of State on a proposal from a panel of the Council of the Kingdom.
  • National Council of the Movement (or second chamber): It had no legislative powers and was a simple discussion forum. Counselors were, at the same time, prosecutors in courts.
  • The Administration of Justice: Senior members were appointed by the Head of State.
  • The Council of Regency (three people): It would take power in the event of unexpected disability or death of the Head of State.

2. Other Institutions of the Basic System

  • The Army, regarded as the backbone of the regime and the guarantor of the unity of the country, remained loyal to the regime in its entirety until the end, through careful selection and training of its members, and the action of SIPM (Information Service Military and Police).
  • The Catholic Church was one of the pillars of the regime, which has been named National-Catholicism. Its support reversed in economic benefits (the state covered the costs of the church) and in return for higher levels of power that it had enjoyed even before the Republic (education and moral control of society). However, the support of much of the Church began to fail from the Second Vatican Council (1962-1965), in which the most important sector of the Catholic hierarchy distanced itself from the regime.
  • The single party, or FET de las JONS National Movement, integrated into their control panels the sectors of society more supportive of the regime, even if it framed elements of the middle bourgeoisie and the working class, captured by the Youth Front. It had a strong hierarchy and total loyalty to Franco. At its head was the National Council of the Movement, which brought together the various national leaders from each region chosen by Franco. Then there was a whole range of leaders at provincial and local levels.
  • The vertical union (CNS, National Trade Union Center), the only one, excluding independent unions and class of compulsory membership for employers and workers under the National Movement.

B. Political Families

In the Franco regime, political parties were banned. Not only the parties and organizations that had supported the Republic, but also the right-wing parties that had supported the military uprising. Falange was only allowed, but defining it as a party was banned, so it was renamed the National Movement.

Despite this, Franco was served both by the Falange and other ideological groups to get their partners in government. These ideological groups formed what is known as the political families of the regime. All had in common loyalty to Franco and the defense of the principles of the scheme (authoritarianism, Catholicism, anti-communism). However, there were also important differences between them. The most important were:

  1. The Military: Many of the rebel leaders were collaborators of Franco after the war and remained at his side all the time, for example, General Alonso Vega and Admiral Carrero Blanco. Most shared with Franco the ideology of victory, anti-communism, his rejection of separatism (autonomy), and hardness on issues of public policy. They were pure or integral Francoists, whose hallmark was the unconditional loyalty to Franco and for which the Franco regime would be unchanging and eternal.
  2. The Falangists: While under Franco they lost part of their original identity and increasingly part of their influence on the development of the pro-Catholic regime, Franco’s technocrats or pure, handled the levers of power and local association, and always had representation in the organs of power. They formed part of the core of the regime, what would be called later the bunker.
  3. Catholics: Were represented by two major associations:
    • a) The first was the National Catholic Association of Propagandists, ACNP, founded by the Jesuit Angel Ayala to try to spread the Catholic Church’s thought throughout society. They all agreed on deep Catholicism, radical opposition to everything that meant the Republic, and support for an authoritarian style of governance. Later, they faded in importance from the 1960s, to be replaced by members of Opus Dei.
    • b) The Opus Dei: Organization created by Escrivá de Balaguer, its members were highly qualified and were those who dominated the government from the 1960s. Known as the technocrats, they started the country’s economic development. For them, economic development would generate a welfare that would replace the ideological and propaganda campaigns, arguing further that the great economic changes needed for an authoritarian regime to succeed.
  4. The Monarchists: Divided into two groups:
    • a) The Carlists: Played a secondary and unimportant role within the regime, especially after the unification decree with the Falange. The Carlists aspired to restore the monarchy in the person of D. Javier, who never thought Franco would ascend to the throne. In that hope, they supported the regime and occupied several government posts, but their influence was gradually fading. Subsequently, Carlism, represented by the person of Carlos Hugo (son of Javier), evolved from the 1960s towards more leftist and democratic positions.
    • b) The Don Juans: Family of generals, bankers, and landowners who were part of the civil fabric that supported the military uprising and helped Franco during the war. They were supporters of the successor of Alfonso XIII, D. Juan de Borbón. Franco disappointed them by refusing to leave office. However, despite the strained relations between Franco and D. Juan, many monarchists collaborated with the regime and occupied important positions, especially in the diplomatic corps.

In fact, all these families were fictitious. Franco, who lacked a clear political ideology, did not defend or protect any of them. He used them to choose their partners, provided that no deal to avoid a lot of power and to divide the posts equally among the different families.

II. Development: Economic Growth and Social Changes

A. Development

In 1959 the Stabilization Plan came into force. The Spanish economy endured high inflation, high public deficits, and excessive debt. It had no foreign exchange reserves, and autarky was unable to broaden the timid industrial development, hindering the growth of dynamic sectors and impeding the entry of foreign capital and technology.

Politicians who had come to power in 1957, convinced of the need to promote the growth of the Spanish economy, and following the recommendations of the World Bank, launched in 1959 the Stabilization Plan. Alberto Mariano Navarro Rubio and Ullastres were the main architects. Like other economic ministers, they were linked to the technocrats and Opus Dei.

The Stabilization Plan implemented technical measures such as the devaluation of the peseta, cut spending, tightened credit, froze wages, and eliminated overtime. The plan intended to put Spain on the path of economic liberalization, which would be very costly. Many of the objectives of this plan were developed: inflation was contained, and the economy was liberalized with the abandonment of autarky. But the social costs were the freezing of wages, slowed consumption, increased unemployment, and accentuated the imbalances between industry, the most favored, and the primary sector, which was forgotten.

Overcoming the economic recession caused by the Stabilization Plan inaugurated the development phase. The national target was to increase per capita income.

To achieve this, development plans were articulated. For them, the state planned the nation’s economy, pointing to a number of priority sectors to which it directed a high level of resources – investments, tax exemptions, deductions – and in many cases engendered numerous jobs and encouraged the emergence of so-called development centers in seven cities: Burgos, Huelva, Vigo, La Coruña, Valladolid, Zaragoza, and Seville. In these places, including the floor for the installation of factories, it was cheaper or had better communication infrastructure, etc. Each Development Plan covered a period of 4 years.

Development Plans were inspired by the French system. They were designed in the Commissariat of Development Plan at the forefront of which in 1962 was Laureano López Rodó, the real brains of the Spanish government’s economic policy. The per capita income in 1963 was $500 per year; in 1971, it was higher than $1,000 per year. There were three factors that contributed to development:

  • Foreign tourism: Buoyed by low prices, climate, and increased living standards of Europe. It provided foreign exchange to invest in industry.
  • Migration: Between 1960 and 1970, more than a million people moved to Europe. It eased the unemployment problem and the countryside while helping to clean up the trade deficit.
  • Foreign investments: Easy to install, especially the Americans, and gained great benefits.

Not all goals were achieved, but in the 1960s, Spain had one of the highest growth rates in the world. It was necessary to import capital goods, which were paid with foreign currency remittances from migrants and tourism. In the early 1970s, multinationals began to settle, and foreign capital investments grew.

Spanish economic growth, since the entry into force of the first Development Plan to the impact of the oil crisis in 1973, represented a profound transformation of production structures and the opening of the economy to market capitalism and to the world. This substantial change contributed to improving living conditions and changing social attitudes of the Spanish.

B. Social Transformations

On the social level, Spain changed from a backward peasant society to an urban and industrial society, middle class and consumption-oriented.

1. Broader Migration Movements

  • a) Internal migration acquired in the decade of the 1960s an unprecedented scale: more than three million people migrated to industrial and service areas. Intensive rural exodus headed to industrial centers such as Madrid, Barcelona, Zaragoza, Valencia, and Vigo. The failure by these cities to absorb the mass immigration brought heavy urban balances expressed in a) settlements in the periphery as dormitory towns lacking adequate infrastructure and basic services, slums, and b) building control.
  • b) Foreign emigration reached very high figures: over one and a half million Spanish migrated to Europe between 1960 and 1973. The main destinations were France, Germany, and Switzerland. This external migration was crucial for the social stability of the system because it prevented the formation of a large segment of the population unemployed, and therefore potentially conflicting.
  • c) The modernization of the social structure. For the first time, the workforce in the secondary and tertiary sectors exceeded that of the primary sector. Also, the modernized social structure evolved into a partnership with a numerical predominance of the middle classes.

2. Welfare

The increase in per capita income and wages – although remaining low compared to Europe – had an impact on the high general standard of living of the population, with significant changes in consumption patterns: improved food (increased consumption of meat, milk, fruits, and vegetables), increased housing construction but largely without proper planning and speculative, improved allocation of households with increased acquisition of phones, refrigerators, and televisions, and dramatically increased the demand for automobiles. The famous Seat 600 became a symbol of the era and a usual image of Spanish cities and highways.

3. Change of Mind

This change was promoted by:

  • a) The highest level of training and information. Primary school enrollment rates reached 90%, and significantly grew the rates of access to secondary education and university. Both through college and through new publications under the 1966 Press Law and clandestine movements, criticism or ideas contrary to the regime were created.
  • b) The slow but progressive incorporation of women into the workforce.
  • c) Contact with Europe, which had a strong influence on the new mentality of the Spanish. New tastes, fashions, and customs were imposed from Europe, whose influence was introduced in Spain through tourists, especially in coastal areas where the scheme consented to attitudes and standard practices in Europe, and migrants in Europe when returned to Spain brought with them a new mindset. Europe was becoming a beacon of freedom in politics and ways of life, which the Spanish hoped to achieve. The result of all this was the rise – especially among urban youth – of a new mindset opposed to the authoritarian and conservative 1940s and 1950s. This was summed up in a struggle for liberty, moral, cultural, and political life, pushing ever harder for democracy. Economic changes translated into welfare had the effect of a change of mind expressed in the desire for political and social freedom, which became a major factor of destabilization of the Franco regime.

4. Other Major Changes

Other major changes experienced by the population were the increasing urban population, the increasing number of industrial workers who influenced the development of the labor movement, and a new unionism.

III. The Political Opposition

The circumstances of the new regime (prohibition of political parties, unions, lack of freedoms) made any attempt at political dissent illegal, minor, and sporadic.

A. The First Time

With the exile of hundreds of thousands of people in France, England, or America, parties and organizations attempted to reorganize and even formed a Republican government in exile. Also, the regional governments (Catalonia and the Basque Country) were formed in exile again. Inside Spain, small guerrilla groups took to the mountains, to extinction in the 1950s.

Within the same monarchical conspiracies, the Franco regime had a certain importance, pressing for a transition to the monarchy. Franco’s ability to marginalize or attract Don Juan and make it opt-in monarchical succession of his son Juan Carlos, eliminated the opposition, at least actively.

B. The Reorganization of the Opposition

When the international situation of the 1950s made it clear that the regime was consolidating and that Spain did not integrate into a democracy, there was a hard moment for the opposition. The anarchists (CNT) split, and their paintings were imprisoned, persecuted, or isolated in rural or urban guerrilla warfare, slowly diluted, and lost their influence in the labor movement.

The PSOE and the UGT, with foreign addresses and disconnected from reality, were hardly relevant in Spain.

Only PSUC in Catalonia and the PCE painfully achieved rearranging their pictures and making their presence felt in the first movements. The address was still in exile and quite embarrassed by the inner reality.

However, little by little, from 1950 on, other groups appeared on the scene: the Catalan Socialist Movement, the Christian Democrats, and the nationalist groups in Catalonia and the Basque Country. Their activity was minimal, and the risks they faced were huge. The most important was the beginning of a mass movement like the Barcelona tramway strike of 1951, the first strikes in Asturias, the university protests of 1956, or the strike in Barcelona the same year. Although it is clear that these movements were weak and limited, as was the situation, they later gave way to the movements of the 1960s.

C. Strengthening the Opposition

The 1960s marked the gradual consolidation of the movement against Franco. The growth of opposition within led to the creation of new centers of political leadership in the interior of the country that faced many times the views of the old leaders of the exile, who gradually lost their hegemony.

1. Reconstruction of the Worker and Student Movement

The economic recovery and discussion of the first collective agreements meant an increase in labor unrest. The workers’ strikes multiplied, and although it was a right not recognized, they ceased to be crimes of sedition. The choice of shop stewards overflowed the CNS (National Trade Union Center), since in many factories the workers began to create their own representative bodies (workers’ commissions). In this context, the organization CCOO was born. The first commission came in the Asturias workers’ strike in 1962, but its expansion was between 1964 and 1966. In the union elections of 1966, it was a remarkable success with which the regime backed down, declared illegal commissions, and their members were persecuted. Besides the labor mobilizations, the 1960s were marked by the emergence of a strong democratic student movement. The student organization Falange (SEU) was cornered by the appearance of Democratic Trade Unions in 1965.

2. The Rebirth of Nationalism

Catalan nationalism began to be a unifying factor of broad social sectors, leading to a unitary action of the different Catalan political forces, such as the Assembly of Catalonia in 1971. In the Basque Country, the Church had a basic role in shaping opposition to the Franco regime, especially with the progressive disengagement of the Church from the Regime. The PNV remained the dominant party, but its social conservatism led to the radicalization of some nationalist groups. Thus, ETA was born in 1959 and began armed actions in 1962, causing severe repression in the entire Basque Country.

3. The Different Political Forces

Of the major parties of the Republic, only the PC retained a certain strength and organization on the inside. The PSOE was, well into the 1960s, a party in exile, which experienced dislocation and the divergence between the direction of internal and external. The old leaders of the exile, such as Rodolfo Llopis, came into conflict with the young militants inside: In 1974, the Suresnes Congress overcame difficulties, and the party remained in the hands of the militants inside (Felipe González).

The PC was, despite its internal divisions, the party that best managed to keep its underground organization and the only one with a certain mass organization. This was because of its political line penetration in the mass organizations (workers’ committees, student unions, neighborhood associations, etc.) and their approach to all anti-Franco forces, regardless of the side that had waged war: policy”national reconciliation”

Also important was the awareness of some Catholic sectors who sided with the opposition. This included the training of Catholic character Christian Democrats to be hostile to the dictatorship (Democratic Union of Catalonia). Also, former collaborators of the regime (such as José Mª Areilza, the Christian Democrats, as Ruiz Jiménez, or former Falangists and Ridruejo) bucked the Franco regime and publicly spoke in favor of a democratic government. In June 1962, the moderate opposition participated, together with an exiled sector (excluding communists and anarchists) at a meeting in Munich, organized by the European Movement (meeting called by the Francoist ‘Munich conspiracy’). What was discussed in Munich were the political conditions that were given in Spain to join the European Common Market:

  • Democratic institutions: democratically elected parliament, government chosen by universal suffrage.
  • Guarantees to exercise the rights of person, individual freedom, right to life, to expression.
  • Recognition of the personality of the peoples of Spain: rights for the peoples that constitute Nations in Spain.
  • Freedom of association, right to strike.
  • Legalization of political parties and respect for the opposition.

IV. The Final Crisis of the Authoritarian Regime

The Franco dictatorship had come in early 1973 into a deep crisis. The democratic opposition from positions outside the rules, demanding its demise. Within the regime faced an immobile sector, known as the bunker, and another supporter of reforms, which were named starts.

A. Prime Minister Carrero Blanco

Following the murder in May 1973 of a police inspector by the terrorist group FRAP (Frente Revolucionario Anti-Fascist Patriotic), the regime launched a major offensive, with arrests of opponents of any sign. In these circumstances, Franco held the separation, under the Organic Law of State for the post of head of state and Prime Minister. Admiral Luis Carrero Blanco, vice president since 1969 and representative of the sector and the unchanging continuity of the dictatorship, was named president in June 1973. He reshuffled the Cabinet with the addition of known figures of their political party to silence the opposition.

From November, the Spanish economy suffered the first effects of the oil crisis, with soaring oil prices that raised inflation. The government undertook stabilization measures, answered with an increase in social unrest and, consequently, government repression intensified. In process 1001, the system tested its strength against the Workers’ Opposition, ten members of CC.OO. were tried for conspiracy.

On December 20, 1973, minutes before the trial of labor leaders, Carrero Blanco was assassinated by ETA. The closest collaborator of Franco disappeared. Uncertainty arose about the immediate political future.

B. The Spirit of February 12

Carlos Arias Navarro, Minister of the Interior and member of the ultra-conservative line, was named by Franco in place of the slain president. The problems of his government focused on the high inflation, the discontent of workers and students with the regime, and terrorism.

In the first half of 1974, the effects of the crisis worsened. Oil rose 70% in less than one year, an increase that fell on consumption, affecting the purchasing power of the Spanish. The economic crisis was widespread with the decline of remittances from international tourism and immigrants, who returned in droves. Unemployment rose, and living standards declined, while worker discontent was expressed increasingly openly.

On February 12, 1974, Arias Navarro delivered a speech before the Cortes program of deep political significance. It argued for a controlled opening of the regime, given the legalization of political associations (not games) and greater participation in the institutions. It was the spirit of February 12. The tolerant and permissive policy of the new Information Minister, Pio Cabanillas, reinforced this spirit of openness.

However, these reformist purposes were soon undermined by the execution of anarchist Salvador Puig Antich and the Añoveros case. Monsignor Añoveros, Bishop of Bilbao, published a pastoral letter in defense of the cultural and linguistic identity of the Basque people, which is why the government tried to temporarily abandon Spain, but, supported by the church hierarchy, he refused. Arias had to give in, and the rift between the regime and the church was extended.

The Prime Minister, defending the regime but aware of the need for reform, resistance was discussed among the so-called bunker and the pressure starts. The Carnation Revolution that ended the dictatorship in Portugal in a military coup progressive, mobilized all sectors and increased political struggle.

The opposition, in July 1974, created the Democratic Board, a forum sponsored by the PCE with the participation of CCOO, the Popular Socialist Party, and independent Carlists of prestige. Its strategy was based on democratic breakdown, the worse half of the triumph of a political general strike peacefully putting an end to the regime.

In August 1974, an ETA attack in the cafeteria Rolando, with 11 dead and over 70 wounded, gave a new dimension to the terror that the dictatorship took to trigger a repression that ended any semblance of openness. Pio Cabanillas was dismissed, whom he accused of permissiveness in the immobile sector in control. A wave of resignations in solidarity with the minister moved to the state apparatus, and many officials were added to the moderate opposition.

C. The End of the Scheme

At the end of 1974, the law on political associations came into force, which allowed, with major restrictions and preserving the essence of the regime, the existence of political groups. In March 1975, as a counterweight to the granting of immobility, Arias gave his Government entry to Fernando Herrero Tejedor, an openness as minister secretary general of the Movement. His untimely demise in an auto accident brought to the political forefront his collaborator Adolfo Suárez.

The Government intensified repression with the proclamation of emergency rule in Guipúzcoa and Vizcaya, to labor protest, and the actions of ETA. A tough anti-terrorism law became effective in August, while censorship acted with the kidnapping of critical issues such as the weekly magazines Cambio 16 or Triunfo.

The protest became increasingly evident. Part of the opposition, wary of the role of the PCE in the Democratic Board, founded the Democratic Convergence Platform, including the PSOE and the Spanish Social Democratic Union. The Platform and the Board opted for the democratic break with the demand for amnesty, the restoration of freedoms, and free elections.

In this tense atmosphere, on September 27, 1975, two soldiers from ETA and three from FRAP were executed under the Terrorism Act. The pressures to get a pardon in Spain, but especially at the international level, were very intense, and thirteen countries called their ambassadors for consultation.

Franco appealed to the concentrations in the Plaza de Oriente and, thus, on October 1 was supported by his supporters from a balcony of the Royal Palace. A few days later, he fell ill. Arias Navarro found himself isolated. The breakthrough of the Board and the Platform and system reformers demanded changes to the immobile sector resisted.

The situation was complicated by the question of Western Sahara. The Government had proposed to end the Spanish presence in the colony through a process of self-determination. Morocco claimed the territory, and King Hassan II organized the Green March, a mobilization of thousands of unarmed subjects who converged on the border to occupy the Sahara but finally gave up their purpose. Juan Carlos himself, acting head of state by Franco’s disease, visited Laayoune in support of the garrison and support initiatives such as Spanish.

The Government of Arias Navarro, paralyzed by the serious internal situation of the country without the active support of the UN and US pressure, changed its attitude and signed the Treaty of Madrid in November 1975. A change of a fisheries agreement and guarantees on Ceuta and Melilla, the Sahara was subject to an administration charged with Morocco and Mauritania to the call for a referendum on self-determination that was never carried out.

On November 20, 1975, Franco died in Madrid. The Prime Minister informed the country of the news on television and read the political testament. It ended a stage in the history of Spain.