Europe’s Strategic Role in the New International Order
International Order Without European Leadership
A new international order can exist without European leadership. Hedley Bull’s concept of order is useful here because he argues that international order does not necessarily require a hegemon, a sovereign authority, shared values, or Western dominance. For Bull, order exists when regular patterns of activity sustain basic goals of international society:
- Life: Protection from violence.
- Truth: Ensuring promises are kept.
- Property: Ensuring possession remains stable.
This means that Europe is not structurally necessary for order to exist. The post-World War II liberal order was strongly shaped by Western and European power through institutions such as the UN and Bretton Woods, and through liberal ideas such as free trade and multilateralism. However, this order was created “by someone and for someone,” so it should not be seen as neutral or universal.
Today, the global order is changing because of China’s rise, Russia’s challenge to Western dominance, technological competition, and legitimacy crises. From a Bullian perspective, this does not necessarily mean the end of order. It may mean the emergence of a different order with different leaders, rules, institutions, and narratives.
However, Europe can still remain relevant. It may not lead the entire order, but it can shape parts of it through trade, regulation, climate diplomacy, enlargement, development policy, and technology standards. The EU is especially strong as a regulatory, economic, and climate actor, even if it is weaker in hard security.
In conclusion, a new international order can exist without European leadership because order does not require Europe or the West to lead it. Europe can still be an important order-shaper, but it is more likely to be one actor among several than the central leader of the emerging global order.
Theories of the Modern International Order
Two opposing theories that can explain the impact of the modern international order for Europe are liberal institutionalism and realism.
From a liberal institutionalist perspective, the modern international order has been largely beneficial for Europe. This theory argues that institutions, rules, and interdependence can reduce conflict and facilitate cooperation. For Europe, the post-World War II order created a stable environment based on multilateral institutions, free trade, diplomacy, and economic cooperation. Institutions such as the UN, Bretton Woods, NATO, and later the EU itself helped rebuild Europe, stabilize relations between states, and embed Europe in a wider liberal order. From this view, Europe benefited from an order based on rules, trade, and cooperation, and later became one of its main defenders through climate diplomacy, trade policy, enlargement, and multilateralism.
Realism offers a more skeptical interpretation. Realists argue that international order mainly reflects power relations and the interests of dominant states. From this perspective, the modern order was not neutral: it was created by powerful Western actors and served their interests. Institutions may exist, but they often reproduce the existing balance of power. For Europe, this means that its role in the order depends less on norms and more on material capabilities, security dependence, and strategic interests. The EU’s dependence on NATO and the US, its weakness in hard security, and the challenge posed by Russia and China show that power politics still matters.
Therefore, these two theories lead to different conclusions. Liberal institutionalism sees the modern order as a framework that enabled European peace, cooperation, and influence. Realism sees it as a power structure where Europe’s relevance depends on capabilities and strategic position. A balanced answer is that both are useful: Europe benefited from institutions and interdependence, but the current turbulent order shows that power, security, and material capabilities remain essential.
Impact of China’s Rise on Europe
China’s rise has changed the international order surrounding Europe in important ways, but it has not fully transformed its basic structure. The best answer is that China has changed many things within the order, but not necessarily the fundamental properties of the order.
First, China has changed the material balance of power. It has become a major economic, technological, and institutional actor through trade, 5G, infrastructure, the Belt and Road Initiative, the AIIB, and other initiatives. For Europe, this creates both opportunities and vulnerabilities. China is an important partner, but Europe also depends on China for supply chains, rare earth elements, and critical technologies.
Second, China has changed Europe’s security thinking. Economic relations with China are no longer seen as purely economic. Trade, investment, data, infrastructure, and technology are increasingly treated as security issues. This explains why the EU now describes China as a cooperation partner, economic competitor, and systemic rival.
China also challenges the ideational side of the Western-led order. It promotes alternative ideas about development, sovereignty, and capitalism, such as “capitalism with Chinese characteristics.” This questions the assumption that Western liberal modernity is the only model.
However, China has not completely changed the basic logic of international order. States still matter, anarchy remains, power competition continues, and Western-led institutions still exist. In that sense, China’s rise confirms rather than replaces many realist assumptions about international politics.
In conclusion, China’s rise has not created a completely new order, but it has significantly changed the order surrounding Europe. It has altered power relations, created strategic dependencies, challenged Western norms, and pushed Europe toward a more geopolitical and security-conscious approach.
Theories Explaining EU Enlargement
Two rival theories that can explain EU enlargement are a liberal/constructivist approach and a realist/geopolitical approach. They differ because the first sees enlargement mainly as a process of norm diffusion and Europeanization, while the second sees it as part of a struggle over power and spheres of influence.
From a liberal/constructivist perspective, enlargement is one of the EU’s most successful foreign policy instruments because it transforms candidate countries through conditionality. States that want to join the EU must fulfill the Copenhagen Criteria, including democracy, rule of law, human rights, minority protection, and a functioning market economy. Through this process, the EU exports its rules, institutions, and norms. The 2004 “Big Bang” enlargement can be seen in this way: the EU reshaped the post-Cold War European order by integrating Central and Eastern European countries into a liberal, rules-based framework.
A realist perspective offers a different explanation. Realists argue that enlargement is not only a technical or normative process, but also a geopolitical one. By expanding eastward, the EU redrew the political map of Europe and moved closer to Russia’s perceived sphere of influence. From this view, Association Agreements, Partnership Agreements, and enlargement policy were not neutral: they changed the balance of power in Europe. This helps explain why Russia saw EU expansion in the Eastern neighborhood, especially in Ukraine, as a threat.
The difference between the two theories becomes clear in the case of Ukraine. From a liberal/constructivist view, Ukraine’s closer relationship with the EU reflects its agency and desire for democracy, reform, and Europeanization. From a realist view, Ukraine is a buffer state between competing regional powers, Russia and Europe/NATO, and the conflict reflects rivalry over influence.
In conclusion, both theories are useful. Liberal/constructivist theory explains how enlargement spreads EU norms and transforms states. Realism shows that enlargement also has geopolitical consequences and may be interpreted by other powers as strategic expansion. Therefore, EU enlargement is both a normative project and a geopolitical process.
European Defense and US Deprioritization
If the US further deprioritizes Europe, Europe would have to take more responsibility for its own security. However, according to Meijer and Brooks, Europe cannot yet fully defend itself without the US and NATO.
Their main argument is that Europe faces two major problems:
- Strategic Cacophony: European states do not share the same threat perceptions. For example, Eastern European states see Russia as the main threat, while others focus more on migration, terrorism, or the Mediterranean. This makes common defense planning difficult.
- Defense Capacity Shortfalls: Europe lacks sufficient weapons systems, readiness, spare parts, C4ISR capabilities, and integrated military cooperation. Its defense industry is also fragmented, which increases costs and creates interoperability problems.
These two problems reinforce each other: because Europeans disagree on threats, they do not invest coherently; because they do not invest coherently, capability gaps remain.
In conclusion, Europe can increase strategic autonomy, but it cannot yet fully replace the US. If the US withdraws further, Europe would be more vulnerable, especially to Russia, unless it overcomes strategic cacophony and strengthens its defense capabilities.
Achieving Technological Sovereignty in the EU
Technological sovereignty means that Europe wants to be less dependent on foreign powers for key technologies, such as AI, semiconductors, data, digital platforms, and infrastructure. This has become important because technology is no longer only an economic issue, but also a security and geopolitical one. In the US-China tech war, interdependence can be used as a weapon, for example through export controls, control over data, supply chains, or digital platforms.
The EU tries to achieve technological sovereignty in different ways:
- Regulatory Power: Through competition law, GDPR, and digital regulation, the EU tries to limit the power of big platforms and set global standards.
- Industrial Policy: The EU is investing in strategic sectors through the EU Chips Act, InvestAI, FDI screening, and the EuroStack, which aims to build European capacity in the digital value chain.
- Geopolitical Regulation: The best example is the AI Act, which tries to regulate high-risk AI and ban unacceptable uses such as social credit scoring.
Overall, the EU is trying to turn its regulatory and market power into real technological autonomy. However, the main problem is that Europe is still stronger at regulating technology than producing and scaling it. So technological sovereignty is an important ambition, but it is not fully achieved yet.
Evaluating the Success of the CSDP
The CSDP, or Common Security and Defence Policy, is the EU’s framework for security and defense cooperation. It is part of the broader CFSP and includes both military and civilian crisis-management missions. It developed after the Saint-Malo Declaration and was later formalized in the Lisbon Treaty. However, it is not a European army and it does not replace NATO.
CSDP can be seen as a partial success. It has made the EU a more relevant security actor, especially through civilian and military missions. Its civilian side is important because long-term stability requires police, judges, border support, rule of law, and institution-building, not only military force.
It also became more relevant after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The EU increased defense cooperation, supported Ukraine, developed the Strategic Compass, and promoted tools such as PESCO and the European Defence Agency. This shows that the taboo around EU defense has weakened.
However, CSDP remains limited. It depends on voluntary member state contributions, and member states still have different threat perceptions and national interests. Europe also faces capability gaps, weak readiness, limited joint procurement, and a fragmented defense industry.
So, CSDP is a step forward, but not a full success. It strengthened the EU as a crisis-management and regional security actor, but it has not created real European defense autonomy.
Strengths and Weaknesses of PESCO
PESCO, or Permanent Structured Cooperation, is an EU defense cooperation framework that allows willing member states to work together on military and capability projects. It was created to make European defense cooperation more systematic and to reduce fragmentation.
Its main strength is that it helps member states cooperate more closely without forcing all EU countries to move at the same speed. This is useful because defense is still very sensitive and national governments do not always agree. PESCO can also support joint procurement, capability development, interoperability, and a stronger European defense industry.
However, PESCO also has clear weaknesses. It still depends on member states’ political will and voluntary commitments. It does not create common EU military capabilities by itself, and it does not solve the deeper problems of different threat perceptions, NATO dependence, capability gaps, and fragmented defense industries.
So, PESCO is a useful step toward stronger European defense cooperation, but it is not a solution to all of Europe’s defense problems. It improves coordination, but it does not create real European defense autonomy on its own.
Navigating Pressures from the US and China
Europe is in a difficult position because it depends on both the US and China, but for different reasons. The US is still Europe’s main security partner through NATO, while China is very important for trade, supply chains, rare earths, and technology.
This means Europe cannot simply choose one side without costs. The US pushes Europe to be tougher on China, especially in areas like 5G, semiconductors, export controls, and security. China, meanwhile, can influence European states through investment, market access, infrastructure, and business interests.
A useful idea here is wedging. Some European countries are easier to influence when their governments are divided or when business groups have strong interests in China. The Huawei case in the UK shows this well: Chinese telecom companies had entered the market and built support among business actors, which made the decision politically harder. In the end, the UK banned Huawei, but the case shows how pressure from China works through domestic politics, not only through direct state pressure.
So Europe tries to balance both sides. It still needs the US for security, but it also does not want to completely cut economic ties with China. That is why the EU describes China as a partner, competitor, and systemic rival at the same time. Overall, Europe is trying to gain more strategic autonomy, but this is hard because member states have different interests, dependencies, and threat perceptions.
Challenges to EU Foreign Policy Capabilities
The EU has important foreign policy tools, but its capabilities are limited by several challenges.
- Intergovernmentalism: EU foreign policy is still highly intergovernmental, especially in CFSP and CSDP. This means member states keep control, and decisions often require agreement or unanimity. As a result, the EU can be slow, divided, or unable to act decisively.
- Strategic Cacophony: Member states often have different national interests and threat perceptions. For example, some countries see Russia as the main threat, while others focus more on migration, terrorism, the Mediterranean, or economic relations.
- Capability-Expectations Gap: The EU has high ambitions to be a global actor, but it does not always have the military, political, or institutional capacity to match those ambitions. This was visible in Yugoslavia and Libya, where the EU had declarations but limited ability to act militarily.
- NATO Dependence: The EU remains dependent on NATO and the US for hard security and territorial defense. CSDP has developed crisis-management tools, but it is not a European army.
- Material Problems: Europe faces fragmented defense industries, weak joint procurement, capability gaps, limited readiness, and dependence on foreign technologies.
So, the EU can conduct foreign policy, especially in trade, regulation, climate, enlargement, and development, but it is much weaker in hard security because of internal divisions, intergovernmentalism, NATO dependence, and limited military capabilities.
Key Concepts in European International Relations
1. The Council of the European Union
The Council of the European Union represents the governments of the member states and is one of the EU’s main decision-making bodies. In foreign policy, it meets as the Foreign Affairs Council, with national foreign ministers and the High Representative. It is especially important in CFSP/CSDP, where member states remain central and decision-making is strongly intergovernmental.
2. Normative Power Europe
Normative Power Europe is the idea that the EU influences world politics through norms and values, not only through military or economic power. These include democracy, human rights, rule of law, peace, and multilateralism. Enlargement and climate diplomacy are prime examples. However, the idea is contested because the EU does not always apply these norms consistently, as shown by critiques of its role in various global conflicts.
3. Post-World War II International Order
The post-World War II international order was shaped after 1945, primarily by Western and US power. It was based on liberal ideas, multilateralism, free trade, interdependence, and institutions such as the UN and Bretton Woods. Europe benefited from this order through US economic and security support, including the Marshall Plan and NATO. Today, it is challenged by China’s rise, Russia, technology, and legitimacy crises.
4. Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)
The CSDP is the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy and is part of the broader CFSP. It gives the EU tools for civilian and military crisis-management missions, such as peacekeeping, border support, police missions, and rule-of-law assistance. However, it is not a European army and does not replace NATO, because it depends on voluntary capabilities from member states.