Wittgenstein’s Tractatus: Language, Meaning, and the Mystical
Item Language and World
The purpose of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus is to establish the role and the legitimate use of language. Language can only describe facts, so there are many aspects of life, as essential as those related to moral or artistic values, or even logic, which are beyond the expressive possibilities of language. These aspects, which the author calls mystical, are unspeakable.
The Language and the Picture Theory of Meaning
Wittgenstein considers language as an intermediary between thought and reality: language is the manifestation of thoughts (its costume) and thoughts are only expressed through language. Talking and thinking are therefore almost the same, although language cannot convey all thoughts, but only those that relate to the world and can be described. He considers the fundamental unit of meaning to be the proposition.
According to this theory, a proposition is a representation, or picture, of reality itself. It is like painting a picture: the function of language is representative and its purpose is to reproduce reality. The comparison between a proposition and a representation is based on the idea that language, like paintings, is composed of simple or atomic elements. The position of each element and its relationship with the other elements have a critical influence on the form of a painting, just as they do in a proposition. If the order of the names that appear in a sentence is changed, its meaning is completely different.
The author uses this theory to solve the problem of meaning. Language makes sense because it shares the same logical component as reality, which Wittgenstein calls logical form. The logical form is the relationship between elements that can occur in reality and can be reproduced by language. It is the set of possible relationships between different elements that are actually supported and reflected in language.
The common element between a statement and reality is the logical form. Without a common logical form between thought and reality, language could not convey meaning. A statement is meaningless when it refers to objects and relations that are not possible in reality, that is, when it describes something logically impossible. A statement is meaningful if it represents a possibility that is supported by the logical form. Moreover, sentences that have meaning can be divided into true or false. A sentence may convey meaning to the ordinary listener, but be false.
State of Affairs, Objects, and Facts
A state of affairs consists of objects and their relationships, and is one of the possibilities offered by reality. States of affairs share the same logical form as an elementary proposition. The objects of reality correspond to the elements represented in the picture or representation and are the names used in the proposition. A fact is a state of affairs that has actually happened and which corresponds to a true representation.
States of affairs are the potential realities of relating different objects, and facts are the realization of one of these possibilities. A proposition has meaning only when it represents a situation that may occur in reality.
Say and Show
What is said is a sentence that serves to represent a reality. Any real object can be described through language. What is shown is not a real object, but it is what allows language to refer to real objects and have meaning.
In a sentence with meaning, something is said about the world: it has a logical form shared with reality. That logical form is not said, because it is not an object of the world, but it is present in language in each proposition. It also ensures that human beings could only describe the logical form by standing outside language. Language, when trying to represent itself, ceases to be representative.
Wittgenstein distinguishes between what can and what cannot be said. These limits are determined by the notion of logical form and the difference between saying and showing. The logical form sets limits because language cannot be used to refer to a state of affairs that is not possible in reality. For example, traditional metaphysics goes beyond the limits that language marks by referring to unobservable entities, like the soul.
Traditionally, philosophical statements have represented logically impossible truths, creating pseudo-propositions that are rooted in a misuse of language. The difference between saying and showing also reveals the limits of language. What is shown (such as logic, ethics, aesthetics, etc.) is the basis of life, but language is unable to describe it: it is the mystical. Logic or ethics relate to aspects that language can only show, and not say. Wittgenstein’s Tractatus ends by saying: “What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence.” This is not intended to belittle these aspects of life; however, they are the most important, he says. But for him, the mystical is what can be shown, but cannot be said. As the fundamental problems of life cannot be set forth without incurring a misuse of language, nor are they thinkable, these problems simply disappear due to the impossibility of formulating them (they can only be shown). So, what is not in the world, cannot be said. This is only possible by referring to pseudo-propositions.
Context
This is a piece of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, one of the most important works of Ludwig Wittgenstein. It is a work about meaning; its aim is to draw the boundaries of meaning, to separate what can be said from what cannot be said. It is usual to distinguish two periods in the thought of this philosopher, called “early Wittgenstein” and “later Wittgenstein”. Although there are important differences between the two phases of his philosophy, there are several common elements, such as his interest in language and his appreciation of philosophy. The major work of the “first Wittgenstein” is the “Tractatus…” and the major works of the “second Wittgenstein” are the “Blue and Brown Books” and “Philosophical Investigations.”
Ludwig Wittgenstein was born in Austria in 1889. He grew up in a household that provided an exceptionally intense environment for the artistic and intellectual. The philosopher began his engineering studies at the University of Berlin and continued in Manchester, devoted to aeronautical research for several years. But after reading Bertrand Russell, his interests shifted to the problems of the foundations of mathematics and, hence, to logic and philosophy. From 1912 he continued his studies at Cambridge, where he was later appointed professor. He eventually died of cancer in Cambridge in 1951.
Many authors influenced his thinking, including Gottlob Frege, who is considered one of the founders of modern logic, mathematics, and philosophy of language, and Bertrand Russell, who developed a denotative theory that in part comes from Hume. Wittgenstein accepts this theory but makes it more complex.
Wittgenstein was a very important philosopher during the 20th century. His most important works managed to create a school of thought, but his relationship with philosophy and academic circles was always unstable and troubled, like his own life. The two periods in the thinking of Ludwig Wittgenstein created two independent currents in English philosophy. The time in which the philosopher lived, the late 19th century until the early 20th century, was characterized by advances in theology, medicine, and science in general, the end of slavery in developed countries, and the liberation of women in most countries, but also by crises and human despotism, causing effects such as world wars, genocide, social and political exclusion, widespread unemployment, and poverty.
Summary: Say and Show Concept
This fragment belongs to one of the most important works of Wittgenstein called Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. The main theme of this text shows us that the limits of what language can express can be found, and beyond these limits is an encounter with the inexplicable. First, it says that language can describe the world and we can only ask questions that we can answer, and we should refrain from asking what cannot be answered. The second part talks about the vital issues that are beyond language and therefore we cannot ask about them or receive answers.
Notion of Say and Show
A proposition has meaning only when it represents a situation that may occur in reality. What is said is a sentence that serves to represent a reality. Any real object can be described through language. What is shown is not a real object, but it is what allows language to refer to real objects and have meaning.
In a meaningful sentence, something is said about the world: it has a logical form shared with reality. That logical form is not said, because it is not an object of the world, but it is present in language in each proposition. It also ensures that human beings could only describe the logical form by standing outside language. Language, when trying to represent itself, ceases to be representative.
Wittgenstein distinguishes between what can and what cannot be said. These limits are determined by the notion of logical form and the difference between saying and showing. The logical form sets limits because language cannot be used to refer to a state of affairs that is not possible in reality. For example, traditional metaphysics goes beyond the limits that language marks by referring to unobservable entities, like the soul.
Traditionally, philosophical statements have represented logically impossible truths, creating pseudo-propositions that are rooted in a misuse of language. The difference between saying and showing also reveals the limits of language. What is shown (such as logic, ethics, aesthetics, etc.) is the basis of life, but language is unable to describe it: it is the mystical. Logic or ethics relate to aspects that language can only show, and not say.
Criticism of the Language Issue
The logical consequence of the theory of language held by Wittgenstein in his Tractatus (i.e., the correspondence between language and the world, in which the first should correspond to states of affairs in the second) is a thorough criticism of how language has been used in traditional philosophy. All that can be said clearly indicates the natural sciences (the set of true propositions concerning actual states of affairs). What to say then about the rest of language activity? Ethics, for example, speaks of good and evil, metaphysics of being and non-being, aesthetics of beauty and ugliness, theology of the sacred and the sublime, and so on. What to do with all the speeches that address the meaning of life and so many other things about which there can never be relevant states of affairs in the world? You will never have a real fact (scientifically describable) concerning God, being, goodness, or beauty. As much as you analyze a Velázquez painting, you will not find any physicochemical properties that apply to beauty. Therefore, we should condemn the nonsense of that “other language” that violates the limits of the world, something that seems to be “outside” the world, something that is not at all a thing of the world. So ethics and aesthetics fall into nonsense when they try to say something by confusing the good, the beautiful, or the sublime with an object or state of affairs.
The role of philosophy as a critical analysis of language would cure us of our traditional claims to say what cannot be said (that propositions can be constructed that can be true or false of objects in the world) and, to that extent, heals us from the nonsense and absurdity that can lead to our metaphysical aspirations. The statement with which the Tractatus ends (Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent) was interpreted by members of the Vienna Circle in the narrow sense as condemning the pretensions of seriousness of any discourse outside the sciences. But Wittgenstein himself admitted in his second period the legitimacy of other languages different from the natural sciences. In these works, Wittgenstein distances himself from these interpreters, speaking of himself as the author of the Tractatus. The purpose of the Tractatus is to establish the function and the legitimate use of language. Language can only describe facts, so there are many aspects of life that are beyond the expressive possibilities of language. These unspeakable aspects the author called mystical. Wittgenstein considers language as an intermediary between thought and reality: language is the manifestation of thoughts and these alone are manifested through language. Talking and thinking are about the same, although language does not allow all thoughts to be conveyed, but only those that relate to the world and can be described. Language is composed of the simplest elements. The position of each element has a decisive influence as it can change the meaning of a sentence. The author uses this to solve the problem of meaning. Language makes sense because it shares the same logical component as reality, which Wittgenstein calls logical form.
Summary: Science and Philosophy Concept
This fragment belongs to one of the most important works of Wittgenstein called Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. The main theme of the text is to know what the correct method of philosophy is. First, it states that the method would be not to say anything more than what can be said; second, it tells us what philosophy can say, which is comparable to the referential theory of language; and it also tells us that the world consists of facts, everything that is not a fact has no value, what matters is what can be said, and what cannot be said must be passed over in silence because it cannot be expressed. Then, we have to overcome these propositions to see the world properly.
Science and Concept
The logical consequence of the theories of language held by Wittgenstein in his Tractatus is a deep criticism of how it has been used in traditional philosophy. Everything that can be said clearly indicates natural science. Ethics speaks of good and evil, metaphysics of being and non-being, aesthetics of beauty and ugliness, theology of the sacred and the sublime, etc. You will never have a true fact corresponding to God, being, goodness, or beauty. So we should condemn the nonsense of that “other language” that violates the boundaries of the world, something that seems to lie outside the world, something that is not at all a thing of the world. So ethics and aesthetics fall into nonsense when they try to say something by confusing the good, the beautiful, or the sublime with an object or state of affairs. The function of philosophy as a critical analysis of language consists in curing us of our traditional claims to say what cannot be said. The statement with which the Tractatus ends (Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent) was interpreted by members of the Vienna Circle as a condemnation of the pretensions of seriousness of any discourse outside the sciences. In these works, Wittgenstein distances himself from those interpretations, speaking of himself as the author of the Tractatus.