Utilitarianism: Happiness and Moral Responsibility in a Globalized World
Utilitarianism: Happiness and Moral Responsibility
Mill’s Definition of Happiness
1. Explain briefly: In this fragment, Mill defines happiness from a utilitarian perspective. According to him, it is not the happiness that the act provides the agent of the action, but the happiness of all those whom this action will affect. To make this notion of happiness effective, Mill argues that whoever performs the action must be able to distance themselves from their own action, as if they were a mere external spectator.
The Challenge of Impartiality
2. What does it say in the text, “to be: With this expression, Mill points to one of the toughest challenges facing the utilitarian criterion of happiness. Indeed, utilitarianism seeks to move beyond individual interest and happiness to the happiness and interest of groups. This is reflected in the famous formula “the greatest pleasure for the greatest number.” The problem with such an approach, of course, lies in the fact that whoever performs the action has to agree to prioritize collective interests above their individual interests. Not only that, but they should be as strictly impartial as a disinterested and benevolent spectator. When humans act, however, we do not behave like automatons performing moral calculus; we do not assess the consequences of our actions in a dispassionate and distant manner. We all know that in most cases, what we do affects, to a greater or lesser extent, those around us. However, the simple fact of not always knowing this becomes a strong enough reason to modify our course of action to the point where we subtract personal benefits for ourselves. Herein lies the most important practical difficulty of utilitarianism. This difficulty is increased by the fact that Mill claims that his criterion has a utilitarian effect beyond specific acts. That is, as opposed to act utilitarianism (which advises the assessment of utility in each specific event and was primarily defended by Jeremy Bentham), Mill proposes rule utilitarianism, which allows us to go further and not only evaluate the utility of specific actions but also to establish moral standards that can be translated into useful actions, i.e., to provide the most happiness.
Comparing Mill’s and Epicurus’s Concepts of Happiness
3. Compare the concept of happiness: One of the ethical theories to which utilitarianism is most easily linked is the hedonistic theory of Epicurus (341-270 BC). Like the Greek philosopher, Mill also believes that the source of happiness lies in seeking pleasure and satisfaction. From a very general point of view, therefore, we could say that Mill’s utilitarianism is also a hedonistic theory, since it is based, like the ethics of Epicurus, on the notion of pleasure (hedoné in Greek). Now, as the texts we are discussing show us, there is a very important difference between Epicurean hedonism and Mill’s. According to the Greek philosopher, obtaining happiness through the exercise of pleasure is a strictly individual endeavor. Epicurus advised, in fact, against social practices such as politics and even considered friendship beneficial for obtaining happiness. After reading the text of Mill that heads this commentary, it is clear that the utilitarian perspective is quite different. According to the English philosopher, one could not truly be happy, even if they obtained maximum individual happiness, if this were in a context of collective unhappiness. Happiness, for a utilitarian, is clearly social happiness, which seeks to fit individual happiness into a pluralistic framework of maximum happiness, and it does not allow, under any circumstances, the former to override the latter.
The Challenge of Moral Responsibility in a Globalized World
4. Do you agree with the thesis of Mill: Once again, Mill’s thesis raises a problem that is more theoretical than practical. To say that you cannot be happy in an atmosphere of collective unhappiness, and therefore that collective happiness must prevail over individual happiness, is quite easy to sustain on paper. The problem, however, lies in the fact that you are putting into play such abstract notions, so lacking in concreteness, that they can lead us to be severely misled and paralyzed when it comes to judging. Needless to say, without a doubt, speaking of “others” in the first half of the nineteenth century in England was much simpler than it is for us now. Who are we thinking of when Mill asks that we look not at the agent’s own happiness, but at [that of] all those affected? Who are those affected by my actions every day in a globalized society, that is, where equalities, and especially inequalities, become more evident on a global scale every day? My “others” are not, in any way, just my family, the circle made up of my friends, my neighbors (whom I do not even know), or the citizens of the town or city where I live. My “others” are, increasingly, children in Brazil or India who stitch soccer balls with which I play; the thousands of women in African villages who have to travel tens of kilometers every day to fill a bucket of water while I throw away the same amount just to wait for the hot water in the shower; all those who die on the other side of a planet reheated due to the tailpipe emissions of my car. In fact, each and every one of my small acts increasingly tends to have causes (that is, possibilities of being) and impacts that completely escape me, even though I could not have foreseen them. What sense can it still make, in a global context like ours, to speak of “others”? Maybe it makes more sense than ever; more than ever, we must think of “others” as *all* others (if that is possible). In any case, we are looking at a scenario that has little to do with the one Mill envisioned nearly 200 years ago, because it requires a much more concrete meaning and scope of our moral responsibility.