Unification Decree of 1937: Franco’s Rise and Spain’s Single Party
Unification Decree 1937
Classification
This primary source document is a legal-political text from the Spanish Civil War. It was written on April 19, 1937, by General Francisco Franco and published the following day in the State’s Official Gazette.
Franco, a key figure in the conspiracy against the republican democracy, leveraged his military experience in the Moroccan War to command the army guarding the protectorate starting July 18, 1936.
Analysis
The decree presents two main ideas: First, Franco places the Falange Española Tradicionalista y de las JONS (FET y de las JONS), referred to as the “national movement,” under his direct authority. Second, the new state is built upon the integration of traditional Spanish values, embodied by the Carlists (traditionalism), and new ideological concepts coalescing under fascism.
Historical Context
Following the failed military coup of July 18, Spain was divided into Republican and “national” zones, each with its own institutions. The death of General Sanjurjo left the rebels without a clear leader, leading to the establishment of a National Defense Board chaired by Cabanellas. This board suspended the Constitution and banned political parties.
On October 1, 1936, Franco was elected as the highest political and military authority of the national side, influenced by his military successes and recognition from Hitler and Mussolini. He established his headquarters in Salamanca.
The Franco regime’s foundations were inspired by fascist states: one-party totalitarian regimes with an absolute ruler. Political cohesion was necessary for the diverse groups supporting the uprising (Falangists, Carlists, monarchists, CEDA members). This unification was achieved through the April 19 decree, creating a single party under Franco’s authority. The decree also addressed the prolonged war effort following the failed attempts to capture Madrid, shifting focus to the Northern campaign and necessitating political unification in the rear.
Review of the Ideas
Franco references the ongoing civil war, initiated with the military uprising in Morocco on July 17, 1936. The failures at Jarama and Guadalajara shifted his focus to the “North campaign,” recognizing the need for a prepared rear for a prolonged war. The decree is one of the measures taken to achieve this.
The rebels recognized the need for unified leadership early on. By early 1937, rumors of Franco establishing a party were circulating. The right’s previous advantage, the CEDA, was replaced by Franco’s single party. While factional fighting within the Falange aided Franco, it wasn’t the primary cause of his decision to merge political and military power.
The decree aimed to unify the various political forces that participated in the uprising against the Spanish Republic. It was presented as a necessary step to organize the “new” state that would emerge after victory.
Ideological differences caused internal tensions. The new state, already institutionalized, would follow the principles of the National Revolution according to Franco. The Falange Española, a fascist party founded in 1933 by José Antonio Primo de Rivera, merged with Onésimo Redondo and Ramiro Ledesma Ramos’s JONS, adopting Nazi ideology. Falangists were anti-liberal, anti-Marxist, anti-democrats, and nationalists, advocating for an authentic revolution. They had engaged in violent actions during the Second Republic and mobilized volunteers for the civil war. Franco needed them, and his “new” state drew inspiration from national syndicalism, though he aimed to control them.
The Carlists, who had opposed the liberal system throughout the nineteenth century, organized their military actions into units called “requetés.”
The decree’s logic, following fascist and militarist principles, was to unite all political forces under a single hierarchy, mirroring the established systems in Italy under Mussolini and Germany under Hitler.
Franco highlighted the contributions of the Requetés and Falange to the state. He argued that this union of new and traditional elements had precedents in other totalitarian countries. Article 1 of the decree unified the Requetés and Falangists into a single party, the Falange Española Tradicionalista y de las JONS (FET y de las JONS), under his leadership. Society was organized around military virtues: service, hierarchy, and brotherhood. All other parties and organizations were dissolved. The party was headed by the Chief of State (Franco), a secretariat, and a national congress. The militias of both groups were merged into a single national militia, with Franco as Supreme Leader. The party, known as the National Movement, formed the basis of the Franco regime, with Franco adopting the title of Caudillo, imitating Mussolini and Hitler.
This merger faced resistance. Some Carlists considered the decree illegitimate as it bypassed the authorities of the Traditionalist Communion (CT). The 1940s saw significant clashes between Carlism and the Franco regime. Falange leader Manuel Hedilla rejected the unification, but Franco neutralized leading dissidents, achieving peace in the national political sphere, eliminating infighting, and allowing for concentrated military efforts.
Conclusion and Scope
The decree represents the necessity of constructing a new framework as victory approached, a process defined as the “National Revolution.” The new state was built on the integration of traditional Spanish values (Carlism) and new concepts advocated by the Falange Española.
Throughout 1938, military victories solidified Franco’s radical fascist tendencies and increased his power. The new party became an artificial entity without autonomous action, as Franco prevented any internal statutes that would limit his power. The unity achieved during the civil war significantly contributed to the victory. Franco’s personal and military dictatorship, with a single party of limited influence, was born during the civil war.
Bibliography
– CARR, Raymond. History of Spain. Barcelona, Península, 2001.
– PÉREZ, Joseph. History of Spain. Barcelona, Crítica, 2003.