Understanding Descartes’ Cogito and the Nature of Existence
The Cogito
The first truth of the Cartesian system, “I think therefore I am,” is cogito ergo sum.
It is a conclusion of reasoning, since the validity of these has been questioned. “I think therefore I am” is a truth given in intuition: to doubt the self realizes that it exists. Moreover, the more one stresses the self in doubt of everything else, the more certain one notes that at least one is thinking and there.
To think therefore I am is finally a truth with which Descartes refutes the skeptics. The method eliminates doubt, as if it were false, all that of which is never in doubt. But doubt crashes with the existence of self, which is evident as thought or doubt.
From this, Descartes proceeds to explain other truths that he feels are included in the first: the essence of self, the criterion of truth, and the existence of God.
In the process of discovery, the order in which each truth is revealed is important, as these truths are chained to each other in connection with the method that the author has proposed. Each occupies a specific place, with statements that are only set when one is unsure about their truth.
The Res Cogitans
The second truth discovered by Descartes states, “I am a thinking thing.”
With the first, he expresses the discovery of one’s existence; now he finds out the existence of self. Once I know that I exist, I wonder what I am. Following the scholastic distinction between the existence of something (that is really out of mind, as reality) and its essence (its nature and definition).
Cartesian definitions to be taken into account are:
– Substance is that which does not need to exist otherwise.
– Mode to exist is something that requires another.
– Attribute or property is the essential characteristic of a substance. The essence of a substance is its definition; the definition of a substance is by its attribute.
Descartes distinguishes three substances: the self, whose attribute is thinking; God, whose attribute is infinity or perfection; and the world, which has the attribute of extension.
The second truth discovered concerns the essence or nature of self or subject. This replaces the Platonic dualism that Aristotle refuted and exposed, as in Plato, “I am my soul,” a thinking thing (res cogitans), entirely distinct from the body.
This distinction between body and soul argues that the existence of the body cannot be doubted, but the thought itself can be. The ego realizes that when one thinks, one exists in all; however, it is possible to assume that there is no body. So, the self is a substance whose essence is thinking.
The radical separation between thought and extension, between body and mind, poses the problem of explaining the communication that undoubtedly exists between the two substances. When the mind gives a command to the body, and this is executed, there is communication between the thinking substance and the extended substance. Descartes’s critics felt that his system did not solve this problem properly; therefore, Spinoza and Leibniz paid attention to respond.
The Criterion of Truth
It is the general rule under which it must be recognized that a certain proposition is true.
Knowledge (an idea or opinion) can be true or false, according to whether it coincides with reality. But Descartes was also concerned with whether human beings can achieve certainty or subjective assurance about what they know.
The Cartesian criterion of truth is formulated in the first rule of method; yet the standard of truth has two difficulties:
“This is a purely formal approach, i.e., referring to what generally would be required to recognize a truth (that it is clear and distinct). Still, that approach would lack formal fill containing concrete and undeniable truth that manifests as outlined in a clear and distinct manner. When Descartes discovers ‘I think therefore I am,’ he also believes he has found the content of the criterion of truth: all that is perceived by some evidence, such as one’s own thinking existence. The criterion of truth is clarity and distinctness, but precisely the clarity and distinction of the cogito.
“The criterion of clarity and distinction is worth knowing: what I clearly and distinctly perceive subjectively is safe, but it serves to ensure that what I perceive clearly and distinctly is also true in reality, outside of mind. The evil genius hypothesis does not override certainty about the existence of each one, nor the certainty that two plus three equals five, but it casts doubt on the reality that two plus three makes five. Therefore, lack of security makes the criterion of clarity and distinction through the self-test created by God good. The test itself will not be fully seated to prove the existence of God, and thus all of our clear and distinct ideas correspond with reality. The existence of a loving God is the final guarantee or ultimate criterion of truth.
Descartes classifies his ideas according to three criteria:
– According to their relevance to reality, they may be true (representing what exists) or false (what does not exist).
– According to the criterion of truth: clear and distinct, unmistakable or confusing, if they do not meet the criteria of clarity and distinction.
– According to their origin or provenance: adventitious ideas, which seem to come from outside, as they coincide with the reality that the senses apparently show. Although the truth of these ideas is uncertain, since Descartes’ true state prohibits knowing through the senses. Factitious ideas are those produced by the imagination and do not coincide with reality, therefore, they are false. Innate ideas are those already in the mind or soul. They could not be produced by the subject itself, because if so, they could be modified at will. Thus, Descartes concludes that they have been placed in the subject by God. If we also take into account that the security of the criterion of truth is the existence of God, then ideas that are true (clear and distinct) coincide with innate ideas and the real, since the existence of God ensures their correspondence with reality.
