Rousseau’s Philosophy: Reason, Faith, and the Human Condition
Country Cluster 1: Rousseau and the Practical Orientation of Philosophy: The Critique of the Enlightenment – Concepts of Reason and Progress
Rousseau’s philosophy is characterized by the practical turn he gave to philosophy. Unlike Descartes, Rousseau departs from theoretical rationalism, betting on a practical philosophy closer to life, morality, and politics.
Rousseau’s philosophy is fundamentally that of the Enlightenment and its blind faith in reason, inherited from Descartes. This blind faith in reason fueled the rise of the Enlightenment, a cultural movement that developed in Europe from the early 17th century until the French Revolution. It occurred throughout Europe but took root most strongly in England and France.
The Enlightenment saw reason as an instrument to achieve knowledge and wisdom. Reason led to a boom in all fields of science, with figures such as Isaac Newton in physics, thinkers like Voltaire and Montesquieu, and Rousseau himself as ideologues of the French Revolution.
The great development of reason and science led to significant progress. The Enlightenment believed that progress would continue if science and reason were the driving forces. To achieve this progress, the enlightened thought it useful to educate the people because, with better education, all people could use reason and understand the world around them without the superstition and mysticism of the Old Regime.
Rousseau did not believe that progress ensured the welfare and happiness of society. He believed that the more developed a society became, the more corrupt and degenerate it would be. Progress, he argued, meant that society would degenerate until its complete destruction. This is seen in human history: when a civilization reaches its peak, it begins to decline until its eventual self-destruction—a clear example being the Roman Empire. Progress does not guarantee the happiness of man. These ideas are developed by Rousseau in his first work, Discourse on the Arts and Sciences, awarded by the Academy of Dijon.
Rousseau was concerned about the pursuit of happiness for man; he did not care about metaphysical or transcendental searches or solving the big problems that had always preoccupied philosophy. Rousseau was worried that man should be happy, and this required a turn toward the practical.
Rousseau shifted from the major problems of traditional philosophy to issues of truth and how it affects man. Rousseau was not concerned with trying to understand what God is or how He “works”; he was more interested in showing only His existence. He addressed this by trying to seek the happiness of man. For this, reason was not needed, but feelings and heart. The heart is the way to find true happiness.
It is at this point that there was a confrontation with the Enlightenment.
The enlightened wanted to know everything and adopted a totally modern, enlightened attitude, believing that reason was the only way to know everything around them. The importance of reason in life led them to assume the role of a goddess and the only way of knowing the world. The enlightened also had the idea of knowing the world to settle on it properly. Rousseau saw that God was enthroned as the only reason, this being a very effective but simple instrument. Reason is indeed an irreplaceable aid to man in understanding the world we live in, yet, being a simple instrument, it had been given more importance than it deserved, putting it in the first place. This is the source of his opposition to the Enlightenment.
Rousseau also objected because the heart and feelings are the only way to know what surrounds us, while enlightened rationalism believed in blind faith in reason as a way of knowing.
Another point where he disagreed was in progress. Unchecked material and technological progress leads to self-destruction and waste. Since it is positive, Rousseau believed that if we can achieve an optimal level in technical development, why not reach it in the moral realm, that is, in practical terms? Rousseau saw the need to broaden the moral plane more than the scientific one, which had already been sufficiently, if not excessively, developed.
Rousseau was in favor of a practical—moral—philosophy that helped man to be happier while ensuring that he did not complicate matters by addressing issues beyond his reach. Cases unattainable for human understanding serve only to waste time. There are other issues that affect us more directly, and yet we do not pay attention to them because we are looking at others that we will never fully understand. Therefore, we should focus on the things that we can understand and leave those that surpass us. These limits of reason, limits of pure reason, just outlined in Rousseau, will be much better described in the critical philosophy of Kant.
Thematic Area 3: The Articles of Faith – God and the Notion of Order
During the 18th century, Newtonian physics developed, stating that the universe is matter and works mechanically. There is neither God nor souls that move the universe. Rousseau directed harsh criticism against this movement, which considered science autonomous from God. To counter these materialistic theses, he puts forward two arguments: spontaneity and the cause of motion. Rousseau adopts a theistic stance, believing in certain truths not reached by revelation or purely logical deduction but by a reason that accommodates feeling. This is reflected in the articles of faith of the Savoyard Vicar.
Rousseau says that everything perceived by the senses is matter, and we can perceive the qualities of different materials. He notes that some things are moving while others are at rest, and he points out that movement is the result of a cause, just as rest is the absence of a possible source of movement. That is, when there is nothing that moves the subject, it does not move because its natural state is rest. Rousseau understands movement as any change in status or place that is always done in a particular direction. Rousseau argues that spontaneity is the voluntary movement that is in the same body and is the driving force in moving things that have no will of their own. Spontaneity is something external to matter, which does not possess it. He says this because he feels it. This applies to his reasoning, “I feel, therefore I am.” At the same time, Rousseau realizes that the world is dead matter, so it follows that any being with free will must move it. He also realizes that the world is too well-organized for there to be nothing that directs it. However, the ground motion is commanded because it is subject to laws; it always works well. Thus, Rousseau shows that the world has the freedom that gives spontaneity.
For all this, Rousseau argues that the causes of movement are not in the area, but it receives and communicates the movement, but it does not produce it. Every movement not produced by another comes only from a spontaneous act. Lifeless bodies act not only by the movement that a will gives them, and without will, there is no real action. Here, Rousseau states his first article of faith: there is a will that moves the universe and the matter within it. With this claim, he refutes the enlightened idea that the universe moves by itself, stating that if you only look at the material, you are staying at the effects. And he says again, if you conceive of matter as producing motion, you conceive an effect without a cause, which is the same as not thinking anything. Rousseau is confident that matter could not have the innate ability to move because, if so, we would not conceive of matter at rest; it would always be in motion. All this is perceived by his senses, confirming the idea that feeling is a guarantee of knowledge. Regarding this article of faith, Rousseau argues that man is incapable of knowing the qualities of will and how it encourages matter, only that it does so because we perceive it. But these metaphysical questions do not overly concern Rousseau because he does not try to discover the ultimate truths of the why of things. His practical interest is well above the theoretical.
Continuing with what has been said before, to give motion to matter is to give it a cause. Rousseau cannot imagine a universe in chaos; it is easier to maintain its order, so he continues to believe that something is the cause of that harmony. This is the second article of faith: “If the matter moved shows me a will, the matter moved according to certain laws shows me an intelligence.” In other words, he says that the will that moves the universe and encourages matter is intelligent. Matter moves according to certain rules to which it is always subject. In other words, what is clear is that the universe has not arisen by chance. These rules that govern the universe have been made by someone who has the will and, therefore, can transmit motion. Assuming that the cause is greater than the effect, Rousseau states that the will that orders the universe is God. Rousseau reiterates that we cannot understand the why and wherefore of the universe because our knowledge is limited, and this issue is beyond us, as is God’s nature. But we should not be concerned because it is not necessary for what really matters in human life, which is morality. Just knowing the existence of an intelligent being who organized everything is sufficient to guarantee our freedom and our moral structure. At this point, Kant subsequently maintained his postulates of practical reason.
Hence, he states the third article of faith: “Man is free in his actions, and as such, is animated by an immaterial substance.” Man has a body that, being matter, has no free will or freedom, but we, as humans, do have one, so we must have an intangible part that would give us these qualities. If man works for himself, and his work is a product of the freedom that God has given him, those facts are not within the orderly system of Providence. God cannot compel man to do good because it would be against our nature since God has made us free to choose the good. But God limited the impact of the bad actions of men so that they do not affect others, only themselves, and do not alter the general nature of everything. As a result of our nature, God does not enslave us because He wants us to be free, while evil itself degrades us. Thus, given the fact that human freedom is limited, it does not alter God’s providence. In other words, through his freedom, man makes himself and acquires much merit, but he never came to propose varying that order willed by God. Therefore, there are fixed laws for material things and a providence, a more flexible one by God for his beloved creature, man, and it cannot break.
Subject Area 4: Natural Feelings and Moral Universality
Natural feelings make man in nature harmonious and peaceful, like the rest of nature. Natural man has freedom and only two innate feelings: self-love and natural piety.
- Self-love would lead to a feeling of self-protection and conservation, to avoid danger. Current psychologists probably call it the “self.” It is a well-understood form of egoism, which has nothing to do with civilized man’s self, which leads to the exclusion of others and aggressive competition.
- Piety is a natural human feeling; we want to prevent others from experiencing what we do not wish for ourselves. Some of it can be seen in animals when they are attacked; they do not attack unless for some urgent need. We identify with those who suffer and feel a rejection of the alien evil. Natural man would calm their passions and soothe conflicts.
Consistent with the hypothesis of man in a state of nature, the fact that natural man does not live in society makes him a being alien to morality, prior to any moral reason for lacking it. He feels no responsibility; he is like a baby, free, with no regrets, and since he does not choose his actions, he cannot be morally responsible for them. The noble savage or natural man is not rational, “but he will develop this capability in the future,” and since rationality is also a necessary condition of morality and responsibility, we can say that natural man is not a moral agent. Therefore, natural man is good, but we do not understand “good” as understood by civilized man, who lives according to virtue, but a naive and primary goodness who works almost instinctively, adjusting to the freedom of natural feelings that guide their action and do not differentiate between right and wrong.
It is customary to contrast the state of nature we have seen with that conceived by Hobbes, where the human being is in a state of perpetual war against his fellow man and lives in a violent and terrible chaos. “Homo homini lupus” (Man is a wolf to man). The fear of living in this context is the engine that makes civil society possible, in this case, the absolute monarchy, which has the main purpose of protecting the lives of subjects and maintaining order. For this purpose, individuals give up the freedom they enjoyed in their natural state, primarily to resolve conflicts without resorting to any mediator, be it a judge, etc. These two contrasting perspectives regarding the state of nature correspond to two antagonistic mindsets: anthropological pessimism and optimism.
- Anthropological pessimism conceives of man as innately selfish and violent, closer to evil than to good, where virtue is an effort to suppress his natural selfish instincts. Vice is not simply sacrificing; it is being driven by innate tendencies.
- In contrast, anthropological optimism believes that men tend to avoid the pain of others and worry if others suffer, that is, natural piety.
Feeling is considered an intuition that allows us to apprehend, without rational intermediaries, innate principles: freedom, equality, mercy, etc., which are the foundations of morality because they fulfill the characteristics of universality derived from human nature, which is unique. These principles are evident; they are captured immediately.
Universal morality claims that humans partake of a structure and freedom of innate feelings that make us equal to our fellows. Rousseau considers that natural law derives from these feelings originating in our participation in the same nature; cultural differences are overcome; we are all men and possess a universal morality. Since natural law is what we may be required because it is inherent to our nature, invariably in historical continuity and cultural differences. In contrast, the positive law of civil codes differs from life as they are human laws, mere historical products that can change and do change, for example, the Spartan constitution of Lycurgus or the Spanish constitution of 1978. As a result, moral universalism is not compatible with the conventional view of morality (Sophists) because if morality depended on men, it might vary according to different social crowds. You cannot accuse Rousseau of moral relativism.
Anthropological optimism leads to benevolence and virtue, inherent to our nature, so we can get into moral attitudes.
We can see that selfishness, greed, and other reprehensible vices are immoral, contrary to what we observe when acting in solidarity, so unselfish, and so on. They are the foundation of virtuous conduct and fair.
In conclusion, Rousseau’s moral universalism is contrary to moral relativism, although it is compatible with cultural relativism, provided that these cultures always adhere to that moral universality. Their cultural manifestations are irrelevant if they retain the common fund. That is, every culture is acceptable provided it does not break the foundations of moral universality.
Subject Area 5: Being and Seeming – Self-Love, Self-Esteem, and Harmony
Understanding how to bring about the fact of pretending or implying something that is not or does not exist, we note that in the state of nature, in which man interacts only with his peers, he lacks foresight, properties, competitive zeal, etc., something that only happens when interacting with their peers. The state of nature is not an ancient historical period but the hypothesis that Rousseau manages to show how degraded man is in the state, referring to the Enlightenment and also expanding criticism today.
Therefore, a man in a state of nature does not comprehend the distinction between being and seeming. This distinction is absurd for a man who thinks because he does not need it. In this state, man cannot pretend; as a being who lacks rationality, ambition, greed, etc., he is not able to make anyone see that he is not real. He does not need to pretend. In contrast, civilized man, says Rousseau, lives “in the view of others”; as if reflected in the eyes of others, he concludes that “what is, is nothing; what seems, is everything.” This makes man a hypocrite and leads him to create mismatches with his peers.
In the natural state, man lives in a state of harmony, achieved by two feelings: self-love and mercy. In other words, the instinct of self-preservation and identification with the suffering and rejection of others’ pain. These two sentiments allow pure man to live completely peacefully in the State of Nature, for piety prevents him from getting benefits at the expense of the rest. However, when entering civilization, man creates a sense of pride, a corruption of self-love, which sees his fellows as instruments with which to satisfy their desire to appear. This corruption, this change from self-love to self-esteem, is given, according to Rousseau, by the way into culture, the definitive establishment of private property, which destroys the “everything is all” natural and leads to the degeneration of this feeling of self-love (love yourself) to vanity (pride), the foundation of ruinous feelings such as vanity, selfishness, greed, and lust.
When this feeling appears, the harmony and peace that existed in the diluted state of nature, for man acts in a manner, and his conscience, which still retains the natural state, reproaches her behavior, making him aware of the possibility of having done otherwise. That is, although we can act one way or another, and self-love leads us to consider selfish and individualistic, yet, through consciousness, we can reasonably lead natural feelings to achieve happiness. For, as we have said, man in the wild lives in harmony, and civilized man agrees to decide to act rationally with respect to the natural feelings, leading him to feel the harmony of one who is at peace with himself and nature.
It should be noted, finally, the difference between the spontaneous harmony existing in the state of nature and that characteristic of civilized man, who fits natural feelings by reason since the latter has the merit of those who choose to comply with pure feelings.
Subject Area 6: Theodicy, History, and the Problem of Evil
Theodicy is the part of philosophy that studies God. This term is due to Leibniz, who, in 1710, wrote a book with that title, wanting to say something about the goodness of God, human freedom, and the problem of evil. Etymologically, “theos” means God, and “dike” can be translated as justification. Thus, theodicy means justification of God or, put another way, the philosophical discourse about God. It should not be confused with the term theology, which applies to the study of God but through religion, so there would be as many theologies as there are religions. And yet, there is only one theodicy that tries to make rational proofs of God and tries to reason if such tests are justified.
The underlying problem, both in Leibniz and now in Rousseau and the Enlightenment, is how to reconcile the problem of evil, which is evident throughout human history and society, with the existence of an almighty and good God. For the enlightened, the answer to this problem is the deist position, which is to assume that if God can indeed have created the world, He does not seem to address it at this time. God would let men be released, focusing on improving a world and society that are clearly deficient. The enlightened deny the providence of God, thinking that this way, the human role is greater. You cannot lay the blame on God for what happens because we are men who, with our freedom, do wrong, foremost among these evils being ignorance. The enlightened want to promote universal education that reaches all, thinking that knowledge carries with it happiness and prosperity, thus prolonging the intellectual knowledge of ethics: if we know more, we will be better. And for that, you have to banish useless knowledge, such as that derived from religions, which are, according to the enlightened, superstitions that keep many people away from true knowledge. Somehow, they think that all the effort that people use to study religions is time lost for the development of true knowledge, which would be applied arts and sciences to improve our lives. Current secularism and faith in unlimited progress are clearly heirs of the Enlightenment. Also, the effort to get an education that reaches everyone.
Rousseau’s part of the confrontation with the Enlightenment is produced by the ideas outlined above. In particular, a good representative of the Enlightenment, such as Voltaire, believed that the problem of evil is absolutely incomprehensible, and perhaps that is why this author is skeptical, as well as other enlightened figures. According to him, we can know nothing of the divine, much less understand anything about the real existence of evil in the world as incompatible with the righteousness of God. In positions like this, we derive the well-known thesis about God and His righteousness and omnipotence, usually formulated as follows: If God is just, He should not allow evil, and if He cannot prevent evil, He is not God.
Rousseau addresses the problem this way: the providence of God is inherent in His essence, which means that God really takes care of creation and of men. And the first thing that Rousseau makes clear is that there are two types of evil: physical evil and moral evil. The first corresponds to the conditions of matter. Matter is as it is and obeys laws, which is like saying that, for example, rocks fall, and if one falls on someone’s head, it is likely to kill them. But those are the conditions of life. Another very current example: an earthquake of the same intensity brings many more disasters where the houses are made worse. But man learns to improve his own buildings, becoming a bad time to perfect physical refining what he does. Regarding moral evil, Rousseau accepts that God has given us freedom, not for evil but for good with responsibility and merit. The widespread corruption that we observe cannot be attributed to God, as it is of our making. Quoting freely, Rousseau argues that in God, all goes well, but it is corrupted in the hands of men. And this is what makes life interesting. In the same way that men can and do wrong, they can and should do well. This means that men are free indeed. One could also say that God does not want slaves and has been “foolhardy” in giving humans freedom. But He also calls to account, and the main one is that the virtuous life is the prize of the same satisfaction of good works, and conversely, the bad pay in the same vicious debauchery for all the evil they do. Rousseau does not end up deciding on the question of whether there is a hell for the wicked and a heaven for the good because he assumes that everything in this life would be justified. Thus, the good live well, and the bad live badly. That would be logical divine justice.
The true happiness of the righteous man is achieved in a virtuous social life, with much civil liberty rather than the abandoned natural and wild liberty. Rousseau never advocated a return to nature in the sense of history and nostalgia, trying to recover some lost paradise. What the Genevan wanted was to “humiliate” a civilization too smug about the undoubted scientific advances but had achieved only an appearance of virtue. And Rousseau did not think it possible to propose to any man under God without speaking to the human heart and dictating how to behave. Without God, he did not believe man could propose any improvement.
Thus, man is the true author of evil; in this, he coincided with the Enlightenment. However, as they do not trust that it will be the law and a simple improvement in scientific knowledge that will make us better. To achieve a moral development of society, it is necessary to confess to God and morally educate men so that they do not disregard what they can hear in their conscience. Such education must find the brake of passion and contempt for the artificiality of a life based on seeming instead of being. Part of this last criticism is made by Rousseau in his Discourse on the Arts and Sciences.