Rousseau’s Critique of Materialism: The First Article of Faith
3 – Criticism and Materialism of Three Articles of Faith (33-66)
3.1 – First Article of Faith: God as Engine of the Universe and Critique of Mechanism (Paras. 33-44)
The Vicar introduces a lengthy argument (paras. 33-40) against materialism as a satisfactory explanation of the world, leading to the first article of faith. After establishing the method, the criterion of truth, and their existence, he sets aside his ‘I’ to examine external nature, or matter. He defines matter based on sensible qualities. He argues that matter cannot generate its own motion, being inert and passive (accepting the mechanistic view of Descartes: matter is inert and requires external force for movement). Therefore, its natural state is rest (it only moves when acted upon) (34), not motion, as materialists claim. Materialists base their theory on a nature where motion is inherent, not external, and matter is not mere extension (as Descartes argued). They see no need for God or superhuman beings; the religious hypothesis is unnecessary. However, Rousseau describes matter as passive and inert.
He then distinguishes two types of motion (35):
- Impressed movement: caused by an external force (e.g., opening a window).
- Spontaneous movement: originating within the moving body, typical of humans.
Against mechanism’s claim that only mechanical motion exists, he argues: “I affirm its existence based on the feeling I have, which is stronger than any ‘evidence’. ‘I know because I feel it'” (again, inner conviction over reason) (36). “I move my arm, and it moves.” This would be impossible if we were only inert matter. We are more; we have a will, freedom. Without it, human responsibility and morality would be impossible. This counters materialism’s reduction of humans to matter, instead positing a body/mind duality (anthropological dualism). We don’t understand this union – “the means of union of the two substances seems to me absolutely incomprehensible” (42), “The will is known to me by its actions, not by its nature” (41) – and cannot explain how body and mind interact. Descartes’s account is unconvincing. While we may not grasp this interrelationship, Rousseau argues we cannot reduce one to the other as materialists do. Operations of such different natures cannot be explained by a single subject. Although we don’t know the properties of the will animating matter, we know enough for practical purposes (Rousseau’s turn). We can assert its existence as an article of faith or premise (“The will is known to me by its actions, not by its nature”). Feeling the will’s influence on the world is enough to affirm it.
Another argument: By analogy with ourselves (though not certain), animal movements are spontaneous (36).
Conclusion: If the cause of motion is not in matter (it receives and transmits motion but doesn’t produce it), and we cannot view the world as a giant animal (animism, 38) because we, as part of it, don’t feel it, and the universe’s movements lack spontaneity (freedom), then, avoiding an infinite causal chain, we must refer to a first cause. This cannot be physical; it must be like the will – a Supreme Will. “God moves the universe” and animates matter (40). This is the first dogma or article of faith of natural religion. Rousseau calls these principles ‘articles of faith,’ emphasizing feeling’s (inner persuasion, internal assent) relevance over reason in establishing them. They are not theoretical or speculative principles but dogmas requiring faith in feeling. Internal assent leads to asserting a supreme will and final cause: “God as first cause.”