Political Power and State: Forms, Theories, and Legitimacy

I. Political Power and the State

Power can be defined as the ability of a person or social group to impose its will on others. Power is determined by a relationship in which one element is controlled and determined by the other component of the relationship. When power relations mainly affect social functioning, there is talk of political power; that is, power is organized within the polis, in the broadest sense. Political power can be defined as the power exercised in the management, control, and distribution of common goods.

In most contemporary societies, the regulation of political power comes from the state. Broadly, we can say that a state exists in any society with some form of political organization. This means any society in which organisms exist that wield power to control, regulate, and manage common property and the rights and obligations of citizens. From a narrower viewpoint, the modern form of the state appears in the 16th century.

From the works of Machiavelli (The Prince), the state is defined as a form of political organization characterized by permanent and unchallengeable power within a defined territory. For Max Weber, what characterizes the state is the possession of a monopoly of force and violence within its territory. We can therefore characterize the state as an organization that has the following features:

1. It has territorial power. State power is limited to the territory that delimits its borders.
2. It is sovereign. Within the state, there is no higher court to which the state must submit. This feature is currently being discussed due to the emergence of supra-state bodies that can usurp some functions of nation-states.
3. It maintains order to protect members of society from internal and external dangers. Domestically, the state must enforce the law, guaranteeing peace and security. Externally, it must protect citizens from raids, establish international relations with other countries, and meet international commitments arising from international agreements.

But what is a political partnership from a sociological standpoint? Nor is this a concept that can be sociologically defined from its activity. There is hardly a job here or there that has not been undertaken by a political entity. On the other hand, nor is there any task that can be said to have always been the exclusive responsibility of political associations now called states, or which were historically the forerunners of the modern state. This state is only sociologically definable by reference to a specific medium that it, like every political association, owns: physical violence. “Every state is founded on violence,” said Trotsky at Brest-Litovsk. Objectively this is true. If there were only social settings that ignored the midst of violence, the concept of ‘state’ would be gone, and what would be established is what we would specifically call “anarchy.” Violence is not, of course, the only means of the state, but it is its specific environment. Today, precisely, the relationship between the state and violence is especially intimate. In the past, many different associations, beginning with the family, have used violence as an entirely normal means. Today, however, we must say that the state is that human community that, within a given territory, claims for itself the monopoly of legitimate physical violence. The specificity of our time is that all other associations and individuals are granted the right to physical violence only to the extent that the state allows it. The state is the only source of the “right” to violence.

– Max Weber, Politics as a Vocation (1919), Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1981

II. Early Forms of Political Organization

II.1. Athenian Democracy

As is known, in archaic Greek communities, different tribes were structured to meet a number of sibships, surely the basic hierarchical unit, which in turn were grouped into several sets of families who, allegedly, had the same common mythical ancestor. This articulated a hierarchical and pyramidal dependence in a given territory, which presided over both the organization of political decisions and the military defense of the community. We are not dealing with a political theory until the social, political, and economic backdrop of social immobility entered a crisis in the second half of the 8th century BC, and especially in the 7th century BC. This is often called the pre-classical period, before the political theories that arose with the Athenian Enlightenment movement of the Sophists.

In this society, the aristocracy was imbued with special virtues. The concept of “dike”—justice—is vaguely characterized as presenting the order given by the rules, by tradition. Furthermore, among aristocratic ideals, we have the hero equipped with “arete”—excellence—which included both the ability to express the best opinion and the ability to lead a superior material and spiritual life (Euphrosyne). This “pre-classical theory” will evolve with regard to the status quo. On one hand, it intended to include the most disadvantaged positions in the social scale, that is, the demos, within the universe of dike. On the other hand, there is the conviction that “measure” is the ideal that should govern our actions, just as it is the ideal associated with the knowledge of our own limits. This new ideal of measure will allow a process of rationalization and moralization of behavior that takes on a constitutional expression in the Athenian system of Solon in 594 BC. This streamlined process will understand the universe as essentially rational, presided over by a common Logos. The political consequences of this process will be decisive in the democratic period. The strength of this egalitarian idea, included in the concept of dike, will be at the base of the democratic system.

Reforms: Successive reforms that will be made in the polls, especially after Solon, will be aimed in two directions. First, democratization efforts necessarily go to limit the power of aristocratic sectors. Although it is not possible to eliminate the aristocracy as a class, it is possible to eliminate the functions of the political bodies that represent them. This will allow major political issues to be treated in the assembly, where the demos will have a greater presence. Moreover, the constitutional reforms will organize the polls and the bodies where political, administrative, and economic decisions are made, so that, gradually, the demos will be incorporated into the tasks of government, voiding aristocratic institutions of political content. In the 6th century BC, the Athenian system could be considered an Isonomia, or equality before the law, or an Isegoria, or equality of all citizens before the Assembly. In the 5th century BC, the term Demokratia appears to describe the political system in Athens during the Greco-Persian Wars. Until the political context of the Peloponnesian War and the Athenian civil war, there will be no basic division within democracy.

II.2. Personal Forms of Political Authority

The form of political authority that is prevalent in antiquity is that of personal authority in the exercise of power. This exercise of power is legitimized by various types of discourse: religious, historical, salvific, etc. These forms of personality in the exercise of power predominate in despotisms, in which power is linked to the hero, the founder of a city, a clan, or a dynasty. Vehicles of transmission of power in these cases are inherited, as we continue to see in current monarchies. With the demise of the Roman Empire, a system of personal power focused on the subordination of one individual to another, known as “vassalage,” emerged in Europe. These are forms of personal relationships in which the vassal swears allegiance to the lord in exchange for the latter’s commitment to their defense.

At first, the relationship of vassalage allowed the transfer of a portion of land, including villages and the population concerned, by a master to a member of his entourage, thus providing them with the means of subsistence. Thus, the lord did not need to maintain his entire company but could use them if necessary. The characteristic of these socio-economic relations was not the ownership of property but the right to use it, a right that was inherited along with the burdens and charges it entailed. The priority, therefore, was to control land use and the population that worked it. At the end of the Middle Ages, there existed two major political institutions: on one hand, the Empire States, and on the other, the Church. Both the State and the Church, whose coexistence has always been rife with conflicts, developed complex systems to perform administrative and governance functions that would subsequently lead to the formation of modern states.

II.3. Modern Civil Society and Social Contract Theories

A characteristic feature of modern society is the defense of the right to property. The right to property guarantees the existence of free and autonomous individuals able to establish social ties between them, always with respect for their individuality. Because of this linkage between socio-economic autonomy and political autonomy, the individual takes precedence over the social collectivity. Sociability, as an essential feature of human beings, is now based on the idea that society is the result of individuals establishing social relationships governing politics, economics, and the use of force. Once the idea that power has a divine origin is rejected, the thinkers of the time (Hobbes, Locke, Hume, Rousseau, James Mill, etc.) raised the question of the source of power. Since the individual is free, the power they wield over each other must have its origin either in violence or in the exercise of some individuals over others, or in the idea of a covenant or contract between free individuals. The first option is rejected as a power based on the constant use of violence does not guarantee its stability, as it requires the constant use of violence and coercion. In the second case, providing a series of rules that are binding only makes sense if those rules would be useful and beneficial to all, or at least for most. It was then necessary to find and legitimize a series of standards to ensure possession of what each person owns, as well as their own safety. This is postulated as the existence of the state, whose role is primarily to ensure compliance with the pact. The theories of the social contract or covenant distinguish between the covenant of partnership for establishing civil society and the pact of submission by which the individual gives the state authority. Together with these two ways of understanding the covenant, a distinction is critical to understanding social contract theory. This new distinction allows us to contrast marital status against the state of nature. What characterizes the state of nature is the “free radical” of the individual, which does not introduce any form of coercion on the individual, nor does it guarantee the possession and enjoyment of their property or their personal safety. Faced with a state of nature, marital status guarantees the possession of property through its recognition and legal expenses. Marital status is a state of law in which private individuals legally regulate their relationships and act collectively in compliance with joint standards.

II.3.A Thomas Hobbes

Hobbes’s political theory aims to ensure social order and avoid widespread conflict among the population in a “state of war of all against all.” This idea of a war of all against all must be understood not literally as a civil war, although this possibility could exist, but rather as a widespread social conflict that prevents the development of the qualities or the potential of human beings and their culture. Thomas Hobbes bases his argument on three premises:

1. Human beings are equal with regard to intellectual or physical capabilities, which leads them to pursue the same ends.
2. All human beings seek their own preservation as well as pleasure in the actions they perform.
3. The fact that each person seeks their own preservation and to meet their own needs leads humans to widespread competition among individuals.

The way to avoid this conflict would be by subjecting all individuals to political power so as to prevent subjects from confronting each other. What characterizes the “state of war” is its permanence in time and the fact that the individual is dependent for their security on their own strength and ingenuity.

Keep in mind that the natural state of war is a consequence of the nature of man and of his passions. Force and fraud are the two cardinal virtues in war, and therefore, in this state of affairs, justice and injustice have no meaning. In short, the situation of generalized conflict in the state of war would prevent mankind from benefiting from the achievements of civilization, and only within a society and the establishment of a “social body” can peace and civilization be attained. It is important to note that this “state of war” is not a historical fact, that there has been a time in history that preceded the creation of all societies, but rather it is a state that precedes society from a logical point of view. In the sense that if we ignore what characterizes society and its benefits, this would lead to a situation prior to the state in which everyone would have to fend for themselves and their chances of survival to ensure their preservation. What Hobbes might argue is that the “state of war” represents the condition in which one might find oneself if we ignore human civilization and the social model based on the notion of a state that guarantees compliance with a law that limits the abuse of power that some could exert over others. Ultimately, Hobbes would be opposing the principle advocated by Callicles that there is a natural right of the stronger to impose their will on the rest of the people who do not have the strength to oppose them. To limit this abuse of power, all power must be concentrated in a state conceived as a ruthless power to prevent the chaos that would be established in a situation described as a state of war of all against all. “This clearly shows what life would be like if there were no political power to fear.”

The foundation of this state must be in what Hobbes called the “Laws of Nature.” The laws of nature are defined as the laws enacted by the right use of reason. “A natural law is a precept, a rule discovered with the help of reason, whereby a man is to avoid doing what can destroy his life or deprive him of the means to preserve it, and do everything he thinks best to preserve it.” Natural law is not based on any metaphysical or theological principle, but on a selfish principle of survival. The laws guarantee our survival better than the continuous struggle for existence. There would be a natural tendency in man to be governed, and this would explain the ultimate source of power. In Leviathan, Hobbes describes 19 natural laws. Three examples:

a) “Every man has to strive for peace while he has hope of obtaining it, and when he cannot, he can find and use all the help and advantages of war.” The first part contains the basic law: every human being must strive for peace, while the second expresses the natural rights that human beings have to defend themselves and the state of peace achieved, albeit through the use of war.

b) “That a man is ready when the others are as well, to defend and abandon the defense of peace and take as many liberties against the other men as the other is taken against him.” This law tells us that there are rights to which a person cannot renounce or transfer, as the waiver of a right can only be done if you get some benefit, so that since the waiver of certain rights, for example, the right to defend his life, cannot provide any benefit, it follows that there are inalienable rights.

c) “That men meet the agreements made.” For Hobbes, a contract involves the transfer of rights. When delegating certain rights for a certain time, a person deposits trust in another; the contract is an agreement or covenant. Respect for conventions and the law necessarily requires the commitment of people to comply with covenants subscribed. A society that respects covenants will be a just society, while injustice resides precisely in the breach of covenants. These laws seek to ensure self-preservation and personal safety, a goal that is in the nature of human beings. The laws themselves cannot achieve this unless there is fundamentally a coercive power to impose them, ordering them and compelling compliance by threat and punishment, backed by force. “The conventions, without the sword, are but words and have no ability to protect man.”

From this conception of political power, it is inferred that citizens “shall transfer all his powers and strength to one man, or assembly of men who can reduce all their wills to a single will.” This transfer of rights takes place after an agreement between people. This would involve, firstly, renouncing the right to self-government, and secondly, allowing an assembly of people or one man to rule in my own name, provided that the members of that assembly or that man give up their right to self-government. “Once done, the crowd, united in one person, is called society, Latin civitas. And this is how the great Leviathan emerges, or to speak more reverently, the mortal god to which we owe, under the immortal God, our peace and defense.” This person on whom rests the responsibility of government is called the sovereign, and the other people are the subjects. What is remarkable is that for Hobbes, the contract is between subjects, while equal, and not between subjects and the sovereign. In this way, the sovereign’s legitimacy comes from the contract between the subjects, although he is not part of it. Sovereign power is absolute and cannot be granted conditionally. The subjects cannot change the form of government nor repudiate the order established after the contract. Not only can they not question the power, but the sovereign cannot be blamed for his deeds. “Anything that makes the sovereign cannot be detrimental to any of his subjects, nor can they be accused of injustice.” No sovereign can be charged or punished by their subjects because, when each is the perpetrator of the acts of his sovereign, the sovereign would punish another for one’s actions.

Although sovereign power is absolute, there are limits on their actions. The sovereign cannot ask any of his subjects to renounce their rights related to basic survival or limb. Neither is a person forced to admit their own crimes or to kill on command. A particularly important point is that subjects are removed from their obligation to obey when the sovereign waives its sovereignty or when unable to exercise power and protect his subjects.

II.3.B J. Locke

Locke agrees with Hobbes’ state of nature. “All men are naturally in this state and stay there until their own free will become members of a political society” (Two Treatises of Government). However, his idea of the ‘state of nature’ is very different from Hobbes’. For Locke, there are essential differences between the ‘state of nature’ and the ‘state of war’. “The state of nature, properly speaking, is characterized by men living together according to reason without a superior in the common ground to resolve conflicts among them.” The state of war arises when force is used outside the area of law. The existence of the state of nature is based on the existence of a natural moral law that can be discovered through the use of reason. “The state of nature has a law that governs it, which obliges all, and the reason is that this law teaches all men who consult it are equal and independent and that no one ought to harm another in his life, his health, liberty, or property.” The existence of a natural state based on a natural moral law that acts on the conscience of all men regardless of the state allows Locke to justify the existence of natural rights. The emergence of the civil state or society is a necessity in human nature itself. For Locke, God created man free but in the state of nature, also gave a “strong inclination” to live socially. This idea of a natural inclination toward life in society allows Locke to say that society is something in human nature itself. The first form of social grouping would be the family, while civil society allows human needs to be met. These human needs are not covered in the state of nature, as what characterizes it is complete independence from each other. For Locke, the satisfaction of certain human needs is possible only if men are provided with a certain social organization, especially to preserve their freedom and natural rights. Despite the defense of natural law that gives men their basic rights, Locke recognizes the need for a positive right to establish laws that are recognized and accepted by all. Political society arises “whenever a series of men in a state of nature enter into partnership to form a village, a political community under one supreme government, or when a man is associated and incorporated into a political community established.” This law prevents any man from being surprised by this filing status and subject to any political power without their own consent.

The acceptance of marital status means giving up their legislative and executive powers as were used in the state of nature with the aim of ensuring their safety and freedom. Also, “those who are in a state of nature are grouped into society, should be understood to make an abdication in the hands of the majority of the community of all the power necessary for the purposes for which they are grouped, unless expressly agreed to dispense more than most.” This situation requires the consent of individuals to submit to the will of the majority. Although Locke recognizes the possibility that the majority may behave in a tyrannical manner with the minority, the possibility of abuse of power is always less than in the political system of absolute monarchy, which Locke considered inconsistent with civil society. What compels a man to accept the power of the majority is the acceptance of the advantages of living in society. When a person enjoys the rights and privileges of a citizen, it is assumed that they have voluntarily accepted the duties of a citizen of the state where they live. It is often said that Locke tacitly establishes two kinds of pacts: one that forms the government and another that transfers sovereign power. By the first covenant, a man would become part of a political society and was obliged to accept decisions made by most members of the community; by the second covenant, community members themselves decide or are responsible for government or establish a monarchy or an oligarchy. The difference between the role of the pact in Hobbes and Locke is that while in the first case, the overthrow of the sovereign would involve the dissolution of political society, for Locke, political society cannot be dissolved because it had formed in a different pact and could only disappear by agreement of its members. Beyond the outward forms of government, for example, by conquest of another government, Locke believes that there are ways of internal dissolution by changing the legislature. Thus, Locke tells us that in the case in which the assembly, which is where the legislative power resides, transfers power to the person of a prince, when he confuses the law with his personal will, or denies the call and the meeting of the assembly, especially the assembly of representatives, it can be seen that the legislature has changed the role for which he was appointed, and therefore must be dissolved. Similarly, if the legislature that holds abandoned or neglected his duties, the government is dissolved. It is also considered that the government is dissolved when the legislature works against the interests of citizens or against the mandate they have received. In cases where a government is dissolved, rebellion is justified. Thus, Locke’s political theory leaves open the possibility of a rebellion against power, provided that it no longer defends the collective interests. Strictly speaking, Locke will tell us, the rebel is the government that ignores, neglects, or contradicts the interests of the community or acts against their rights. The right to rebellion leads us to ask who determines the opportunity or justification for a rebellion? Locke’s answer is simple: “the people will judge.”

II.3.C Rousseau

Rousseau starts from the finding that over history, poverty and inequality among human beings have increased. This trend could be stopped only with the establishment of a covenant or contract that would result in a fairer society. Rousseau starts from an anthropological concept that leads him to assert “the innate goodness of men.” It is social life that turns natural inequalities into social inequalities that make possible the unequal appropriation of wealth. The person responsible for this situation is not the individual but civil society, which will require a concept of “civil society” in which each and every one of its members could be reflected in a “general will,” understood as a moralized body that is above the particular will and the selfish interests of individuals. The political structure that would have this general will is not direct democracy but representative democracy.

III. State Forms

The main historical forms in which the state has been presented are:

A] Authoritarian State: Authority is unlimited, is not subject to any control, and does not recognize any body that can exercise criticism. This monopoly of authority is manifested in the inability of citizens to exercise any political activity or intervene in “matters of state.” Neither are judicial bodies independent of government bodies and their interests, and consequently, the individual is totally defenseless against abuses of the state. Two forms of authoritarian rule tend to be distinguished:

A.1. The Absolutist State: Typically the state in the beginning of the modern age. Typical examples of these models of absolutist states would be the reign of Philip II in Spain, Henry VIII in England, and Louis XIV in France. In these monarchies, the sovereign’s power is virtually unlimited, with no restrictions of any kind. There is no way of exercising any power or opposition to legal opposition against the king’s command.

A.2. Totalitarian State: In this type of dictatorship, the state controls all areas in which it operates, subject to control, reaching those agencies and institutions that are not properly state-owned, and even the private lives of individuals, coming to exercise control over the media, religious beliefs, moral standards, family, etc.

B] Rule of Law: The state authority is subject to the rule of law. Political power can only be exercised within the limits imposed by law, which affect both the subjects and the rulers. The ultimate goal is to protect individual rights against abuses of authority. The earliest forms of the rule of law are heirs to the American and French Revolutions. Although the structure and functioning of the rule of law may change, its characteristics are:

• The existence of a constitution, understood as the highest law regulating the functioning and structure of the rule of law. Fixed in the constitution are general rules, bodies, and procedures for the exercise of power and the relationship they have with individual bodies and their rights. This is the text that sets out the fundamental principles underlying the state. Among other things, it explicitly states the individual and collective rights to be protected.
• The division of powers. Although there were references to the division of powers in the works of Aristotle, it is generally regarded as the philosopher Montesquieu who introduced this concept in order to prevent the abuses that can be exerted by political power. Ultimately, it is to correct and introduce mechanisms to control the exercise of power.

Division of Powers:

• Legislative Branch: Makes the laws. Parliament controls the executive branch.
• Executive Branch: Enforces the law and directs the administration of the state. Government.
• Judicial Branch: Enforces the laws and sanctions noncompliance. It ensures the constitutionality of laws passed by Parliament. Courts.

C] Rule of Law (Social and Democratic): This is the typical way in which the state is presented in democratic countries, where citizens can participate in the election of political representatives and, in some cases, the election of members representing the three branches into which the state is divided, and even direct participation in the administration of power, being eligible to vote and participate in the courts by the constitution of juries. The formation of such states requires:

• The abandonment or surrender of individuals to violence, understood as not only individuals but also groups, corporations, or social classes.
• The monopoly of force by the state and its specialized equipment.
• The resolution of conflicts between individuals, groups, between classes for corporate or civil proceedings (law).
• The existence of limits to the exercise of domination that are specified in the law’s public legitimation of power through the constitution of the ‘political man’ or citizen through precise mechanisms of participation in state institutions and symbolic identification with them.

Western democracies do not go beyond who and under what conditions is entitled to govern and what areas may be subject to this action. Typically, in this form of government, there is the recognition that individual and collective freedoms are essential but not sufficient because the state is required, in addition to being the guarantor of rights, to be just. For the rule to be fair, it must not only comply with the law but must address the inequalities generated by the system itself. With the labor movements of the 19th century, it was recognized that for our freedoms to be effective, in the sense that they are real, there must be social equality between citizens. To ensure that minimum social equality, the state intervenes directly in the realization of rights, such as the right to health, education, housing, etc. This new configuration is known as the Welfare State.

IV. The Legitimacy of the State

The need to establish mechanisms of legitimation of power is particularly important when the aim is to explain under what conditions citizens must respect the laws and submit to the state. Having authority is entitled to exercise power; when we recognize this right, it is said that power is legitimized. The classical classification of the various forms of legitimate power is due to Max Weber. According to Max Weber, there are three forms of legitimation of power:

Traditional: They appeal to tradition to legitimize the power that certain families or dynasties have been exercising ever since. This form of authority is not based on rational principles but is based on the belief in the hereditary or divine. Due to their lack of rationality, it is therefore difficult to argue in its favor as against it. Examples of this form of legitimation of power would be hereditary monarchies or classical empires that have occurred in history.

Charismatic: Power is legitimized by the use of charisma, that is, a kind of gift that some people have that makes them particularly equipped to attract and mobilize the population. Charismatic legitimacy differs from traditional capacity in that it is considered personal and not hereditary. The prestige acquired by these people does not have a rational explanation, as exclusively psychological and emotional factors are involved. Examples of charismatic legitimacy can be seen in the rise of fascist regimes and the emergence of leaders like Hitler and Franco. We can see similar patterns in revolutionary leaders like Che Guevara or Gandhi. It is also interesting to note how totalitarian regimes can have charismatic leaders like Stalin or religious figures like the Pope.

Rational-Legal (Bureaucratic): Power is legitimized by recourse to law. Legal-bureaucratic procedures confer authority, provided the law is entitled to turn to democratic processes. The state’s power is legitimized because it is the result of an agreement or arrangement reasonably acceptable to the public. This form of legitimacy makes it possible to establish mechanisms for rational argument. The clearest example of rational legitimation of power is found in today’s democracies. Keep in mind that these forms of legitimacy are never so pure, but some elements usually occur in other forms. Some analysts are criticizing the trend, increasingly widespread in today’s democracies, to strengthen the charismatic element in the process of electing governors. The danger is to replace the rational element of political debate with the charismatic element of the leaders.

V. Representative Democracies

After the Second World War, with the exception of Spain, democratic regimes were implanted in Europe. This type of government is based on the recognition of universal suffrage and a parliament, with the articulation of political activity by political parties. This will set the figure as an intermediary between the population not directly involved in political affairs and the government of a nation. Intermediation mechanisms are defined as “forms of representation” of citizens. These forms of representation should also be considered state structures, and the dual configuration makes them possess their peculiar features. The political participation of citizens is consistent with a model of different levels according to its powers and duties conferred. For the first level, consisting of the mass of the population, political activity is limited to voting. The moments (call for elections), options (political parties), content (manifestos), personalities (members of the candidates), etc., are determined by institutional apparatus-party structures, to which voters have no access. The right to vote is a right of choice among pre-established options on which you cannot exercise control unless indirectly. The loss of an election is considered a punishment from voters that require a “change in supply.” In the “new design strategy,” members of the first level cannot participate.

The second level consists of the party structures, to the exclusion of the single members. The active members of parties are responsible for analyzing, profiling, deciding, and making the various options presented by their group or school of thought. This task involves several aspects ranging from the electoral expectations of the group to the cultural elements that shape their social or ideological perspective. Inside the party, relations between its members are hierarchical and, in many cases, are governed by interest groups. The third level comprises the branches of government in its various areas: municipal, regional, and central positions and functions which are occupied by members of the winning party in elections, governing on behalf of all and which seek to perpetuate themselves in power.

The relations established in the dynamics of parties in democratic states are analogous to the competition established between enterprises in the market dynamics. The citizen, usually politically passive, is closer to the consumer of goods than that of a citizen with a social project in a situation in which—to stay with the metaphor—the production of goods and ideas is restricted to a political elite. The consequences of a model that operates in practice as a system of elites would be:

1. The fact that political intervention is reduced to a single vote makes citizens reduced to social atoms whose choice is reduced to responding with a YES/NO to the limited options facing them.

2. Their powers are reduced because governance issues have become specialized, reserved for the party structures and the technical advisory cabinets.

3. In dynamic democracies, parties are detached from their social basis and become the state’s political apparatus. They act as representatives of citizens, as political choices symbolize, but act as state organizations.