Philosophical Foundations: Descartes’ Doubt and Aristotle’s Hylemorphism
Descartes’ Methodical Doubt
Descartes’ Methodical Doubt is a systematic philosophical approach that involves questioning everything previously accepted as true. The goal is to identify what, if anything, can withstand all doubt and thus serve as an indubitable first principle.
Application of Methodical Doubt
Descartes applied his doubt to several areas:
- Sensory Experience: He argued that the senses can be deceptive. For example, “The senses have deceived us, and what we see is really a sheet” (referring to a common illusion or misperception).
- Existence of Reality: Doubt extends to the very existence of things perceived as real, suggesting they could be part of a dream. “A folio may not exist in reality and could be a dream.” This questioning applies to the things themselves, leading to self-doubt about one’s own perceptions.
- Mathematical Certainties: Even seemingly undeniable truths, like those in mathematics, are subjected to doubt. Descartes considers the possibility of an “evil genius” or “deceiving God” who could manipulate his abstract reasoning, making him err even in simple calculations.
Rationalism and the First Principle
Descartes is a key representative of Rationalism, contrasting with Empiricism. Both philosophies address the question of how we acquire knowledge of reality. Rationalism asserts that knowledge comes primarily from reason, while Empiricism relies on sensory experience.
Descartes sought to build a new philosophy on self-evident, indubitable principles. His foundational certainty is expressed in the famous dictum: “I think, therefore I am” (Cogito, ergo sum). This ‘I’ (the thinking subject, res cogitans) represents consciousness and marks a significant break with previous philosophical traditions. Methodical doubt, unlike skeptical doubt, is a tool to arrive at certainty, not an end in itself.
Aristotle’s Hylemorphism: Understanding Change
Aristotle observed that not all changes are of the same kind. From a common-sense perspective, we distinguish between changes where the underlying subject remains the same and those where it does not. To explain this, Aristotle proposed that beings are composed of two types of properties: essential properties and accidental properties.
Accidental vs. Substantial Change
- Accidental Properties: These are not intrinsic to a being’s substance; they belong to it incidentally and can change without the being ceasing to be itself. A change in these properties is an accidental change. For example, a person’s hair color changing is an accidental change; they remain the same person.
- Substantial Changes: In contrast, these involve a transformation of the being itself. In these changes, the fundamental, substantial properties — those that define what a being is and without which it would cease to exist — are altered.
Matter and Form
Aristotle identified two substantial properties: matter and form.
- Matter: This is the raw material from which things are made.
- Form: This is what organizes matter, giving it its specific nature and defining it as a particular kind of thing. Form is not merely shape; it relates more to the essence or function of a being.
When a particular being undergoes a change in its matter, form, or both, it ceases to be the same entity. Only when matter or form changes does the substance itself change, leading to the cessation of the original subject. If only accidental properties change, the subject remains the same before and after the change.
Challenges to Hylemorphism
One criticism of this theory is that neither matter nor form are directly perceptible entities, making their empirical verification difficult. The substance — the composite of matter and form — is Aristotle’s conceptual tool to explain the consistent behavior of the perceived world, yet substance itself is not directly perceived.
A second difficulty arises in explaining gradual changes where the subject seems to transform without a clear, abrupt substantial change.