Materialism, Emergentism, and Structuralism in Philosophy

Monist Materialist Theories

Monist materialist theories, initiated by Democritus (5th century BC) and Epicurus (3rd century BC), were further developed in the 18th and 19th centuries by figures like Boyle, Gassendi, La Mettrie, and many others. These theories posit that mental processes can be explained solely by the material base, located in the brain.

Physicalism

Physicalism asserts that mental activities are simply physical, chemical, or neurophysiological processes. This view is shared by 20th-century authors such as José Ferrater Mora and Paul Feyerabend. Opponents of this view criticize it as “reductionist physicalism,” arguing that reducing mental phenomena to physical processes is an oversimplification.

Cyber Materialism

Cyber materialism proposes that the brain is a complex machine, leading Alan Turing to assert that mankind is an “automaton consciousness.”

Emergentism

Mario Bunge’s emergentism considers the mental not merely as physical but as an emergent property of evolutionary fitness. He argues that there is only one substance, matter, which possesses diverse properties resulting from evolution. Matter dynamically articulates at various levels: the physicochemical, the biological, and the mental.

Beyond Monism and Dualism: Emergentist Interactionism

Karl Popper attempts to transcend previous theories. He affirms the existence of mental acts and their essential individuality, aligning with dualism. He also posits that the mind is an emergent evolutionary product of the brain, aligning with monism. However, he maintains that not everything real must be material, thus distancing himself from materialism. He argues that real entities, even if not strictly material, can interact with material realities (1).

Popper proposes three interacting worlds that constitute human beings:

  • World-1: Composed of observable physical bodies, the only world acknowledged by materialists.
  • World-2: The realm of mental states, including states of consciousness, psychological dispositions, experiences, and unconscious states.
  • World-3: Consisting of products of human minds, such as stories, myths, science, social institutions, works of art, and language.

Structuralism

Pedro Laín Entralgo advocates for structuralism, arguing that the concept of “structure” is more fitting than “emergence” to describe the relationship between the physical and the mental. He suggests that the mind does not simply emerge from the brain as if it pre-existed. Instead, the mind “is structured from the brain,” indicating a new and distinct reality. The brain possesses a dynamic structure, operating autonomously without external commands. Certain actions depend on specific brain regions, while others can only be explained by the brain’s overall functioning. Actions like seeing, hearing in space, and moving speech are governed by localized brain areas. However, thought, self-awareness, the exercise of freedom, and intellectual and artistic creation can only be explained by the brain as a whole. This leads Laín Entralgo to propose the phrase “my body: I do” instead of “my body and I” (2).