Key Concepts in Modern Political Philosophy: Kant, Rousseau, Mill, and Hegel

Kant’s Views on Modernity

Immanuel Kant occupies a central position in the intellectual history of modernity. His political and philosophical project can be understood as an attempt to define the essence of the “modern” age as one grounded in autonomy, rationality, and moral self-legislation. For Kant, modernity is not merely a chronological period but an attitude—a transformation in human consciousness wherein individuals learn to think for themselves, free from the tutelage of traditional authorities. His famous essay “What is Enlightenment?” (1784) encapsulates this shift by asserting that modernity begins when human beings exercise the courage to use their own reason (sapere aude). This declaration becomes the normative foundation of Kant’s broader political philosophy, which aims to secure a rational, moral, and universal order.

At the heart of Kant’s idea of modernity lies the notion of autonomy. Unlike pre-modern frameworks that grounded authority in religion, tradition, or absolutist power, Kant insisted that the autonomous individual—capable of rational moral judgment—is the ultimate source of legitimacy. Autonomy signifies self-governance according to universal moral principles derived from reason, rather than external commands. This understanding connects directly to Kant’s formulation of the Categorical Imperative, which requires individuals to act only according to maxims that can be universalized. Modernity, therefore, marks the transition from heteronomy to autonomy, from obedience to critical self-reflection, and from inherited norms to rationally justified principles.

Kant’s conceptualization of modernity is inseparable from his moral philosophy, but it extends deeply into his political theory. He argued that a truly modern political order must be one that institutionalizes the freedom and equality of rational individuals. This is reflected in his preference for a republican form of government, which he believed allowed citizens to participate in law-making as autonomous agents. Kant rejected despotism because despotism reduced individuals to passive subjects rather than rational co-authors of the law. Thus, modernity, for him, meant the establishment of a political system grounded in public reason, rule of law, and the inherent dignity of human beings.

Another major dimension of Kant’s modernity is his conception of public and private reason, which he saw as essential for Enlightenment. Public reason represents the unrestricted use of one’s rational faculties in the public sphere—debating, writing, and contributing to collective knowledge. Private reason refers to the limited use of reason within institutional roles (such as a soldier or civil servant). Kant argued that a modern society must allow unrestricted public reason, for progress is only possible when individuals openly question and refine prevailing ideas. This creates a dynamic and self-correcting social order characteristic of modernity.

Kant also articulated a distinctively modern vision of human progress. He believed humanity was moving—slowly but inevitably—toward greater moral and political perfection. This teleological optimism is seen in his essay “Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose”, where he describes history as a process through which human capacities unfold toward reason and freedom. Modernity is therefore a project of self-cultivation: humans progressively develop institutions that reflect rational and moral principles. This includes his idea of perpetual peace, where rational states enter a federation to reduce conflict and respect universal rights. In this sense, Kant anticipates later liberal and cosmopolitan theories that define modernity as global interdependence based on law and rights.

At the same time, Kant’s modernity has inherent tensions. His emphasis on rational universality has been critiqued for overlooking diversity, cultural specificity, and material inequalities. Critics such as postmodernists and postcolonial theorists argue that Kant’s universalism reflects a Eurocentric conception of reason. Yet, even these critiques acknowledge that Kant’s articulation of autonomy, dignity, and critique forms the normative backbone of modern political thought. His vision of modernity as a condition of self-reflective freedom continues to shape contemporary debates on democracy, citizenship, rights, and global justice.

In conclusion, Kant’s views on modernity represent a profound philosophical shift that redefined the foundations of political and moral life.

Rousseau’s Views on Human Nature & the State of Nature

Jean-Jacques Rousseau stands apart in the Western political tradition for offering a radically different conception of human nature and the state of nature than thinkers such as Hobbes and Locke. Whereas earlier modern theorists deployed the state of nature to justify political authority in terms of security or property, Rousseau used it as a philosophical device to critique existing society and expose the corrupting impact of civilization. His account is primarily moral, not historical: the state of nature reveals what human beings are by nature, before social institutions distort their character. Through this contrast, Rousseau redefines the foundations of political legitimacy and freedom.

Rousseau’s central claim is that human beings in the state of nature are essentially good, peaceful, and guided by simple needs. His famous line—“Man is born free, and everywhere he is in chains”—captures the idea that natural freedom precedes social corruption. Human nature in its original condition is marked by two basic principles:

• Amour de soi (a natural form of self-love involving self-preservation without harming others).
• Pitié (natural compassion).

These impulses ensure that humans neither dominate one another nor engage in unnecessary conflict. Unlike Hobbes, who saw the state of nature as violent competition, Rousseau believed that early humans were solitary but content, guided more by instinct than reason and possessing few desires capable of generating conflict.

The state of nature, for Rousseau, is not merely peaceful but also a condition of natural equality. Because individuals live largely independently, there is minimal scope for domination, exploitation, or pride. There is no private property, no organized labour, and no complex social comparison. This absence of structured relationships means that concepts like virtue, vice, justice, and injustice do not yet arise. Human beings are neither moral nor immoral—they are pre-moral. The simplicity of the state of nature ensures a form of negative freedom, where one is free because one’s desires are few and easily satisfied.

Rousseau’s narrative undergoes a decisive shift with the emergence of social institutions, particularly the invention of private property. He famously traces inequality to “the man who first enclosed a piece of land and said: this is mine,” declaring him the true founder of civil society. With property comes dependence, competition, and comparison. Humans who were once self-sufficient now rely on others for economic and social recognition. This transformation gives rise to amour-propre, a socially conditioned form of self-love rooted in pride, vanity, and the desire for approval. Amour-propre generates jealousy, rivalry, and ultimately institutionalized inequality. Thus, Rousseau’s state of nature is used as a philosophical contrast to show that society, rather than nature, is responsible for human corruption.

A key implication of Rousseau’s idea of human nature is his critique of modern civilization. He argues that the so-called achievements of progress—arts, sciences, luxury, refinement—do not elevate humanity but instead distance individuals from their natural compassion. Modern society fosters competition, greed, and artificial desires, fundamentally altering the simple moral orientation of natural man. Civilization thus produces inequality and alienation, making political reform necessary.

Yet Rousseau does not advocate a literal return to the state of nature. Rather, his political project aims to reconcile social life with the freedom of the natural condition. In The Social Contract, he proposes a new political order where individuals obey only the laws they collectively author through the general will. This allows individuals to regain autonomy and moral equality, conditions that were present in the state of nature but lost in the civil condition. His account of the state of nature thus becomes a normative benchmark for constructing a just society—one that secures freedom while preserving the moral qualities of compassion and equality.

In conclusion, Rousseau’s views on human nature and the state of nature serve as a foundational critique of modern society and a radical reinterpretation of human goodness. By portraying humans as naturally compassionate and free, he challenges the pessimism of Hobbes and the economic rationalism of Locke. The transition from the natural to the social condition reveals how institutions distort human character and generate inequality. Ultimately, Rousseau’s analysis provides the philosophical groundwork for imagining a political order that restores autonomy, equality, and moral community, making his thought central to the development of modern democratic and republican theory.

Rousseau’s Theory of the General Will

Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s theory of the General Will is one of the most influential and contested concepts in Western political philosophy. Introduced primarily in The Social Contract (1762), it forms the moral and political foundation of Rousseau’s vision of legitimate political authority. The General Will represents Rousseau’s attempt to reconcile individual freedom with collective decision-making, making it central to modern democratic theory. It is not merely the will of all citizens but the will that aims at the common good, transcending private interests. Through this idea, Rousseau articulates a model of political community where individuals remain free even when they are subject to laws, because they obey only rules they prescribe to themselves collectively.

At the heart of the General Will lies Rousseau’s belief that sovereignty resides in the people collectively, and that this sovereignty must always be exercised for the common good. The General Will is the expression of this collective moral purpose. Rousseau differentiates sharply between the will of all and the General Will.

• The will of all is simply the aggregate of individual preferences, often shaped by private desires, economic interests, and social inequalities.
• The General Will emerges when citizens set aside particular interests and deliberate as equals about what benefits the community as a whole.

Thus, the General Will is inherently oriented toward justice, equality, and the collective welfare.

The General Will gains its normative force from Rousseau’s understanding of freedom. He famously asserts that humans can only be truly free when they live under laws of their own making. In a political society governed by the General Will, individuals participate directly in lawmaking. Once a law is passed through the General Will, even those who disagree with it remain free because the law reflects rational and collective interest rather than arbitrary power. This leads to Rousseau’s provocative claim that individuals may be “forced to be free,” meaning they can be compelled to obey the General Will because it represents their true rational interest, not a coercive imposition from outside. For Rousseau, to obey the General Will is to obey oneself as a moral member of the community.

One key assumption underlying the General Will is that citizens must undergo a form of civic transformation. They must learn to subordinate private interest to the common good, not by abandoning individuality but by recognizing that personal flourishing is tied to collective well-being. This requires a high degree of civic virtue, political education, and moral development. Rousseau sees the General Will as viable only in a society where socio-economic inequalities are minimized. Extreme inequality corrupts public deliberation, strengthens private interests, and hinders citizens’ ability to think in terms of common good. Thus, the General Will is inseparable from Rousseau’s broader critique of inequality and his emphasis on moral citizenship.

The functioning of the General Will is rooted in direct democracy. Rousseau argues that sovereignty cannot be represented: the moment the people authorize others to decide on their behalf, genuine political freedom is lost. Legislators or representatives may help draft laws, but sovereign power remains with the assembled citizenry. This makes Rousseau a strong advocate of popular assemblies, frequent participation, and civic engagement. Although this model seems impractical for large modern states, Rousseau believed it worked best in small, cohesive political communities where citizens shared common values and interests.

A crucial feature of the General Will is its infallibility. Rousseau maintains that the General Will, by definition, cannot be wrong because it always aims at the common good. However, people’s perceptions of the General Will can be mistaken due to misinformation, factional influence, or inadequate deliberation. To address this, Rousseau emphasizes procedural safeguards such as open deliberation, equality of voices, and elimination of factions. Factions represent private interests organized against the common interest and therefore threaten the emergence of the General Will. When individuals deliberate independently rather than as members of groups, the General Will is more likely to emerge.

In conclusion, Rousseau’s concept of the General Will articulates an ideal of political association where freedom and authority are harmonized. By grounding sovereignty in the collective moral purpose of citizens, he envisions a political community that is self-governing, egalitarian, and oriented toward the common good. Although the practical application of the General Will remains challenging, its normative power continues to influence democratic theory, republicanism, and debates on collective decision-making.

Mary Wollstonecraft’s Views on Women and Patriarchy

Mary Wollstonecraft is widely regarded as one of the earliest and most influential feminist thinkers in Western political philosophy. Her seminal text, A Vindication of the Rights of Woman (1792), laid the foundation for modern feminist critique by identifying the systemic structures of patriarchy and arguing for women’s rational and moral equality. Writing during the Enlightenment, Wollstonecraft responded to male philosophers who celebrated universal rights but excluded women from their scope. Her work challenges this hypocrisy by asserting that women, like men, are rational beings deserving of education, civil rights, and political participation. Wollstonecraft’s critique of patriarchy is therefore both philosophical and political, aiming to transform gender relations at their root.

At the heart of her argument lies the belief that women are not naturally inferior to men, but appear so only because society denies them proper education and opportunity. Wollstonecraft criticizes the dominant social norms of her time that trained women to be “pleasing” rather than virtuous, emotional rather than rational, and dependent rather than autonomous. This social construction of femininity, according to her, is the primary mechanism of patriarchy. It ensures that women internalize their subordination and remain confined to the domestic sphere. For Wollstonecraft, true moral and intellectual fulfillment cannot arise from such a system. She insists that women possess the same rational capacities as men and should therefore be trained to exercise reason, judgment, and independence.

A crucial aspect of her critique is her attack on patriarchal education, which she sees as the principal instrument of female subordination. Contemporary educational philosophies, such as those of Rousseau, reinforced the belief that women existed primarily to serve men as companions or caretakers. Rousseau’s Émile suggests that women should be educated only to please men. Wollstonecraft strongly opposes this idea, arguing that educating women merely for beauty, charm, or obedience corrupts both private and public life. Instead, she advocates for a national system of co-educational schools, where boys and girls study together and develop rationality, virtue, and civic responsibility. Education thus becomes both a tool of emancipation and a means of reshaping social institutions.

Wollstonecraft also provides one of the earliest feminist analyses of marriage as a patriarchal institution. She notes that because women are trained to value superficial accomplishments—beauty, delicacy, submissiveness—they enter marriage as dependents rather than equals. This unequal dynamic reproduces male authority and female subordination within the household, which she identifies as the microcosm of broader political inequality. Wollstonecraft proposes that only when women become rational, autonomous citizens can marriage transform into a relationship of mutual respect and partnership. In this sense, she links personal relations to political structures, anticipating later feminist insights that “the personal is political.”

Another central theme in Wollstonecraft’s political thought is her emphasis on women’s citizenship. She argues that virtue is the basis of citizenship, and because women are capable of virtue, they have a rightful claim to full participation in the public sphere. Her argument goes against the prevailing belief that women were naturally suited only for domestic roles. Wollstonecraft contends that excluding women from politics weakens society because it deprives the nation of their talents and contributions. Her demand for women’s political rights—education, property rights, and civic participation—places her among the earliest advocates for feminist liberalism.

Wollstonecraft’s critique of patriarchy extends beyond institutions to the psychological effects of gender oppression. She observes that patriarchy produces women who are fragile, dependent, and emotionally unstable, not because of biological destiny but because social norms encourage them to behave in childish ways. Men, too, are corrupted by patriarchy, as it encourages tyranny, egoism, and domination. Therefore, the liberation of women is also a moral reform for society as a whole. Wollstonecraft envisions a social order based on reason, virtue, equality, and mutual respect—values that require dismantling patriarchal structures.

In conclusion, Mary Wollstonecraft’s reflections on women and patriarchy represent a groundbreaking intervention in modern political theory. By identifying the socially constructed nature of gender inequality and linking it to broader political structures, she exposed the contradictions within Enlightenment liberalism. Her insistence on rational education, equal citizenship, and moral autonomy laid the foundation for later feminist movements and continues to influence contemporary debates on gender, rights, and justice.

J.S. Mill’s Views on Liberty

John Stuart Mill’s reflections on liberty, most clearly expressed in his seminal work On Liberty (1859), constitute one of the foundational texts of modern liberal political theory. Mill wrote during a period when political despotism was declining in Europe, but he believed that a new and subtler threat had emerged: the “tyranny of the majority.” His theory of liberty thus seeks to safeguard individual freedom not only against government oppression but also against social pressures and conventional norms. Mill regards liberty as essential for human flourishing, social progress, and the advancement of truth. His conceptual framework is built around three interconnected spheres: liberty of thought and expression, liberty of action, and liberty of association. Together, they form the basis of a liberal democratic society grounded in individuality, rationality, and autonomy.

The central pillar of Mill’s argument is the Harm Principle, which states that individuals should be free to do whatever they wish unless their actions cause harm to others. For Mill, the only legitimate reason for society or the state to interfere with an individual’s liberty is to prevent harm. This principle sharply limits the scope of state coercion and protects personal freedom in matters of lifestyle, belief, and self-regarding actions. Mill insists that individuals are the best judges of their own interests, and even when they make mistakes, allowing them freedom promotes learning, responsibility, and moral growth. The Harm Principle thus establishes freedom as the default condition of human life and places a heavy burden of justification on any authority seeking to restrict it.

A major component of Mill’s theory is the freedom of thought and expression, which he describes as the most fundamental liberty. Mill defends free speech not only because individuals have a right to express themselves but also because society benefits from the competition of ideas. He famously argues that suppressing an opinion is a disservice to humanity:

• The suppressed opinion might be true.
• If false, it helps clarify the truth through rational debate.

Even widely accepted opinions must be challenged regularly, lest they become “dead dogmas” rather than “living truths.” Mill sees open discussion as the engine of intellectual and moral progress. Thus, the protection of free expression is essential for an enlightened and self-correcting society.

Mill’s second dimension of liberty is the freedom of action and lifestyle, grounded in the belief that individuality is a key component of human development. Mill argues that society should value diversity, experimentation, and personal choice. Individuals should be allowed to explore different “modes of living” because such diversity enriches society and fosters innovation. He criticizes social conformity as a form of tyranny that restricts creativity and undermines personal growth. The cultivation of individuality enables people to develop their unique talents and capacities, making society more vibrant and progressive. This emphasis on individuality distinguishes Mill from earlier liberals who focused primarily on limiting state power; Mill extends the critique to social norms and moral pressures.

Mill also advocates for the freedom of association, which allows individuals to unite voluntarily for lawful purposes without state interference. Associations, according to Mill, provide spaces for cooperation, intellectual exchange, and moral development. They strengthen civil society and check the excessive concentration of power. Voluntary associations contribute to democratic participation and offer alternative channels for self-expression and collective action outside state structures.

Critics have questioned the ambiguity of the Harm Principle, especially regarding what counts as “harm.” Additionally, some argue that Mill’s emphasis on individuality reflects a specifically Western, bourgeois conception of the self. Nonetheless, Mill’s theory remains a cornerstone of liberal political thought, influencing contemporary debates on personal autonomy, free speech, and the limits of state power.

In conclusion, J.S. Mill’s views on liberty present a comprehensive defense of individual freedom grounded in the Harm Principle, the importance of free expression, and the value of individuality. By opposing both governmental despotism and social conformity, Mill broadens the liberal project to include protection from societal pressures. His theory envisions a society where individuals develop freely, experiment with diverse lifestyles, and participate in open debate. Mill’s defence of liberty has shaped the modern understanding of democratic citizenship, human rights, and pluralism, making him one of the most enduring thinkers in the liberal tradition.

J.S. Mill’s Views on the Subjection of Women

John Stuart Mill’s The Subjection of Women (1869) is one of the most important early feminist texts within the liberal tradition. Written with significant intellectual collaboration from Harriet Taylor, the work offers a powerful critique of gender inequality and the patriarchal structures that restrict women’s freedom, education, and economic participation. Mill situates his arguments within the broader framework of liberty and utilitarianism, asserting that the subordination of women is both morally unjust and socially harmful. He contends that society cannot progress when half of its population is constrained by legal and cultural barriers. Mill’s critique is grounded in reason, empirical observation, and a strong commitment to equality.

Mill begins by identifying the legal and social subordination of women as the last remaining form of slavery in modern civilization. Unlike other inequalities that are historically contested, the domination of women is normalized through tradition, custom, and social conditioning. He argues that the existing gender hierarchy is not based on natural differences but on historical accident and force. Traditions should not be preserved simply because they have existed for a long time. For Mill, the test of a just institution is not its age but whether it promotes liberty, equality, and human flourishing. The subjection of women clearly fails this test.

A central argument in The Subjection of Women is Mill’s critique of the notion that women are naturally inferior. He rejects biological determinism and maintains that society cannot know women’s true nature because their potential has never been allowed to develop freely. Their abilities have been shaped—and artificially limited—by restrictive upbringing, lack of education, and dependent economic roles. Mill insists that only in conditions of equality and freedom can women’s natural capacities be understood. Thus, claims about women’s supposed inferiority are untested assumptions produced by patriarchal institutions rather than evidence-based truths.

Education is a major theme in Mill’s argument. He observes that women are trained from childhood to internalize ideals of obedience, emotional dependence, and self-sacrifice. This gendered socialization prepares them only for domestic roles and reinforces stereotypes that justify male dominance.

Mill further critiques marriage as an institution that embodies and reproduces gender inequality. In his time, marriage legally placed women under the control of their husbands, limiting their rights to property, earnings, and autonomy. Mill denounces this relationship as inherently unjust, likening it to a form of domestic despotism. A marriage based on inequality, he argues, cannot foster genuine affection, companionship, or mutual respect. Instead, Mill advocates for companionate marriage, where partners are equals and both contribute to domestic and public life. He argues that equality within the household is essential for broader societal equality.

Mill also emphasizes the economic and political exclusion of women. He asserts that women should have access to all professions and should be admitted to citizenship on equal terms with men, including the right to vote. Denying women these opportunities wastes human talent and weakens society. From a utilitarian perspective, the greatest happiness of the greatest number cannot be achieved when women are denied the freedom to pursue their own ambitions or contribute to the public good. Their exclusion produces inefficiency, injustice, and social stagnation.

A powerful part of Mill’s argument is his analysis of power and social conditioning. He explains that women often appear to accept their subordination because they have been taught to see it as natural or desirable. This “internalized oppression” makes patriarchy particularly resilient. Mill compares this psychological conditioning to slavery: those who are oppressed may defend their condition simply because they have never experienced freedom. Therefore, he insists that genuine consent can only emerge in a context where equality is already established.

Mill’s arguments have been praised for their progressive vision but also critiqued for being limited within a liberal, individualistic framework. Some feminist theorists argue that Mill underemphasizes structural power relations and focuses too much on legal reforms without fully recognizing the depth of cultural patriarchy. Nonetheless, his text remains a landmark in the history of feminist political theory.

In conclusion, The Subjection of Women presents a comprehensive and morally compelling critique of gender inequality. Mill’s emphasis on liberty, equality, education, and social reform makes his work a foundational document in liberal feminism. His insistence that society cannot flourish when half its members are oppressed continues to resonate in contemporary debates on gender justice.

Hegel’s Views on Civil Society and the State

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s political philosophy, especially as presented in Elements of the Philosophy of Right (1821), offers one of the most systematic accounts of modern political life. His theory of Civil Society and the State is central to his understanding of ethical life (Sittlichkeit). Hegel sees modern society as a progression of human freedom, where institutions embody rationality and ethical norms. Within this framework, civil society and the state are not opposing forces, but interconnected stages through which freedom is realized. Hegel’s account is distinctive because he rejects both the individualistic liberal tradition and the organic, hierarchical view of earlier political thought, offering instead a dialectical understanding of political institutions.

Hegel divides ethical life into three spheres:

1. Family: Represents unity based on love.
2. Civil Society: Stands between the family and the state as a sphere of difference, competition, and individual interest.
3. State: Represents unity based on reason.

The family represents unity based on love; the state represents unity based on reason; and civil society stands between them as a sphere of difference, competition, and individual interest. Civil society, for Hegel, is not a natural condition (as Hobbes or Locke would claim) but a distinctly modern creation. It arises when individuals pursue private economic interests in an impersonal, market-oriented world. Civil society is characterized by individualism, division of labour, economic exchange, and the pursuit of self-interest. It represents the “system of needs,” where personal desires are pursued in a rational, structured manner through institutions like the market, corporations, and legal systems.

Because civil society is driven by competition and inequality, Hegel recognizes both its productive and destructive capacities. On one hand, it fosters dynamism, innovation, and individual freedom. On the other hand, it produces poverty, exploitation, and alienation. Hegel is among the first philosophers to identify structural poverty as an inevitable product of market society. He argues that in civil society, wealth accumulates in the hands of a few while many fall into economic vulnerability, creating a “rabble” that threatens social stability. Thus, civil society cannot sustain itself without regulation and integration into a higher ethical structure.

To manage the contradictions of civil society, Hegel introduces the concept of corporations—professional and economic associations that provide social identity, solidarity, and ethical life to individuals engaged in the market. Corporations help to mediate the harshness of competition by offering welfare, protection, and a sense of belonging. Similarly, Hegel sees the legal system and the administration of justice as essential institutions that guarantee rights, regulate conflict, and provide equality before the law. However, despite these stabilizing mechanisms, civil society remains fragmented and incapable of securing the universal interest on its own.

This is where the State enters Hegel’s framework as the highest embodiment of ethical life. The State, for Hegel, is not merely a coercive institution or an instrument for protecting private interests; it is the realization of the universal will and the rational organization of freedom. Unlike social contract theorists, Hegel argues that the State is not created by individuals; rather, individuals find their highest purpose and freedom within it. The State integrates the particular interests of civil society and elevates them into a universal, ethical order. It harmonizes competing interests and resolves contradictions through laws, institutions, and political authority.

Hegel famously asserts that the State is “the actuality of the ethical Idea,” meaning it embodies rationality, justice, and collective freedom. He distinguishes between the civil society, which represents particularity, and the State, which represents universality. The State does not eliminate individual freedom but gives it meaningful direction by situating individuals within a community governed by reason. Through political participation, constitutional monarchy, and representation, individuals recognize their identity as citizens, not merely as economic actors. The State mediates between private interests and the universal good, ensuring stability, security, and moral life.

Hegel’s understanding of the State has sparked extensive debate. Critics argue that he idealizes the State and leaves too much room for authoritarian interpretations, while supporters maintain that he provides a powerful defense of constitutionalism, civic duty, and the rule of law. His emphasis on the interdependence of institutions, his recognition of civil society’s contradictions, and his vision of the State as a rational ethical order have influenced modern political theory, from Marxism to contemporary communitarianism.

In conclusion, Hegel’s distinction between civil society and the State forms a cornerstone of his political philosophy.