Kant’s Critique of Metaphysics: Is it a Science?

The Problem of Metaphysics

The problem of metaphysics, which Immanuel Kant called into question, is its lack of progress compared to other sciences such as mathematics and physics. These sciences, especially physics, were making great strides in the eighteenth century. However, metaphysics was in the midst of chaos between the dogmatism of the rationalists and the skepticism of the empiricists. That is why the German Enlightenment sought to find out, through critical analysis of reason, what prevents the progress of metaphysics. But it must first ascertain the characteristics of knowledge in general, which is represented by science, and then compare these conditions with metaphysics to see if they comply and thus answer the question: Is metaphysics a science?

However, before developing the entire procedure that will take Kant to answer this question, some slight modifications should be made to the term “metaphysics.” Since this concept is of vital importance to Kantian philosophy, it acquires different meanings, four different meanings: first, in the sense of traditional metaphysics, dogma that is on the fringes of all experience and is uncritical. Second, as a natural disposition insofar as it addresses issues that humans naturally encounter—soul, world, and God. Third, it is the name that Kant himself gives to his philosophical system, to his critical philosophy. Finally, the metaphysical as that address, when Kant answers the question raised earlier, the world of ethics and values. So when we talk about comparing metaphysics with other sciences, we speak clearly of its traditional meaning.

The Validity of Science

Well, on the way to responding to the claims of metaphysics, the first step is to analyze what gives validity to science. In this regard, it is important to note that Kant does not discuss science because he doubts its validity, since it is evident that it is knowledge, but he does so to find out what gives it that validity. Thus, to discover what constitutes knowledge, the German philosopher makes a distinction between two types of judgments according to their structure: analytic and synthetic judgments, which in turn can be classified into a priori or a posteriori depending on the source of their validity.

• Analytic judgments express in the predicate an idea that was already included in the definition of the subject itself, so that they do not extend knowledge, but are necessary.
• Synthetic judgments provide new information that was not in the predicate, so that they both enlighten and are derived from experience.

With this, it is evident that science should be made of synthetic judgments, but these have the problem of being contingent, which cannot occur in knowledge that must be necessary and universal. Therefore, the judgments that make up science are synthetic a priori, that is, they expand knowledge and furthermore, their validity does not depend on experience, so they are necessary and universal.

The Synthesis of Knowledge

Accordingly, it is clear that knowledge is formed by a synthesis of two components: experience and a priori, transcendental conditions. This is known as a synthesis that unifies the Kantian empiricist and rationalist currents to determine the two components of knowledge, as in Kant’s words, “thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind.”

Thus the origin of knowledge is experience, which belongs to the level of sensitivity. But experience is not conceived as the empiricists did, but also as a synthesis of two elements. On one side are sensitive data that come from the outside world and that we grasp through the senses. On the other hand, we found a priori conditions of sensibility, which are space and time.

Space and Time

These conditions are imposed immediately by the knowing subject, and what they do is order the chaotic set of data that come through the senses, so that it would be impossible for the subject to capture such data without placing them in space-time coordinates. These two elements are building what Kant called the phenomenon, which is what we can get to know of reality, versus what we will never know by the very nature of our way of knowledge: the noumenon.

Understanding and Categories

However, as noted, experience is necessary but not sufficient, so we must move to the next stage of our process of knowing: understanding. This level receives the phenomenon that comes from experience and, in the same way as in experience, the subject brings a priori conditions. In this case, the a priori conditions are the twelve categories in which concepts are ranked that allow us to understand what comes from experience. This division into twelve categories corresponds to the twelve kinds of judgments that Kant distinguishes, as judgments are nothing but relations between concepts. So it is with these a priori conditions that the subject brings from which the necessity and universality of science and characteristics of all knowledge derive.

The Copernican Revolution

With this, the German philosopher manages to overcome the consequences of Hume’s critique of causality, which was none other than the impossibility of universal and necessary knowledge, as these features are not found in experience, which is particular and contingent. Kant made the turn, and passing the imposition of the conditions of knowledge from the object to the transcendental subject is what is known as the Copernican revolution and was an important step in the philosophy of the time.

Metaphysics: Not a Science

Once certain conditions that all science meets are established, it only remains to compare them with metaphysics in order to verify whether it complies and is a science, or if instead it does not and cannot be considered as such. The answer is clearly negative: metaphysics is not a science. However, this does not mean that metaphysics is no longer important, but simply that it will need to devote itself to other pursuits. Kant entrusted it with the task of dealing with the transcendent world of moral values and issues that naturally arise in humans—recalling the meaning of metaphysics as a natural disposition—beyond all experience.

It is, therefore, in the field of practical philosophy, in the arena of pure reason, that it deals with what things are in themselves, noumena, of which no knowledge can be obtained, but it is possible to think of them. And although reason knows that it cannot know them, it will incur over and over again in an effort to generalize, in the transcendental illusion that will make it believe it can answer these questions, and it will be inevitable, as it is a natural disposition of being human.

Conclusion

In conclusion, Kant responds to the claim of metaphysics as a science with a flat refusal, reminding reason of the need to set its own limits, without seeking to gain knowledge outside of experience, as well as to critique itself. So with his transcendental idealism and the important role of the subject in the active process of knowledge, Kant set a precedent for philosophy, which must abandon attempts to get to know reality itself.