Kantian Philosophy: Knowledge and Thought
The Difference Between Physical and Mathematical Science and Metaphysics
The critique of reason raises the question of what can be known. On one hand, it attempts to understand and explain scientific knowledge, including mathematics and physics as the science of nature. On the other hand, it aims to address the problem of metaphysics. Therefore, physical-mathematical science progresses and evolves, while metaphysics, by its very nature, does not.
Knowledge and Thought
Kant establishes a fundamental difference between knowing and thinking, noting that not all reality is capable of being known scientifically. The “elements” of knowledge are the sensible and the logical/rational, divided into “transcendental aesthetic” (sensitivity) and “transcendental logic” (understanding).
Empirical Concepts vs. Pure Concepts
Sensitivity confronts us with a multiplicity of phenomena. But perceiving these phenomena is not understanding them. Sensitivity receives, while understanding provides knowledge through concepts. There are two types of concepts:
- Empirical concepts, originating from experience (a posteriori).
- Pure concepts (a priori) or categories that are not from experience.
According to Kant, pure concepts are transcendental conditions necessary for our understanding of phenomena.
Kantian Idealism: Phenomenon and Noumenon
The categories are not applicable outside of experience, beyond what is given in space and time. The object (displayed and known) is called “phenomenon.” Its relationship with sensitivity is called “noumenon.” Noumenon is defined as something that cannot be known by sense experience or as something that can be known by intellectual experience.
As the noumenon is given beyond experience, it is seen as the limit of what can be known. Kant’s doctrine is called “transcendental idealism” because space, time, and categories are conditions of possibility of the phenomena of experience rather than real features of things in themselves.
Analytic and Synthetic Judgments
In a judgment, we think about the relation of a subject and a predicate. According to the basic modalities of this relationship, the judgment will be either analytic or synthetic.
Analytical Judgments: When the predicate is included in the subject, and thus it is enough to analyze the subject to understand that the predicate necessarily follows. These judgments do not give us any new information; they do not extend knowledge. The analytic judgment is thus a priori, since its truth can be known independently of experience.
Synthetic Judgments: When the predicate is not contained in the notion of the subject. These judgments do provide new information and extend our knowledge. A synthetic judgment is a posteriori, as its truth is known from the data of experience.
Kant concludes that a priori analytic judgments are universal and necessary but do not expand our knowledge, while synthetic a posteriori judgments are not universal or necessary but do expand our knowledge. Therefore, only one form of judgment combines the fundamental characteristics of scientific knowledge: synthetic judgments a priori. These are universal and necessary because they are a priori, and because they are synthetic, they expand our knowledge.
Kant explains that space and time are forms of sensibility, a priori pure intuitions. There are two conditions of sensitivity absolutely necessary to enable identification: time and space. Kant called them a priori forms of sensitivity.
- “Forms” means that there are sense impressions, but the forms or ways we perceive them are particular.
- “A priori” means that they do not come from experience but are conditions for experience to be possible.
- A priori forms of sensation means that they belong to sensitive knowledge.
Kant also calls space and time “pure intuitions.”
- “Intuitions” means they are not understanding concepts; they are unique. There is a plurality of them, but they are parts of a single space and a constantly flowing time.
- “Pure” means they lack empirical content. They are “empty coordinates” in which sense impressions are sorted.
