Interpretation and Limits of Fundamental Rights in Spanish Constitution
The Interpretation of Rights
The objective nature of rights, making them essential elements of the order of the community, has a direct impact on their interpretation. The interpretation of statutory provisions must be made in the light of constitutional norms, particularly those that proclaim and embody fundamental rights and civil liberties. In case of doubt, the interpretation that gives greater force to the fundamental right should prevail. One of the constants of our constitutional doctrine is the principle of “liberalizing”: the principle that fundamental rights must be interpreted as widely as possible (ordinary law must be interpreted in the way most favorable for the effectiveness of such rights). Together with the principle just referred to, the Constitution incorporates another principle: the principle of consistent interpretation with Human Rights Treaties ratified by Spain. The origin of this principle is in an amendment by UCD in the Senate, with which it was intended that the rights and freedoms were protected and guaranteed in accordance with international human rights agreements ratified by our country. Many and varied are the treaties and agreements ratified by our country: the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. The Constitution is inserted in an international context in terms of fundamental rights and freedoms, as we interpret its rules in this area in accordance with the aforementioned international texts.
Art. 96.1 -> Validly concluded international treaties become part of our domestic law.
Art. 10.2 -> Clause of protection and guarantee of rights; recourse to international treaties on human rights.
This reference to international law cannot resolve all interpretive problems. A self-binding of the Constitution interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights on this matter must be understood as connecting to a minimum standard, which may be increased by our legislation and the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court (European influence). The Constitutional Court expresses its willingness to interpret, on its own terms, the judgments of the European body.
The Limits of Rights
Fundamental rights are not unlimited in their exercise; they are subject to a number of limits. Our Constitution provides full confirmation of this general rule. One might think otherwise in view of Art. 10.1, which elevates to the category of fundamental legal values the dignity of the person and the inviolable rights that are inherent to it, considered “the foundation of political order and social peace.” Designed for individual rights, the general rule of Art. 10.1 implies that “spiritual and moral values inherent in the dignity of the person” have to remain unchanged regardless of the situation in which the person is.
Based on the limited nature of rights, we can say that the limits of these may be of two types:
- Intrinsic limitations arising from the nature of each right and its social role. Within these, it is common to differentiate the objective limits (arising from the nature of the right itself) from the subjective limits (arising from the speaker’s attitude and how the holder conducts himself with the right).
- Extrinsic limits derived from the social existence of the other subjects of law that coexist. Sometimes derived from the Constitution itself.
The Constitution has been very stingy when contemplating general limits to rights. Art. 10.1 only provides, as a basis for limiting rights, respect for the rights of others. The meaning of Art. 29.2 must be to establish a framework to delimit the scope of the ordinary legislature. Only the legislature may limit the exercise of a right, and only for the purpose of pursuing the protection of a legal asset worthy of protection. Article 29.2 provides a reference point.
The Constitutional Court insists that only the limits explicitly defined in the Constitution itself for each right can be transferred to the duties imposed on fundamental rights. Our Constitution is somewhat more subtle when defining the limits of certain rights (the maintenance of public order protected by law as the limit for the exercise of freedom of ideology, religion, and worship).
Limiting constitutional rights requires attention to a series of hermeneutical rules that connect with the principle of “greater value” of rights. As an immediate principle of referral, we find the “liberalizing” principle. The limitations that are established cannot obstruct the exercise of rights beyond reasonable limits. Any act must ensure that the measures are necessary for the desired purpose and must consider the proportionality between the sacrifice of the right and the situation in which the person is for whom it is intended. Any limitation imposed by a law must respect the essential content of the right.