Intentionality and the Representational Theory of Mind
I. Pop Psychology
Intentionality
The main characteristic of mental processes is their intentionality—their directedness toward an object, event, or process. Jerry Fodor’s approach analyzes linguistic forms, particularly sentences with verbs like “believe,” “expect,” and “desire.” These sentences, termed “propositional attitudes,” express a person’s attitude toward a proposition. For example, in the sentence “Teresa hopes the film will be interesting,” the proposition is “the film is interesting,” and the sentence represents Teresa’s attitude toward it. We can use propositions to identify the content of mental states. For instance, Jack Sparrow’s attitude toward the proposition “restore the Black Pearl” reveals his mental state.
Explaining Behavior
By characterizing mental states in terms of propositional attitudes, we can explain behavior in terms of beliefs, desires, and intentions. Fodor contrasts the behavior of his cat, GreyCat, with inanimate objects. GreyCat acts based on beliefs and desires (e.g., wanting food, believing his bowl contains food). Inanimate objects, however, lack such internal states.
Pop Psychology
Fodor calls this explanation of behavior “common-sense psychology,” also known as pop psychology. He highlights its relevance for three reasons:
- Effectiveness: Pop psychology allows us to infer intentions from statements and predict behavior from intentions.
- Depth: It explains how beliefs, desires, and behavior interact, leading to generalizations like: If A wants “x” and believes “w” is necessary for “x,” then A will perform “w.”
- Indispensability: We lack alternative vocabularies for explaining behavior in terms of general laws. We rely on terms like “think” and “desire.”
Representational Theory of Mind
Fodor proposes a scientific psychology based on propositional attitudes: the Representational Theory of Mind. This theory posits that beliefs are representations of states of affairs (e.g., believing it will rain tomorrow is having a representation of a rainy tomorrow). It draws on the computer metaphor, suggesting that mental representations are like symbols manipulated by an operating system. Fodor further postulates an “language of thought,” distinct from our native language, which allows the mind to operate on these representations. This language of thought has its own syntax, enabling the combination of simple representations into complex ones. The theory suggests that the structure of our mental states mirrors the syntactic structure of this language of thought.