Institutions of Democracy

Posted on Jun 18, 2024 in Social sciences

What is Democracy?

Models of Democracy:

  • Direct Democracy: Citizen participation, citizens govern themselves without electing representatives.
  • Representative Democracy: System effectiveness, citizens indirectly govern themselves by electing representatives to make policy (chain of delegation/principal-agent relationship).
  • Liberal Democracy: Values the means (process).
  • Populist Democracy: Values the ends (substance). May go further to promote one vision of the good, prioritizing group over individual rights to some extent.
  • Majoritarian Democracy: Governance by a bare majority; citizens give a clear mandate to a team of politicians; concentrated policy-making power, responsibility clear; direct control.
  • Consensual/Proportional Democracy: Governance by as many as possible; citizens elect autonomous agents who flexibly bargain (elite-centered); dispersed policy-making power; responsibility unclear; indirect control. Related to veto-gates and transactional relationships; concentrated vs. dispersed power; governance by few vs. many.

Definitions of Democracy:

  • A Different Democracy: A chain of delegation (a principal-agent relationship) whereby citizens delegate policy-making authority to the government and hold it accountable via elections.
  • Karl and Schmitter: A “…system of governance in which rulers are held accountable for actions in the public realm by citizens, acting indirectly through the competition and cooperation of elected representatives”.
  • Alvarez et al: A “…regime where governmental offices are filled as a consequence of contested elections”.
  • Dahl: A governing process that grants political equality to members, satisfying 5 standards: effective participation, voting equality, enlightened understanding, control of the agenda, and inclusion of most adults.
  • Acemoglu and Robinson: “Political equality”.

All agree that the citizenry must exercise meaningful control over government/policy through elections, but there are important points of disagreement as well, such as about the inclusion of participatory criteria. The broadest concept of democracy has two dimensions: participation (inclusion) and political institutions. However, we will use the narrow definition: using political institutions as the deciding factor in defining a regime as democratic.

Measures of Democracy:

  • Dahl’s Polyarchy:
    Categories, Spectrum: Continuous: 11 categories 0-10, 0 being least polyarchy.
    Thickness, Criteria: Narrowest: 5 criteria scored 1-3 or 1-4. Contestation: 1. Free and fair elections; 2. Freedom of expression; 3. Freedom of organization; 4. Alternative sources of information; Inclusion: 5. Suffrage.
    Reliability: Good, expertly coded based on fairly clear criteria.
  • Freedom House:
    Categories/Spectrum: Polychotomous: Free, partly free, not free. 0-40 points for political rights, 0-60 points for civil liberties.
    Thickness/Criteria: Thin: 1. Electoral process; 2. Political pluralism and participation; 3. Functioning of government; 4. Freedom of expression and belief; 5. Associational and organizational rights; 6. Rule of law; 7. Personal autonomy and individual rights.
    Reliability: Good, produced by analysts and experts.
  • EIU Democracy Index:
    Categories/Spectrum: Polychotomous: Full democracies, flawed democracies, hybrid regimes, authoritarian regimes.
    Thickness/Criteria: Broadest: 5 categories with 0-10 for each: 1. Electoral process and pluralism; 2. Civil liberties; 3. The functioning of government; 4. Political participation; 5. Political culture.
    Reliability: Less reliable because of culture.
  • Democracy-Dictatorship Index:
    Categories/Spectrum: Dichotomous, either democracy or a dictatorship.
    Thickness/Criteria: Thin: State is a democracy iff (if and only if): 1. Chief executive is elected (either popularly or by a body that is itself popularly elected); 2. Legislature is popularly elected; 3. More than 1 party/candidate contested elections; 4. Incumbents did not use electoral victory to establish non-democratic rule; alteration in power must have taken place.
    Reliability: Good, judged by expert political scientists.

Institutional Components of Modern Democracies

The core institutional component of modern representative democracy is the free and fair election of government by citizens.

Executive Systems:

  • Branch of government: Responsible for implementing and enforcing laws.
  • Head of State: Ceremonial functions and representation.
  • Head of Government: Key policy decisions and administration (presides over the cabinet).
  • Presidential Systems: Executive elected directly by the citizens.
    • Sources of Executive Variation in Presidential Systems:
      • President directly elected by citizens vs. indirectly elected by citizens.
      • What electoral rule is used.
      • Term, term limits, primaries.
    • Legislative Powers:
      • Package veto/override.
      • Partial veto/override.
      • Decree.
      • Exclusive introduction of legislation.
      • Proposal of referenda.
      • Budgetary powers.
    • Non-Legislative Powers:
      • Cabinet formation.
      • Cabinet dismissal.
      • Censure.
      • Dissolution of assembly.
  • Parliamentary Systems: Citizens elect members of parliament, and MPs appoint the executive and cabinet.
    • Sources of Executive Variation in Parliamentary Systems:
      • Types of Cabinets:
        • Single-party majority.
        • Single-party minority.
        • Surplus majority coalition.
        • Minimal winning coalition.
        • Minority coalition.
        • Office-seeking vs. policy-seeking cabinet formation.
        • PM first above unequals.
        • PM first among unequals.
        • PM first among equals.
  • Hybrid Systems:
    • Semi-presidential/premier-presidential.
    • President-parliamentary.
    • Assembly independent.

Legislative Systems:

  • Provides representation.
  • Makes laws (policy).
  • If the executive is parliamentary or hybrid, serves as the direct principal of the cabinet.
  • Sources of Variation in Legislative Systems:
    • Relationship with Executive:
      • In a parliamentary system, the legislature is the principal of the executive.
      • In a presidential system, the legislature makes laws in a transactional relationship.
    • Cameral Structure:
      • Unicameral: 1 chamber of legislation.
      • Bicameral: 2 chambers.
        • Bicameral symmetrical vs. asymmetrical power of each chamber.
        • Bicameral congruent (represents voters in the same way) vs. incongruent bicameral (voters represented differently in each house).
        • Bicameral chambers equal or unequal in size.
        • Bicameral terms can be different between chambers, and elections can be staggered or simultaneous.

Unicameral dominates worldwide, but bicameral dominates different democracy samples because:

  • Power: Federalism might necessitate one chamber more representative of subunits.
  • Efficiency/Cooperation: Different quality of legislation, with longer terms allowing one chamber to slow down, and separation might mean one chamber will have more expertise.
  • Other Sources of Variation:
    • Internal Structures: Centralized/majoritarian internal structure or decentralized/consensual internal structure.
    • Cabinet dominance or opposition influence or individual legislators.
    • Timing of Elections: Flexible or fixed, staggered or non-staggered.
    • Size: Absolute size, relative size to population: cube root of the population being represented.

Executive and Legislative Systems: Veto Players/Gates:

  • Transactional relationships produce veto players, not vertical relationships.
  • Institutional and partisan veto players.
  • Absorption rule: Partisan situations can change basic institutional calculus.
  • Details of institutional design (e.g., the existence of a presidential veto) also affect calculus.
  • More veto players = more consensual, more status quo bias, greater policy stability, gridlock.
  • Fewer veto players = more majoritarian, less status quo bias, less policy stability, policy shifts.

Vertical Relations:

The interaction between central (national) and local (subnational) units of politics. Two dimensions: federal vs. unitary and centralized vs. decentralized.

  • Unitary Systems: Central government serves as the principal of local governments.
  • Federal Systems: Transact with local governments in at least some policy domains.
    • Independently elected local governments.
    • Constitution claiming federal status, guaranteeing sovereignty to local governments, providing distribution of responsibilities.
    • Institutions to represent local preferences within the central political government (e.g., bicameralism).
    • Judicial review.

Representational Issues:

  • Are sub-national units granted equal representation?
  • Is the population equally distributed across sub-national units?
  • Are capitals and territories granted equal representation?
  • Do electoral calendars for local and central governments coincide?

Vertical relations can be centralized or decentralized administratively (is it given to underlings or to autonomous governments) and politically (appointment and decision-making; if both present = federalism) and fiscally.

Unitary predominates around the world (86%) and in the “Different Democracy” sample (60%) with decentralization increasing over time because of:

  • Size.
  • Ethnic diversity.
  • Population.
  • Historical “accidents” where separate political units come together, or vagaries of conquest and colonialism.

Many say decentralism has benefits like:

  • Administrative efficiency.
  • Quality of democracy (e.g., increased participation).
  • Checks and balances.
  • Ethnic conflict management.

Electoral Systems:

Political institution providing rules for translating votes into seats for legislative and executive offices.

Majoritarian Electoral Systems:

  • Small M (1-2).
  • Formula such as plurality or majority.
  • Often disproportional and advantage large parties.
  • Single-Member District Plurality:
    M=1
    F: Plurality (candidate with the most votes wins).
    Ex: US legislature + president, UK legislature.
  • Two-Round System/Dual Ballot:
    M=1
    F: Majority-plurality (over 50%) or qualified majority-plurality (>50%, either a specific % of total eligible voters or a specific % >50%). Majority or qualified majority required for a win in the 1st round, the 2nd round of voting held if no one satisfies requirements. Usually, the top 2 candidates advance to the 2nd round, but variation exists, could be more.
    Ex: France legislature and president, Argentina’s president.
  • Alternative Vote/Ranked-Choice Voting:
    M=1
    F: Majority; rank candidates. If no >50% of 1st preference votes, the one with the lowest # of 1st preference votes is sequentially eliminated and votes transferred to remaining candidates until the majority.
    Ex: Australia’s lower legislature, increasingly used in US State + Local.
  • Block Vote:
    M>1
    F: Plurality; x # of candidates, voters get x # of votes. Either give all votes to one, or spread around to ones they approve of. x candidates with the most votes elected.

Proportional Electoral Systems:

  • Medium-large M (3+).
  • Formula such as LR-Hare or d’Hondt.
  • Proportional and less large party advantage.
  • LR-Hare:
    M>2
    F: Hare quota, largest remainder; Award as many seats to parties as they have full quotas; Hare quota = total valid votes [V]/total seats [M]; Then award remaining seats sequentially to parties with the largest remainder of votes.
    Favors smaller parties.
    Ex: Austria.
  • D’Hondt:
    M>2
    F: Award seat to the party with the highest average number of votes per seat for the seat currently being distributed T/(M+1) where M is the seats already allocated TO THAT SPECIFIC PARTY. Continue sequentially until all seats are distributed.
    Favors larger parties.
    Ex: Netherlands.
  • Single Transferable Vote:
    M>2
    F: Droop quota = (V/(M+1))+1. Voters rank candidates; Award seats to each candidate who meets the quota. If seats remain, redistribute “surplus” votes in excess of the quota for winning candidates, and award seats to any candidates now meeting the quota. If no additional candidate meets the quota, eliminate the candidate with the fewest first-preference votes and redistribute votes; Repeat until all seats are allocated.
    Ex: Ireland.

Mixed Electoral Systems:

  • Two tiers: nominal (candidate) and party-list.
  • M=1 for nominal, >2 for the party list.
  • F: Nominal tier is plurality; Party-list tier is some type of PR, e.g., Sainte-Lague. Allocation differs.
  • MMM:
    Total seat allocation is the sum of nominal and party-list tier seats.
    Ex: Japan.
  • MMP:
    Total seat allocation based on party-list tier votes. Allocate party-list tier seats to compensate for seats won in the nominal tier.
    Ex: Germany and New Zealand.

Constitutions

Consequences of Institutional Choices

The US as a Different Democracy

Readings

Treisman: The only general effect of decentralization is on policy stability (status quo bias); otherwise, consequences are “complex and obscure” and contingent.