Innate Ideas vs. Experience: The Origin of Knowledge
Three Problems of the Origin of Knowledge
The problem of the origin of knowledge (POK) was initially raised as the question of whether there are innate ideas or thoughts in the human mind. Some argue that all our ideas come from experience, while others believe in the existence of innate ideas. Those who support the latter are called Genetic Rationalists (or Nativists). Those who defend the opposing view, that all knowledge comes from experience, are called Empiricists.
Genetic Rationalism
Genetic Rationalists argue that some of our ideas and thoughts are innate, meaning that our minds are structured in such a way that we inevitably arrive at these ideas independently of sensory information. For these rationalists, the role of the senses is limited to awakening ideas that lie latent within our minds. Prominent representatives of rationalism include Plato, Descartes, and Leibniz.
Plato: A Key Figure in Rationalism
Plato was born in Athens in 427 BCE into an aristocratic family. He was a devoted disciple of Socrates. Socrates’s death sentence seemed to Plato the greatest injustice, as he believed they had murdered the most just man in the world. Plato documented Socrates’s thoughts but eventually distanced himself from them and began to develop his own philosophy.
Plato founded a school called The Academy. At its entrance, he placed a sign that read, “Let no one ignorant of mathematics enter here.” Among his most famous works, written during his mature years as the director of the Academy, are The Banquet, Phaedo, Phaedrus, and, most notably, The Republic.
Plato’s Theory of Forms
Plato argued that sensible things, those things we perceive with our senses, are not truly “real.” For example, we may call certain objects “spheres,” but are they truly spheres? They are not perfectly spherical, and they are constantly changing. Therefore, we cannot say that they are, in themselves, spheres.
If something were truly a sphere, it would be a perfect and unchanging sphere. However, this never happens in the sensible world because things are always in flux. According to Plato, “nothing in the sensible world truly is.”
Does this mean that nothing truly exists? Not for Plato. He posited the existence of abstract entities that truly are what they are. These are Forms or Ideas, which we cannot know through our senses but only through our intellect.
It is crucial to understand that when Plato speaks of “Ideas,” he is not referring to mental contents. Instead, he is referring to entities that exist independently of us, whether we know them or not. Even if we were unaware of them, they would still exist.
The World of Forms vs. the Sensible World
According to Plato, if we shut off our senses (the sensory world), we find that there are no true spheres. However, in another world, the intelligible world, there exists an intelligible entity that is truly, perfectly, and eternally a sphere: the Form of Sphere. The same applies to all other things. While nothing in the sensible world truly “is,” the intelligible world contains the Forms, which are the true essence of things.
The Nature of Knowledge
For many, knowledge is that which provides us with reliable, objective, and immutable truths. These truths must be about something, and if they are immutable, they must be about something immutable and objective. Sensible things lack these characteristics. Therefore, there must be something distinct from sensible things: the Forms.
The Relationship Between Sensible Things and Forms
Plato describes the relationship between sensible things and Forms as one of participation. Sensible things are like shadows cast by the Forms; they are imperfect and fleeting copies of the Forms. For instance, the objects we call “spheres” in the sensible world are merely temporary and imperfect replicas of the true Sphere, which is the Form of Sphere.
The Hierarchy of Forms
Forms also participate in one another. Each Form is part of a higher Form, from which it can be defined. This creates a hierarchical pyramid of Forms, with the highest point being the supreme Form, in which all others participate, but which itself participates in none.