Hardin vs Ostrom: Tragedy of the Commons & CHANS
Garrett Hardin (1968) and Elinor Ostrom (1990) both try to explain how to prevent the tragedy of the commons, especially in coupled human and natural systems (CHANS), where human actions and ecological systems interact. However, they propose very different solutions because they have different views about human behavior and governance.
Hardin’s perspective on open resources
Hardin argues that when a resource is shared and open to everyone, individuals will overuse it. He assumes that people act as rational egoists, meaning they try to maximize their own benefit. In a common pasture, for example, each herder gains by adding more animals, but the cost of overgrazing is shared by all. As a result, everyone keeps adding animals, and the pasture collapses. For Hardin, this outcome is almost inevitable if there are no rules limiting access. He calls this a nontechnical problem, meaning that technology alone cannot solve it. The real issue is human behavior and incentives.
Hardin’s proposed solutions
To solve this problem, Hardin proposes two main strategies. First, state intervention: governments can create laws, set quotas, enforce limits, and punish overuse. Second, market solutions such as privatization: if a resource becomes private property, the owner has an incentive to manage it sustainably because they suffer the full cost of depletion. In both cases, Hardin believes that external authority, either the state or the market, is necessary to prevent collapse.
Ostrom’s perspective on community management
Ostrom disagrees with the idea that tragedy is unavoidable. Based on real-world studies of irrigation systems, forests, and fisheries, she shows that communities can successfully manage shared resources without privatization or strict government control. She argues that people are not only selfish.
They can value trust, fairness, reputation, and cooperation. Behavior depends on the institutional context.
Polycentric governance and principles
Ostrom proposes a polycentric governance system, where multiple levels of authority operate together. Instead of one central authority, there are local, regional, and national institutions that interact. She identifies eight design principles for successful commons management. These include:
- Clearly defined boundaries
- Rules that match local ecological conditions
- Participation of users in rule-making
- Monitoring of resource use
- Graduated sanctions for rule breakers
- Accessible conflict resolution
- Recognition of the community’s right to organize
- Nested enterprises for larger systems
These principles make governance more legitimate, flexible, and adapted to local realities.
Comparing Hardin and Ostrom
The main difference between Hardin and Ostrom is their view of human behavior and governance. Hardin believes strong external control is necessary. Ostrom believes that well-designed institutions can support cooperation. In complex CHANS, where social and ecological systems are linked, Ostrom argues that polycentric and participatory governance is often more adaptive and resilient.
Conclusion
In conclusion, Hardin warns about the dangers of unmanaged commons, while Ostrom shows that sustainable management is possible when institutions are carefully designed and communities are involved.