Gorbachev’s Era: Perestroika, Glasnost, and Soviet Collapse
Russia’s Transformation: 1985-1991
No period in peacetime in twentieth-century Russia saw such dramatic change as the years between 1985 and 1991. During this time, Russia achieved greater political freedom than it had ever enjoyed before. The breakup itself was remarkably peaceful, in sharp contrast to the extensive violence that accompanied the separation of the constituent parts of Yugoslavia.
Gorbachev’s Leadership and Early Reforms
Generally, Soviet leaders required time to build up their power base, gradually bringing in known supporters who had worked with them in the past. Gorbachev was unusual in that no one whom he promoted to either of the two highest organs of the CPSU was from his native Stavropol, where he had spent the whole of his career in the Komsomol and party between graduating from the Law Faculty of Moscow University in 1955 and being brought to Moscow as a secretary of the Central Committee in 1978.
At the January plenary session, Gorbachev introduced some measures of intra-party democratization and announced that there would be a special all-Union conference in the summer of 1988 ‘to discuss matters of further democratizing the life of the party and society as a whole.’
Key Concepts: Freedom and Glasnost
The idea of freedom, for instance, transformed. Instead of freedom meaning the recognition of (Marxist-Leninist) necessity, it acquired in the Soviet political lexicon its everyday meaning of freedom from constraints or, simply, ‘ordinary freedom, as established and practiced in the liberal democratic countries of the world.’ It was Gorbachev who broke that taboo by speaking positively about a ‘socialist pluralism’ and a ‘pluralism of opinion’ in 1987.
From very early in the Gorbachev era, one of the key concepts given emphasis was glasnost.
Glasnost Challenges: The Chernobyl Disaster
There were, nevertheless, occasions when glasnost was conspicuous by its absence. The most notable was the disaster at the Chernobyl nuclear power station in Ukraine on 26 April 1986. News of what turned out to be the world’s worst nuclear accident thus far came to Soviet citizens from the West by foreign radio. Those who wished change to progress faster used Chernobyl, however, as an illustration of what was wrong with the system – from shoddy work at the nuclear plant, to the local attempt to cover up the scale of the disaster, to the reluctance of the Soviet leadership and mass media to provide prompt and accurate information about the catastrophe.
Social and Cultural Shifts
A new religious tolerance prevailed, and many places of worship were reopened. The year of the major turning point for this, as for much else, was 1988. In June, the celebration of the millennium of Russian and Ukrainian Christianity took place with state support.
In general, the circulation of newspapers and journals reached far greater heights during the perestroika period than either before or since in Russia.
Political Tensions and Opposition
Gorbachev was implicitly the clear target of several critical speeches from conservative Communists, though not yet explicitly named as someone guilty of social democratic deviation from Communist orthodoxy.
Tension rose as a result of nationalist discontent and economic problems.
However, among those who duly voted for what was essentially a Social Democratic platform, it appears that a majority had no intention of implementing it. Some of those present had already turned their minds to the issue of how to remove Gorbachev from office.
Economic Reforms and Their Limitations
One early initiative was the adoption of an anti-alcohol program. The production of alcohol in state distilleries and wineries was drastically reduced, many retail outlets were closed, and illicit alcohol production filled the gap. The state’s monopoly of this industry had previously, given the high level of alcohol consumption (especially of vodka in the Slavic parts of the Soviet Union), made a massive contribution to the revenue side of the budget. Since alcoholism and drunkenness were alarmingly widespread in Russia, the measure had some support, especially from women; but, in spite of apparent early success in reducing alcohol consumption, it was ultimately a failure.
While the diagnosis that the Soviet economy was too centralized and that economic ministries had too much power was correct, the law did not achieve any of its intended results. The State Planning Committee (Gosplan) and the economic ministries found ways of maintaining many of their powers over the enterprises, even though the number of plan indicators was cut drastically. To the extent that there was some real devolution of authority to the factory level, it did more harm than good. Enterprises were able to charge higher prices for work of no higher quality than before.
Reformers and Western observers saw the Enterprise Law as a step forward. This was so only in the sense that since the attempt to reform the Soviet economy proceeded on the basis of trial and error, and in conditions of glasnost, the failures could soon be brought into the light of day.
There is no doubt that the attempt to reform the Soviet economy ended in failure. In the early years of perestroika, the first aim was being pursued – and with only very limited success.
It was clearer to Gorbachev than to Yeltsin that this would mean tens of millions of citizens becoming worse off for some years to come. Freeing prices would improve the supply of goods and services but would also raise those prices to a level the majority could ill afford. That factor, together with the institutional opposition to change of the type proposed by the Shatalin-Iavlinskii group, and concern about the possibly deleterious impact of economic systemic change on the territorial integrity of the USSR, made Gorbachev hesitate about pushing through the move to a market economy in practice that he had already accepted in principle. Much of the economic legislation of the perestroika years – not least the Law on Co-operatives – had helped to pave the way for marketization, but the Soviet economy remained in limbo at the end of the Gorbachev era. It was no longer a functioning command economy but not yet a market system.
Soviet Foreign Policy Transformation
The outcome of the new direction of Soviet foreign policy was a dramatic improvement in Soviet relations with the outside world.
At a meeting with the East European Communist leaders as early as Chernenko’s funeral, Gorbachev told this disbelieving group that the Soviet Union would respect their sovereignty and independence, and they, in turn, would have to take full responsibility for developments in their countries. In other words – and Gorbachev was to make this more explicit in November 1986 – the ruling parties of Eastern Europe had better earn the trust of their own people, for there would be no more Soviet military interventions if they ran into trouble.
He wished also to divert excessive military expenditure to civilian purposes, but he was initially alone also within the top leadership in being willing to tackle the power of the Soviet military-industrial complex.
One of the features that distinguished Gorbachev from his predecessors as Soviet leader was a strong aversion to violence.
International relations were no longer seen as a zero-sum game, a deadly struggle between socialism and capitalism, but rather an arena where, through co-operation, all countries could benefit. The first fruits of the new co-operation were to be seen in arms reduction agreements.
The improvement in East–West relations was further enhanced by the Soviet Union’s decision to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan.