Ethics of War: Pacifism, Realism, and Just War Theory
Ethics of War: Key Concepts
Soft Power vs. Hard Power
1. Soft power: Co-optive strategies inducing desired outcomes.
2. Hard power: Strategies compelling through military coercion and force.
Pacifism
3. Pacifism: A rule-based ethic; violence is never morally legitimate for national security or moral goods (human rights, justice, peace).
4. Highest norms in pacifism: Peace and nonviolence (take priority over other norms).
5. Historical supporter of pacifism: Erasmus (“You will lose much more than you gain, even if you win”).
6. Problems with pacifism: A significant moral tradition, but offers little guidance for soldiers or statesmen on defending vital interests. Prioritizing life and peace doesn’t allow for using force to pursue other moral objectives.
Amoral Realism
7. Amoral realism: War is a legitimate policy instrument; morality doesn’t constrain war. Military victory is the only governing norm (assuming legitimate war aims).
8. Perspectives of amoral realism: Cynicism and jihadism.
9. Cynical justification for force: Justifying force based on self-interest.
10. Jihadist justification for force: Justifying unlimited violence based on religious convictions (doesn’t eliminate morality, but views actions as fighting for God).
11. Crusade: Shares jihad’s divine justification for war; characterized by a good vs. evil conflict using total force to defeat the enemy.
Just War Doctrine
12. Just War Doctrine: An intermediary position between pacifism and amoral realism. All interstate relations, including war, are subject to moral standards. Peace and justice are imperfectly realized without incorporating power and force into decision-making.
13. Just War approach to violence: Violence is evil, but not necessarily the greatest evil. Values like protecting the innocent, recovering what’s wrongfully taken, punishing criminals, and defending against aggression may justify force.
14. Just cause: Legitimate justification for war is deterring aggression, defending against unjust attack, or righting a grievous wrong. Altering territorial boundaries by force or extending political/economic control is unjust. Aggression is immoral and justifies forceful resistance.
15. Competent authority: Force is morally permissible only when legitimate (authorized by government).
16. Right intention: A just war has limited goals. An unlimited war of attrition is morally unacceptable. Goals and means must be proportionate to the ends.
17. Last resort: A state must exhaust all peaceful means (diplomacy, negotiations, sanctions) before resorting to war.
18. Reasonable hope of success: Force must have a reasonable chance of success; good intentions aren’t sufficient. A war unlikely to achieve its goals is immoral.
19. Discrimination: Military force should target only political leadership and military forces. Discriminate between combatants and noncombatants to minimize civilian casualties.
20. Proportionality: Destruction inflicted must be proportional to the goals. An indiscriminate war of attrition is not morally justified. Use minimum violence to achieve limited aims.
21. Restoration of a just order: After war, the victor must restore order, rebuild the economy, reestablish political autonomy, and hold leaders accountable for atrocities and war crimes.
22. Character of jus ad bellum: Presumptive conservative character.
Case Study: Persian Gulf War
23. Case study: The Persian Gulf War.
24. Background of the Gulf War: On August 2, 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait. Iraq’s superior military quickly took control of Kuwait.
25. Reasons for Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait: Iraq disputed its southern border with Kuwait and faced financial pressures from its war with Iran.
26. Response to Saddam’s annexation of Kuwait: The UN Security Council passed resolutions opposing Iraq and seeking Kuwait’s sovereignty restoration. Sanctions and a multilateral force led by the U.S. liberated Kuwait.
27. Amstutz’s analysis of the Gulf War’s ethics: The case for liberating Kuwait was morally compelling because jus ad bellum criteria were met. Opposition came from those believing more time was needed to satisfy the “last resort” norm or fearing disproportionate force.
28. Amstutz’s conclusion on the Gulf War’s ethics: Just war criteria influenced the liberation of Kuwait. While some elements were fulfilled more fully than others, the resort to force was consistent with just war principles. However, some questioned the timing and prosecution of the campaign.
Case Study: Iraq War
29. 2002 NSS background: After 9/11, U.S. national security policy changed to address threats from non-state actors.
30. 2002 NSS entailments: Sets forth elements of the Bush Doctrine and shifts U.S. security policy from deterrence to preventive action to address threats from terrorist organizations. The U.S. is prepared to use its power unilaterally.
31. Key innovation of the NSS: Call for preemptive action to counter major threats.
32. Preemption: A corollary of self-defense; military attack is allowed when aggression is imminent. Attack before the aggressor strikes.
33. When preemption is justified: Morally justified when there’s an intention to injure, military preparations increasing danger, and immediate action is needed due to higher risk.
34. Preventive war: Occurs earlier in conflict, responding to a growing military power imbalance or development of capabilities posing future threats.
35. Goal of preventive war: Destroy the enemy’s ability to carry out aggression before mobilization.
36. Prime example of preventive war: The war against Iraq.
37. Background of the Iraq War: Iraq’s failure to comply with Gulf War agreements, its stockpiles of weapons, and its progress in developing nuclear weapons led the Bush administration to view Iraq as a threat.
38. George Bush’s Axis of Evil: Iraq, North Korea, Iran.
39. U.S. officials’ justifications for the Iraq War: Iraq’s failure to comply with peace terms, its tyrannical government, and its threat to world order.
40. Amstutz’s analysis of toppling Saddam’s regime: Morally problematic; some view it as illegitimate or illegal, while others see it as justified.
Lessons from the Fog of War
41. Lesson 1: Empathize with your enemy (Robert McNamara).
42. Lesson 2: Rationality won’t save us; human fallibility prevents luck from being a catch-all (McNamara).
43. Lesson 3: There’s something beyond oneself; emphasis on values, even in horrific war.
44. Lesson 4: Maximize efficiency in war.
45. Lesson 5: Proportionality should be a guideline in war; consider goals and rules of war.
46. Lesson 6: Get the data; learn from data (McNamara).
47. Lesson 7: Belief and sight are often wrong; intentions and information are skewed; misperception has heavy costs.
48. Lesson 8: Be prepared to reexamine your reasoning; decide what’s acceptable in war.
49. Lesson 9: To do good, you may have to engage in evil; consider the amount of evil required to do good (Just War Doctrine connection).
50. Lesson 10: Never say never; answer the question you wish they asked.
51. Lesson 11: You can’t change human nature; man is evil, mistakes are inevitable; war’s complexity exceeds human comprehension (“Fog of War”).
Terrorism and Irregular Warfare
52. Terrorism: Random violence to communicate a political message.
53. International terrorism (Clausewitz paraphrase): Continuation of politics by other means.
54. Why terrorism is inconsistent with the laws of war: It refuses to distinguish between soldiers and civilians, combatants and noncombatants.
55. How terrorism has changed since the Cold War: Shift from ideology to ethnonationalism; focus on mass casualties; transnational scope and purpose; better organization and financing.
56. Irregular wars: Wars involving insurgent, revolutionary movements, or radical religious groups undermining state authority through terrorism and clandestine violence.
57. Changes in the causes of irregular war: Post-Cold War shift from ideology to ethnonationalism as the major cause of domestic political strife.
58. Insurgency (guerrilla warfare): Protracted political and military effort by irregular forces and illegal political organizations seeking to topple a regime.
59. Goal of insurgency: Not direct engagement; force collapse through unconventional military tactics (guerrilla attacks and terror).
60. Counterinsurgency: A government’s effort to counter guerrilla activity by maintaining political support and overtly/covertly challenging insurgent operations.
61. Example of counterinsurgency: NATO forces in Afghanistan.
62. Common counterinsurgency strategy: Clandestine operations by unconventional forces (poses ethical challenges—blurs discrimination lines).
63. Walzer’s argument for unconventional force: Insurgency can be a morally legitimate means of fighting oppression.
64. Two ways to counter terrorism: Antiterrorism (defensive) and counterterrorism (offensive).
65. Antiterrorism (defensive): Protecting society by reducing vulnerability to terror; minimizing effects of attacks.
66. Example of antiterrorism: Initiatives instituted post-9/11.
67. Counterterrorism: Using state power to attack and destroy terrorist organizations. Difficult to implement due to terrorists’ stealth and secrecy.
68. Challenge of counterterrorism: Implementing without resorting to the same strategies as terrorists.
Case Study: Coercive Interrogation
69. Case study on coercive interrogation: The War on Terror.
70. Controversy over coercive interrogation during the War on Terror: Evidence of prisoner abuse raised questions about torture; defining torture and justifying it based on threat level.
71. Amstutz’s judgment of torture: Problematic at its absolute best.
72. Coercive interrogation: Part of the challenge of balancing torture and interrogation in the interests of national security.
Perspectives on Preemptive War in Iraq
73. Mearsheimer and Walt on preemptive war in Iraq: No; Saddam was a rational actor, deterrence would work; defends Saddam’s record, arguing he wasn’t allied with terrorist organizations.
74. Schroeder on preemptive war in Iraq: No; war strains relations, shocks the oil industry; preemptive war is rarely justified; U.S. actions destroy world order, shirk international law, and fail to provide security.
75. Kagan and Kristol on preemptive war in Iraq: Yes; Saddam was a predator and aggressor; his rule would destabilize the Middle East regardless of deterrence; threat to international oil supplies; war had positive end results.