Emotivism: A Moral Theory Based on Feelings
Emotivism: A Moral Theory
Introduction
Emotivism is a moral theory that posits the foundation of moral experience not in reason, but in the feeling-qualities that people’s actions evoke in us. Though not explicitly developed by David Hume, his work can be used to characterize this relationship and understand the fundamentals of morality.
Emotivism vs. Intellectualism
Emotivism stands in opposition to moral intellectualism. The latter theory states that a necessary and sufficient condition for moral conduct is knowledge. For example, being good requires knowledge of goodness. This theory seems contrary to common experience, as many people can act badly despite knowing what is right. Emotivism aligns more closely with common sense by emphasizing the importance of feelings and emotions in moral life. Hume is its most important proponent in modern philosophy.
Hume’s Arguments for Emotivism
In Appendix I of his work “An Inquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals,” Hume presents the core thesis of emotivism and critiques moral rationalism. He begins by asking: what are the general principles of morality? To what extent do reason or feeling contribute to decisions of praise or blame? He argues that qualities deserving praise are those related to utility and the beneficial effects they bring to society and individuals.
Hume notes that, except for clear-cut cases, it is difficult to find just laws that respect the interests of all. Reason can help us determine the consequences of actions and thus plays a role in moral experience. However, Hume attempts to demonstrate that reason is insufficient. His main arguments supporting emotivism over rationalism are:
1. Morality as Fact or Relation
If reason were the foundation of morality, then morality would have to be a fact or a relationship. Reason can only judge matters of fact or relations. Hume argues that morality is not a fact. The good or bad character of an action is not an inherent property of the object being evaluated. It is not part of the description of the object’s real properties (color, shape, size, movement, etc.).
Consider this scene: gunmen force someone out of a car, drive them away, and the victim protests until, frightened, they become quiet. The gunmen force the victim to lie down. Suddenly, one of them shoots the victim in the head, and blood splatters. If we analyze this scene, do we find the good or bad character of the action? We find the movement of bodies, the colors of clothes and blood, the sounds of the victim’s protests. Objective science could describe all the real processes occurring in the situation. Physics could explain the trajectory of the bullet, biology and medicine the physical processes, but we do not find the good or bad character of the action.
This means two things: the goodness or badness of something is not a fact, and we do not see or perceive wickedness or goodness. We perceive the redness of blood, the intensity of voices, or the victim’s nervousness.
2. Relational Properties and Morality
One could argue that the criminal character of the previous action is not inherent to the individual act but emerges from its relation to other situations. However, the good or bad character of an action is not a relational property. Even when we know all the links between the people involved in an action (e.g., murder), the description of those links does not reveal the action’s goodness or badness. While new knowledge might alter our moral judgments, this is because we perceive new facts, not values. Expanding our understanding by clarifying new relationships only offers us facts, not values.
Hume notes that moral discussions require knowledge of all objects and their associations, all the circumstances of the case, before making a judgment. If any circumstances are unknown, we should suspend judgment and use our intellect to clarify them. However, it is not the unknown circumstances that lead to judgment, but feeling.
3. The Role of Sentiment in Ultimate Ends
The ultimate ends of human actions are independent of reason and stem from sentiment. Many things are desirable because they help us achieve other things, but some things must be desirable in themselves. Reason cannot determine ultimate ends. It can show us the means to achieve our goals but cannot establish what is a final goal. Something becomes a final goal when it awakens a feeling of pleasure in us. We desire things not because of reason but because of feeling and human affection, pleasure and pain.
Since virtue itself is desirable, it must awaken a feeling in us. It is this feeling, not reason, that causes us to desire virtue. Morality rests primarily on feelings. Hume believes there are moral feelings, feelings aroused in us during the perception of certain actions or qualities of people. The basic moral sense is what we call “humanity,” a positive feeling towards human happiness and resentment towards their misery. We call virtuous those actions that awaken this positive feeling and vices those that awaken the negative feeling.
Addressing Subjectivism and Relativism
One challenge to this view is that it seems to lead to subjectivism and moral relativism. Hume attempts to mitigate these consequences by distinguishing different types of feelings of liking and disliking and establishing conditions for correctly identifying moral sentiment. He also believed that all humans possess these feelings and that they appear similarly in everyone, as they arise from our nature.
Conclusion
Emotivism offers a unique perspective on morality, emphasizing the role of feelings and sentiments in our ethical judgments. While it faces challenges related to subjectivism and relativism, Hume’s work provides a framework for understanding the importance of emotions in our moral lives.