Descartes’ Meditations: Method, Doubt, and the Existence of God
Descartes’ *Meditations*: A Path to Reconstructing Reality
In his *Meditations*, Descartes presents a rationale for the method that will lead to a reconstruction of the conception of reality and knowledge. This argumentation is a complex process that can be divided into four parts:
1. Methodological Doubt
Initially, Descartes doubts all kinds of realities.
2. Hypothesis of the Evil Genius
To make possible the doubt of even the most obvious mathematical content, such as that 2 + 3 = 5, Descartes introduces the hypothesis of an evil genius or consciousness that envelops ours and whose action is to make us mistake even in elementary arithmetic operations. Thus, we can doubt the evidence we attributed to the operation 2 + 3 = 5. At this point, we have exercised doubt in a methodical way because we doubt any kind of reality and all kinds of knowledge, including even the most basic mathematical operations. However, at this time, we are simply consciousness that is doubtful about any kind of reality and knowledge.
What is there that we cannot doubt?
3. Hypothesis of the Cogito
Despite all these doubts and the deception of the evil genius, there is something we cannot doubt, and that is our own existence. This is the famous argument, “I think, therefore I am.” That which is doubtful, however, has certainty that it exists. A similar argument was described by St. Augustine, who stated that we preferentially exist if we are wrong. The observation of St. Augustine is a psychological observation, but Descartes’ argument is interrupted by an argument systematically, which commits the entire reality. While this subject now exists, as evidenced by their thoughts, what is it? Simply a consciousness filled with probably false ideas. To restore confidence in external reality, we must consider these ideas to determine whether any of them involves the real existence of its contents.
4. Idea of God
Reviewing all our ideas, we come to the conclusion that the only idea, and yet our real one, is the idea of God, as St. Anselm taught us in his grounds. It is indeed a clear and distinct idea. Therefore, God exists in reality and is the guarantee of the existence of things outside of me. That which I perceive is real, and the exercise of the method is also real, for no evil genius is capable of twisting the results of our reasoning when they follow the four rules of the method.
Analysis of the Background
Many authors have noted that Descartes’ argument is a circular argument. That is, the fundamental will of the method itself uses the method in the fourth step of grounding, which alludes to the idea of God. This idea appears as a clear and distinct one, and St. Anselm’s ontological argument is presented as an obvious argument. However, in using clarity, distinction, and evidence, Descartes unwittingly uses this method and therefore seems to beg the question. Nevertheless, this circle should not be interpreted as a logical error of Descartes but as an inevitable process when attempting to base the method. Indeed, the method, with its rules of reason, is equivalent to its foundations if we seek the foundations of reason. Reason itself is beyond reason, but there is no other instance than reason itself. In short, the ultimate foundation of all knowledge is reason, which Descartes identifies as a characteristic of human thought. Thinking is made up of ideas, some of which are innate. Moreover, to produce adventitious ideas, one must compose other ideas.
Descartes’ Ontology: Extension and Thought
Descartes’ work follows an ontology, a conception of reality strongly rooted in dualism. Indeed, his work speaks of two main types of realities: on the one hand, extension (*res extensa*), and on the other hand, thought (*res cogitans*). This is an anthropological duality that reflects the mind-body duality. On one hand, we would have extensive realities, such as bodies. On the other side, we would have another kind of reality, which is thought, whose content is ideas, which can be classified into three groups. In this dualism, animals appear as mere automatons, as described in Descartes’ thesis of the automatism of animals.