Aviation Security Transformation After 9/11 Attacks

The Aviation Industry in the Post-9/11 World

Before and After the 9/11 Attacks

  1. Unlawful acts have always been present in aviation but were traditionally low impact and low visibility.
  2. Modest security measures had been in effect since the late 1960s, but they were relatively inexpensive and tolerated.
  3. The 9/11 attacks initiated the “Global War on Terror” and led to an exponential increase in security risks, costs, and disruption to air travel.
  4. What we have now is the “new normal” for a generation or longer, so it must be understood and managed.
  5. The entire security “frame of reference” changed as a result of 9/11, and the entire world is affected and engaged.

Security: Definition and Importance

  • “Security” (in English) refers to the prevention of, or protection from, unlawful activities—not accidents. (Note: This is distinct from “safety,” which addresses accidents. The distinction can be less clear in languages like Spanish, where one term might encompass both.)
  • Unlawful acts against aviation range from minimally harmful acts of “air rage” to catastrophic terrorist attacks such as 9/11.
  • They may be “simple” criminal acts or terrorist acts.
  • In any event, they are disruptive and harmful to civil aviation.
  • “Terrorist” attacks can and have caused massive social and economic damage.
  • Our primary task is to understand and effectively manage this complex situation.

Terrorism: Key Characteristics

  • The use of “asymmetrical” threats and violence against innocent or random “third parties” to create fear in order to gain some objective, commonly political, ideological, or religious.
  • Terrorists seek to convert or destroy targets.
  • Attacks are designed for far-reaching repercussions far beyond the immediate target, often hoping for societal/governmental overreaction.
  • Conducted by organized groups, but typically non-uniformed.
  • Commonly perpetrated by non-state groups.
  • Terrorist groups cannot defeat conventional armed forces through direct confrontation.
  • Terrorism is a violation of international laws.

Asymmetric Acts: Nature and Examples

  • The use of “small” resources to achieve “large” effects, far out of proportion to the means employed.
  • For example, one suicide human bomber used to kill dozens of third-party innocents in airport terminals, stadiums, or shopping areas.
  • Another example could be using a one-ounce vial of Ebola to infect and kill hundreds or thousands of people.

Specific Objectives of the 9/11 Attacks

  • To demonstrate the ability to attack America’s symbols of power and influence.
  • To damage the U.S. economy.
  • To damage global peace and security.

Why Aviation Was Chosen as a Tool by Terrorists

  • Aircraft and aviation capture the world’s attention and imagination.
  • Air travel is a thread that connects global society.
  • Airliners have a high density of innocent victims.
  • Airliners can be viewed as huge flying “bombs.”
  • Airliners can be isolated and possess mobility, making them controllable targets once seized.
  • Airliners are very vulnerable.

Why Aviation Is a General Target for Terrorism

  • Attacks have massive effects on national and global economies.
  • They cause widespread effects on personal and business travel.
  • Each terrorist act against aviation directly and indirectly affects a huge percentage of the global population.
  • Attacks assure world attention for the terror group and its issues for a considerable time.

Economic Reasons for Targeting Aviation

  • Air transport is a pillar of the world economy.
  • Destruction of aircraft and aviation infrastructure is relatively easy for attackers and expensive for the victims.

Case Study: The 9/11 Terror Attacks

  • The Perpetrators:
    • 19 terrorists commandeered 4 U.S. airliners.
    • Weapons included “surprise,” box cutters, and possibly other small items like mace or pepper spray (original text mentioned shoelaces, which is less commonly cited for 9/11 weaponry).
  • The Targets:
    • Twin World Trade Center towers in New York City.
    • The U.S. Defense Department headquarters, “The Pentagon,” in Arlington, Virginia.
    • The U.S. Capitol Building in Washington, D.C. (believed to be the target of Flight 93, which crashed in Pennsylvania).

Fundamental Failures of Pre-9/11 Security

  • A failure of imagination.
  • A failure of policy.
  • A failure of capabilities.
  • A failure of management.
  • A failure of execution.
  • Most of these failures were, at their core, failures of “mindset.”

A Failure of Imagination

  • Not conceiving of suicide bombers being used in this manner.
  • Not envisioning aircraft as flying bombs.
  • Underestimating the use of simple, common items as weapons.
  • Not preparing for multiple hijackings simultaneously.
  • Not having protocols for loss of radio or radar contact with hijacked aircraft in such a scenario.
  • Lack of preparedness for military interception of domestic airliners.
  • Lack of clear policy on military destruction of civil airliners if necessary.

A Failure of Policy

  • Failure of the government to have an integrated and unified intelligence community.
  • Failure to account for and act upon multiple threat indicators.
  • Policy allowing short knives on passengers (a potential factor in 9/11).
  • FAA/airline policy of compliance with hijackers.
  • Lack of a comprehensive passenger screening policy, including:
    • Intelligence-based screening.
    • Profiling.
    • Thorough physical screening, searching, and inspecting.
    • A primary focus on detecting bombs rather than hijackers.
  • Having the FAA solely responsible for aviation security, potentially creating conflicting priorities.

A Failure of Capabilities

  • Regarding Security:
    • Inadequate detection and identification of rogue aircraft.
    • Slow and ineffective response to rogue civil aircraft in domestic airspace.
    • Lack of non-catastrophic means to intercept and terminate rogue aircraft.
  • Regarding Response:
    • Poor compatibility of inter-agency communications systems.
    • Insufficient capacity of communications modes during a crisis.
    • Inability to deal effectively with catastrophic building damage on such a scale.
    • Inability to handle mega-building emergency responses.

A Failure of Management

  • Regarding Security:
    • Failure of government to act on multiple threat indicators.
    • Failure of FAA officials to monitor and act on intelligence.
    • Failure of the FAA to implement many security actions as directed.
    • Failure of government to develop coordinated civil-military response policies and procedures.
  • Regarding Response:
    • Failure of New York City to have an integrated emergency response plan between the NYPD and FDNY.
    • Failure of the World Trade Center management to have adequate emergency training and drills for a mass disaster.
    • Failure of New York City to integrate 911 Center operators effectively into emergency plans.

A Failure of Execution: Security

  • Questionable passenger pre-boarding screening effectiveness.
  • Confused and ineffective NORAD (North American Aerospace Defense Command) response.
  • Failure of inter-agency intelligence exchange and dissemination, such as:
    • Information regarding foreign nationals receiving flight training in the U.S.
    • Reports of suspicious activity among pilot students.
  • Failure of the FAA and other agencies to act on solid intelligence.

A Failure of Execution: Response

  • Confusing, erroneous, and conflicting instructions issued to civilians during the attacks.
  • Underestimation and lack of appreciation for the extent of the World Trade Center damage.
  • Failure of individual civilians to respond to fear and common sense, sometimes due to over-reliance on “instructions.”

Key Issues in the 9/11 Response

  • Cell phone circuits were overloaded and became of little use.
  • Radio channels were overloaded.
  • Serious command, control, and communications (C3) problems existed, including unclear “command” responsibilities and inadequate interagency communications.
  • Key elements of all relevant agencies were not trained or included in important aspects of emergency plans (e.g., FDNY & NYPD 911 operators).
  • “First Responders,” including private citizens, played a key role in successes.
  • “Civilians” need to take personal responsibility for maximizing their probability of survival during a disaster; fear and common sense are often the best indicators.
  • Significant mindset issues were identified as a critical factor.

Characteristics of the 9/11 Attack Preparation

  • Targets were selected for maximum symbolic and actual effect.
  • The mode of attack was carefully considered and planned.
  • Potential attackers were carefully selected and vetted.
  • Elaborate reconnaissance of targets was conducted.
  • Extensive and prolonged training was undertaken by the attackers.
  • Rehearsals of the operation were conducted.
  • Airline operational methods and security vulnerabilities were observed and exploited.
  • Planners made rational changes to their plans based on observations.
  • Patience and persistence were demonstrated throughout the planning and execution phases.

Lessons Learned from Hindsight After 9/11

  • The enemy is patient, lethal, and determined.
  • Institutions protecting the U.S. did not understand the gravity of the threat and did not adjust policies, plans, and practices sufficiently to deter or defeat it.
  • Bad assumptions can lead to horrific consequences.

The Pearl Harbor Lesson (1941) for Intelligence

The “intelligence community” should:

  • Imagine how surprise attacks may be launched.
  • Identify telltale indicators that such attacks are being planned.
  • Develop and collect intelligence on such indicators.
  • Develop defenses to deflect the most dangerous possibilities, or at least provide early warning.

9/11 Commission: Identified Weaknesses

  1. Pre-screening procedures that focused on detecting potential bombers rather than hijackers.
  2. Relaxed checkpoint screening and permissive rules regarding small knives.
  3. A lack of in-flight security measures, such as air marshals and reinforced cockpit doors.
  4. An industry-wide strategy of complying with hijackers in a non-confrontational manner.
  5. A lack of protocols and capabilities for executing a coordinated FAA-military response to multiple hijackings and suicidal hijackings.

9/11 Commission: Key Recommendations

  1. Enhance passenger pre-screening.
  2. Improve measures to detect explosives on passengers.
  3. Examine human factors issues at screening checkpoints.
  4. Expedite deployment of in-line baggage screening technologies.
  5. Intensify efforts to identify, screen, and track cargo.
  6. Deploy hardened cargo containers.
  7. Institute risk-based prioritization as the basis for transportation security policy and create a strategic plan for aviation security.