Admissibility of Confessions and Discovery Statements (Evidence Act S. 30 & S. 27)

Posted on Dec 29, 2025 in Criminology

Section 30: Confession of a Co-Accused in Joint Trials

When more persons than one are being tried jointly for the same offence, and a confession made by one of those persons affecting himself and some other of those persons is proved, the court may take into consideration the confession as against the other person as well as against the person who makes the confession.

Explanation of “Offence”

“Offence” as used in this section includes the abetment of or attempt to commit the offence.

Illustrations of Section 30 Application

A and B are jointly tried for the murder of C. It is proved that A said: “B and I murdered C.” The court may consider the effect of this confession as against B.
A is on trial for the murder of C. There is evidence to show that C was murdered by A and B and that B said: “A and I murdered C.” This statement may not be taken into consideration by the court against A as B is not being jointly tried.

Principle and Scope of Section 30

This section is an exception to the general rule that a confession only affects the party making it. Under this section, where more persons than one are being jointly tried for the same offence, a confession made by one of them can be used against the other. The explanation provides that the section is applicable to the abetment of or attempts to commit the offence. (Per LP Thean JA in Goh Joon Tong v PP [1995] 3 SLR 305, 315).

Conditions for Invoking Section 30

Before the section can be invoked, the following conditions must be fulfilled:

The persons must be tried jointly for the same offence.
There must be a confession which is proved.
The confession must be one affecting the maker and the co-accused.

1. The Persons Must Be Tried Jointly for the Same Offence

The phrase ‘same offence’ in the section means identical offence. (Per Ismail Khan J in PP v Lai Pong Yuen & Ors [1968] 1 MLJ 12, 14.)

2. There Must Be a Confession That Must Be Proved

The Privy Council held in Bhuboni Sahu v The King AIR 1949 PC 257 that the section applies to confessions only and not to statements which do not admit the guilt of the confessing party. Thus, the statement must be a confession within the meaning of Section 17(2) of the Act and must have been voluntarily made.

3. The Confession Must Be One Affecting the Maker and the Co-Accused

The confession must be such that it implicates the maker substantially to the same extent as the co-accused against whom it is sought to be taken into consideration. (Per Bhargava J in Dr Jainand v Rex AIR 1949 All 291, 298.)

When the requirements of the section have been complied with, the court may take into consideration the confession as against the co-accused. (Per Mathew CJ in Yusoff v PP [1956] MLJ 47, 48-49.)

Application of Section 30: Lending Assurance

The manner in which the section must be applied was summarized by Gopal Sri Ram JCA in Juraimi bin Husin v PP [1998] 1 MLJ 537 at 580:

The evidence against an accused must be first marshaled, putting aside the confession of the co-accused.
If the court is prepared to convict on the other evidence, it may “pray in aid” the co-accused’s confession to lend assurance to the conclusion of guilt already arrived at.

If the evidence marshaled is capable of belief independently of the confession, it follows that it is unnecessary to call in aid the confession. It is therefore used to lend assurance only in cases where the court is not prepared to act on the other evidence. That was the view taken by the Federal Court (FC) in Herchun Singh & Ors v PP [1969] 2 MLJ 209 at 210 (per Ong Hock Thye CJ Malaya).

The Position of the Confession of the Co-Accused

The position was considered in PP v Dato Seri Anwar Ibrahim & Anor [2001] 3 CLJ at 381-385. The defense counsels submitted that the confession could not be used against Dato’ Seri Anwar under the circumstances of the case, bringing Section 30 into focus.

Case Analysis: PP v Dato Seri Anwar Ibrahim & Anor

The essential requirements for the application of this section, as gathered from the wording, are that there must be a joint trial for the same offence, the confession must be proved, and it must affect the maker and the co-accused. The section applies to confessions only and not to statements which do not admit the guilt of the person making the confession.

Bhuboni Sahu v The King (1949)

In Bhuboni Sahu v The King [1949] PC 257, the Privy Council considered the application of S. 30 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872 (similar to the Malaysian S. 30). Sir John Beaumont stated:

“A confession of a co-accused is obviously evidence of a very weak type … It is not required to be given on oath, nor in the presence of the accused and it cannot be tested in cross-examination … Clearly there must be other evidence. The confession is only one element in the consideration of all the facts proved in the case; it can be put into the scale and weight with the other evidence.”

The Kashmira Singh Principle (Herchun Singh)

The manner in which S. 30 of the Evidence Act 1950 must be applied was clarified in Herchun Singh. Ong Hock Thye CJ (Malaya) at p 210 adopted the interpretation of Bose J in Kashmira Singh:

First, marshal the evidence against the accused, excluding the confession altogether, and see whether a conviction could safely be based on it. If it is capable of belief independently of the confession, then it is not necessary to call the confession in aid.
But cases may arise where the judge is not prepared to act on the other evidence as it stands even though, if believed, it would be sufficient to sustain a conviction. In such an event, the judge may call in aid the confession and use it to lend assurance to the other evidence, thus fortifying himself in believing what without the aid of the confession he would not be prepared to accept.

This principle in Herchun Singh was again stressed in the FC in Yap Chai Chai & Anor v PP [1973] 1 MLJ 219.

Application in Anwar Ibrahim’s Case

The judge in Anwar Ibrahim’s case considered the other evidence adduced by the prosecution against Anwar, a co-accused, before taking into consideration the confession as against him. Apart from the confession, there was the evidence of Azizan, who testified that he was sodomized by Anwar at Sukma’s apartment as stated in the charge against him.

This evidence was not successfully challenged by the defense. The judge accepted Azizan’s evidence because of Azizan’s credibility and a ruling that Azizan is a reliable and truthful witness. His evidence is wholly reliable and capable of belief. It is indeed a very strong piece of independent evidence to prove that Anwar committed sodomy on Azizan. The judge was prepared to act on this evidence alone independently, disregarding and ignoring the confession on the principle as laid down in Herchun Singh’s case. It was not necessary for the judge to call the confession of a co-accused in aid.

The Singapore Interpretation (Chin Seow Noi)

In any event, an accused can be convicted solely on the basis of a confession by his co-accused, provided the evidence emanating from the confession satisfies the court beyond reasonable doubt of the accused’s guilt. This is the interpretation given to S. 30 of the Singapore Evidence Act by the Court of Appeal in Chin Seow Noi & Ors v PP [1994] 1 SLR 135.

This new approach adopted by the Singapore Court of Appeal is well discussed and set out in Augustine Paul’s Evidence – Practice and Procedure, 2nd ed. at p. 294. The Court of Appeal held that the natural interpretation of this section is that it allows the conviction of an accused to be sustained solely on the basis of a confession by his co-accused, provided the evidence emanating from the confession satisfies the court beyond reasonable doubt of the accused’s guilt.

Rationale for the Singapore Approach

The court held that the various Indian authorities which adopted a narrower construction must be regarded as irrelevant in Singapore because these Indian authorities were decided within the context of a law of evidence differing in material aspects from the Singaporean law of evidence. The difference lies in the definition of “evidence” in Section 3:

The Indian Evidence Act uses the phrase “Evidence means and includes” (making the definition both explanatory and exhaustive).
The Singapore Evidence Act uses only the word “includes” (making the definition extensive).

Thus, Yong Pung How CJ added at page 156:

“Within the context of our Evidence Act, ‘evidence’ may thus be given not just the narrow statutory meaning explicitly spelt out in section 3 itself but also, where applicable, its ordinary, popular and natural meaning. In other words, the scope of admissible evidence as provided for in our Evidence Act is considerably broader than that provided for in the Indian equivalent. In contrast to the situation in India, in Singapore confessions by co-accused persons may be included in the whole body of what is understood to be ‘evidence’ within the parameters set by our Evidence Act.”

This interpretation has now been consistently followed by the courts in Singapore (e.g., Abdul Rashid & Anor v PP [1994] 1 SLR 119; Lee Yuan Kwuang & Ors v PP [1995] 2 SLR 349; PP v Rozmaan, bin Jusoh & Anor [1999] 2 SLR 181).

Conclusion on S. 30 in Anwar’s Case

The judge in Anwar’s case agreed with the learned author (Augustine Paul J) that in interpreting this section, the local cases had followed the interpretation accorded to it by the Indian cases, without a consideration of the difference in meaning to the word ‘evidence’ in the Malaysian Act and the Indian Evidence Act. Augustine Paul J, in Norliana bte Sulaiman v PP [2000] 1 CLJ 36 at p. 45, stated:

“Similarly the confession of a co-accused is entitled to due consideration like any other evidence that has been proven unlike its treatment in the Indian Courts in view of their narrow definition of the word ‘evidence’.”

The judge in Anwar’s case was inclined to adopt and follow the interpretation of S. 30 by the Singapore Court of Appeal. As a result, the judge concluded that a confession by an accused is capable of standing on its own and being used against a co-accused to support a conviction, provided the evidence emanating from the confession satisfies the court beyond reasonable doubt of the accused’s guilt. The confession of the co-accused Sukma could therefore be used standing on its own against Dato Seri Anwar.

Section 27 of the Evidence Act: Discovery Statements

Admissibility of Information Leading to Discovery

Section 27: How much of information received from accused may be proved: When any fact is deposed to as discovered in consequence of information received from a person accused of any offence in the custody of a police officer, so much of that information, whether the information amounts to a confession or not, as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered may be proved.

The Nature of a Discovery Statement

When an accused in police custody gives information that leads to the discovery of a fact (e.g., a weapon), evidence can be given of so much of that information. If the information leads to discovery, it involves a physical fact (the thing was hidden) and a psychological fact (the accused knew it was there).

Locus Classicus and Principle

The locus classicus is Pulukuri Kotayya & Ors v Emp [1947] PC 67. Sir John Beaumont observed that Section 27 provides an exception to preceding prohibitions (Sections 24, 25, 26), based on the view that a discovery affords a guarantee that the information was true.

Raja Azlan Shah held in Chandrasekaran & Ors v PP [1971] 1 MLJ 153 (HC) that Section 27 is a “concession to the prosecution” and an exception to Sections 24, 25, and 26. The relationship is: Information is the “cause,” and discovery is the “consequence.”

Case Study: PP v Krishna Rao a/l Gurumurthi & Ors (2000)

Facts: Robbery and murder at Chitra Jewellers in Ipoh. Former workers broke in, stole jewels, and murdered the owner’s wife, son, and maid. Three men were arrested and made statements leading to the discovery of the dead bodies.

Ruling: The discovery of the bodies was relevant and connected to the crime because the accused knew where they were. The statement is admissible and relevant, whether it amounts to a confession or not, so long as it leads to the discovery of facts.

Meaning of “Information”

Yee Ya Mang v PP [1972] 1 MLJ 120 (HC): Information involves two ideas: the derivation of knowledge from the accused by a person in authority, and the imparting of that knowledge.
Wai Chan Leong v PP [1989] 3 MLJ 356: Gunn Chit Tuan SCJ noted the legislature used “information” rather than “statement,” including both the knowledge derived and the means taken to impart it.

Meaning of “Discovery”

Discovery connotes concealment and requires the assistance of the accused. If the police already knew the facts, it is “recovery,” not “discovery.”

PP v Liew Sam Seong [1982] 1 MLJ 223: Section 27 cannot turn an ordinary recovery into a discovery of fact.
PP v Basri bin Salihin [1993] 1 AMR 111: Sinnadurai J suggested statements should ideally be recorded contemporaneously, tape-recorded, or videotaped if possible.

Section 27 and the Issue of Voluntariness

Historical Legal Position (Pre-1995)

Before the case of Mohamed Desa, the law was clear that there was no requirement for information under Section 27 to be voluntary. The rationale behind this was that a confession is confirmed by the subsequent discovery of facts. The discovery serves as a “guarantee” of the truth of the confession.

Key Judicial Interpretations (Pre-1995)

PP v Er Ah Kiat [1966]: Raja Azlan Shah J held that even if information was given involuntarily, it remains admissible under Section 27.
Queen v Murugan Ramasamy [1964]: Viscount Radcliffe observed that the reason for allowing proof of such information is not related to the confession itself, but rather to overcome general objections regarding the reliability of such evidence.
Chandrasekaran & Ors v PP [1971]: Section 27 is described as a “concession to the prosecution.” The discovery provides the “acid test,” meaning the truth of the statement leading to it is guaranteed. Evidence is admitted based on relevancy and the direct connection of the accused to the recovered object, rather than the voluntariness of a confession.

The Shift in Mohamed Desa Hashim v PP (1995)

In this case, the accused and his brother were in police custody and gave information leading to the discovery of relevant facts. The information was initially admitted as a discovery statement under Section 27.

The Ruling: Gopal Sri Ram JCA was persuaded by counsel Karpal Singh that Section 27 is governed by Section 24. The court ruled that for information to qualify for admission under Section 27, it must have been made voluntarily. The court held that while Section 27 is an exception to Sections 25 and 26, it does not qualify the “all-pervading” requirement of voluntariness enacted in Section 24.

Mohamed Desa Hashim: The Voluntary Requirement

Gopal Sri Ram JCA ruled that S. 27 is subject to S. 24, stating that it should be the policy of the law that such discovery statements must be voluntary. He cited Vijay Kumar [1978] Crim LJ 1619, noting that S. 27 is an exception to S. 25 and S. 26, but it does not qualify the all-pervading qualification enacted in S. 24. Therefore, in order for a confession or other statement or information to qualify for admission under Section 27, it must have been made voluntarily.

Reinstatement of S. 27 as Independent: Goi Ching Ang v PP

In Goi Ching Ang v PP, a different panel of the Federal Court reinstated S. 27 as an independent provision.

Chong Siew Fai CJ stated at 524:

“… we are in complete agreement, as a matter of policy, with the view expressed in the judgment of this court in Md Desa, of the desirability as to the voluntariness of s 27 information.”

However, due to the lack of a language nexus between S. 27 on the one hand and S. 24 and comparable provisions in other enactments on the other hand, the apparent intention of the legislature, and the long line of past decisions of our courts, any departure from the entrenched judicial interpretation laid down in the above quoted and other numerous cases would be a policy decision and should, in our view, be left to the legislature.

Goi Ching Ang Conclusion

The FC, by looking at authority like Raja Azlan Shah in Chandrasekaran on S. 27 being a concession to the prosecution and an exception to S. 24-26, decided by local cases that the statement is not subject to S. 24. There is no nexus between S. 24 and S. 27. The FC did not want to disagree with Sri Ram JCA who contemplated that the statement be volunteered, but noted that there is a vested discretion in the trial judge to exclude evidence that is prejudicial to an accused even though the said evidence may be “technically admissible”.

Juraimi Husin v PP (1998) and the Voluntariness Debate

In Juraimi Husin v PP [1998] 1 MLJ 537 (CA), Juraimi and Mona Fandey hid the body of the victim. Juraimi led police to the discovery of the chopped body and made a statement under S. 27. At the Court of Appeal, Karpal Singh argued before Gopal Sri Ram JCA that since Sri Ram had decided in Md Desa that S. 27 was subject to S. 24, Juraimi’s statement leading to the discovery was not admissible. Sri Ram JCA responded: “Well, well, well. For S. 24 to apply, it must be a confession. Should make that argument before in the HC.”

The Test of Admissibility (Krishna Rao)

In PP v Krishna Rao a/l Gurumurthi & Ors [2000] 1 MLJ 274, Kang J said that while the FC was minded to leave it to the discretion of the trial judge whether to exclude any evidence that may have been obtained improperly from the accused, no yardstick was prescribed to enable the judge to decide when such evidence should be excluded. It is therefore clear that the test of admissibility of evidence under S. 27 when voluntariness is in issue is whether the prejudicial effect of its admission would outweigh its probative value.